Defendant Carter pleaded guilty in 1959 to murder in the second degree and is serving his sentence in the State prison of southern Michigan at Jackson. A motion to set aside the conviction and sentence or, in the alternative, for a new trial in the circuit court was made by him in 1965. The motion claimed that the constitutional rights of defendant were violated by failure of the prosecuting attorney to sign and file with the justice of the peace an order authorizing the issuance of the warrant under which defendant was charged and that, in the absence of such an order, the warrant was invalid. Defendant’s motion relied on the provisions of CL 1948, § 764.1 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.860) and the *28decision of this Court in People v. Holbrook (1964), 373 Mich 94.
The circuit judge denied the motion. The Court ;of Appeals denied defendant’s application for delayed appeal. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on February 11, 1966.
The undisputed fact is that the complaint filed with the justice of the peace was prepared by the prosecuting attorney. No order in writing for the issuance of a warrant was prepared or filed. The warrant wás issued by the justice of the peace. Defendant waived preliminary examination and was bound over to circuit court. An information was filed against him in the circuit court by the prosecuting attorney. Defendant was arraigned on the information and counsel was appointed for him. Upon demand of, counsel, the matter was returned to the magistrate for preliminary examination. Defendant was again bound over to circuit court. When he was arraigned on the information, on advice of counsel and after interrogation by the trial judge, he pled guilty to murder in the second degree.
Murder in the second degree is an offense not cognizable by a justice of the peace.
Where the offense is one cognizable by a justice .of the -peace the applicable statute was CLS 1961, § 774.4' (Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 28.1195).2 This 'is the section of the law which was under consideration in Holbrook. The statutory provision under consideration in this case is found in the code of criminal procedure, CL 1948, § 764.1 (Stat Ann 1954 Eev§ 28.860). Its pertinent provision is as follows:
“It shall not be lawful for any of the above named public officials, to issue warrants in any criminal *29cases, * * * until an order in writing allowing the same is filed with such public officials and signed by the prosecuting attorney for the county.”
In this present case, the question is whether action by the preparation of a written complaint by the prosecuting attorney and filing of same with the justice of the peace can be construed to satisfy the requirement of the statute.
In People v. Holbrook, in commenting on the policy behind the applicable' statute then in effect (CLS 1961, §774.4 [Stat Ann 1961 Cum Supp § 28.1195]), the majority opinion of this Court stated (p 97): .
“The policy behind the statute would appear to be to insure orderly procedure by, in the main, funnel-ling all law enforcement through the prosecuting attorney, the chief law-enforcement officer of a county. Exception is allowed in connection with traffic violations, or a complainant is permitted to proceed on his own if security for costs is filed with the justice. The filing of costs assures payment to the justice, and is also a test of the complainant’s belief in the guilt of the person accused.”
In People v. Griswold (1887), 64 Mich 722, the Court said (p 723):
“The object sought to be accomplished by that statute was to guard against the indiscretion, frequently indulged in by magistrates, in permitting legal proceedings to be instituted against parties for crime without any previous inquiry into the circumstances.”
In neither Holbrook nor Griswold did the prosecuting attorney direct the issuance of the warrant by written order or otherwise, nor did he participate in *30the proceedings until after the crucial decision to issue a warrant was made. The purpose of the statute is to require the prosecuting attorney to pass upon the issuance of a warrant before the warrant is issued.
Section 2 of the code of criminal procedure, PA 1927, No 175, being CL 1948, § 760.2 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.842), in its entirety reads as follows:
“This act is hereby declared to be remedial in character and as such shall be liberally construed to effectuate the intents and purposes thereof.”
The statute does not specify the form of “order in writing” which the prosecuting attorney is to file for issuance of warrants. The preparation of a complaint by a prosecuting attorney and the filing of the same by him with the magistrate fulfills all of the purposes of the statute. The complaint is in writing, it can be prepared only after consideration of the nature of the charged offense, it does provide orderly procedure and it does guard against indiscretion by magistrates acting without the benefit of direction from the prosecuting attorney.
The purpose of the statute having been met and the requirement of the law being that the statute be liberally construed, we find no error.
Care should be taken to note that the holding in this opinion does not return to the overruled holding in Griswold. The policy of the law was recognized in Griswold and is quoted herein even though the holding of Griswold was contrary to that policy. This opinion, in harmony with Holbrook, holds that the prosecuting attorney must signify in writing his approval of the issuance of a warrant. The preparation of the complaint in this case satisfied that requirement. The action of the circuit court in denying defendant’s motion is affirmed.
*31T. M. Kavanagh and Souris, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.Amended by PA 1965, No 307 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 28.1195).