dissenting.
I agree with the majority that motions to disqualify attorneys may raise serious ethical questions and that the legal profession’s adherence to the Code of Professional Responsibility is vital to the public’s interest in the scrupulous administration of justice. Nonetheless, I am compelled to dissent because I believe the majority improperly reaches the merits of the City of Philadelphia’s motion to disqualify. As both the trial court and the unanimous Superior Court recognized, the controlling question here is whether the City of Philadelphia, aware of the challenged attorney’s participation in this case for at least 22 months before filing its motion to disqualify, can on the eve of trial complain of that attorney’s continued participation; or whether the City may be excused for its delay because it retained new special counsel little more than two months before filing this motion. Because both questions must be answered in the negative, I would affirm the unanimous order of the Superi- or Court affirming the order of the trial court denying as untimely the City’s oral motion to disqualify.
The litigation out of which this appeal arises began over six years ago in March, 1972, when American Dredging Company (American), general contractor for the Tioga Marine Terminal Site Development, instituted an action in assumpsit against the City of Philadelphia on its own behalf and on behalf of its primary subcontractor, the Arundel Corporation. Port Corporation, a non-profit organization to which the City delegated management, design and supervi*190sion of the Tioga Terminal construction, is not a party to the action commenced by American against the City, despite the City’s attempt to join it as a co-defendant. Richard P. Brown, Jr., Esquire, a partner in the firm of Morgan, Lewis and Bockius and the challenged attorney in this appeal, entered his appearance as co-counsel for American on December 2, 1975. From commencement of suit in March, 1972, until Otis W. Erisman entered his appearance as special counsel to the City on September 9, 1976, the City was represented in this litigation by the City Solicitor’s office. While numerous other actions were instituted as a result of this original suit, it is important only to note that Port Corporation has never been a party to American’s action against the City, the action in which this appeal was taken, and neither Mr. Erisman nor the City Solicitor’s office has ever represented Port Corporation in any of the suits.
At a pre-trial conference the day trial was to begin, the City, through special counsel Mr. Erisman, moved to disqualify Richard P. Brown, Jr. and Morgan, Lewis and Bockius from participation in the American Dredging case. The City alleged it had the previous evening discovered a memorandum dated February 24, 1967, which had been in Port Corporation’s files from the outset of the litigation in 1972. The basis of the motion to disqualify was that Mr. Bracken, a partner in Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, was a member of the Executive Committee of Port Corporation and supposedly had access to confidential information of the Corporation.
American opposed the City’s motion on several grounds, including: 1) the motion was untimely filed on the day before trial without either a satisfactory explanation for the delay or a demonstration of any prejudice to the City sufficient to offset the prejudice to American from continued representation; 2) even if Port Corporation enjoyed some attorney-client privilege with Bracken, the City was not a party to that relationship; and 3) Port Corporation *191was not a party to, nor could it be affected by a judgment in, the instant litigation.*
The trial court denied the City’s motion as untimely. The parties agree that a party must file a motion to disqualify counsel with reasonable promptness and diligence after learning the relevant facts. Marco v. Dulles, 169 F.Supp. 622, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The facts indicate that: 1) the City Solicitor, both in December, 1975, when Mr. Brown entered his appearance in the case, and throughout the pendency of this litigation, was a director of Port Corporation and a member of Port Corporation’s Executive Committee, and therefore knew of the legal positions of Mr. Brown’s partner, Mr. Bracken; 2) the City Solicitor’s office never raised any objection to Mr. Brown’s representation; and 3) the memorandum containing the facts upon which the city based its motion was dated February 24, 1967, was in Port Corporation’s files from the date of its writing to the time the motion was filed nine years later, and was made available to the city during discovery.
Control of an attorney’s conduct in trial litigation is ordinarily within the discretionary supervisory powers of the trial court. Redd v. Shell Oil Company, 518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975); accord, Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 462 Pa. 138, 338 A.2d 584 (1975). The court here, in its discretion, determined that the facts did not warrant interference, at this late date, with the main litigation:
“This complex and protracted litigation commenced almost five years ago. On June 29, 1976, after a conference with all counsel, this Court entered a pre-trial Order fixing a discovery deadline of October 22, 1976, and scheduling trial for November 15, 1976. The trial date was subsequently changed to November 22, 1976.
“Despite the opportunity for discovery and other pretrial preparations since the entry of appearance by Mr. *192Brown in December of 1975, counsel for the City, on the day trial was to begin, for the first time raised the issue of a possible conflict by the instant oral motion to disqualify. As previously stated, the date for trial of this matter had been set for many months. It was estimated that eight weeks would be necessary to complete the trial, and arrangements had already been made for the calling of the many witnesses who were to testify. In light of all the attendant circumstances, it was the decision of this Court to reject the present motion as untimely made.
“We recognized that new counsel for the City had been designated as such only a few months prior thereto, and that his task of reviewing the thousands of pages of documents and correspondence relevant to this litigation was by no means an easy one. This, however, was the City’s choice, and its decision to engage new counsel three months before a scheduled trial date and about eleven months after Mr. Brown was in the case furnished no valid basis for not moving to disqualify said counsel until the date previously established for trial. This is especially true where all of the information relied upon by the City is now and has been part of its own records since prior to the initiation of these proceedings.
“Counsel for the City contends that the document upon which it founds its motion for disqualification was not discovered until November 21, 1976, one day before the scheduled commencement of trial. That document is dated February 24, 1967, and presumably has been in the City’s file for at least a period of several years. It comes with ill grace for counsel to now appear before the Court and contend that, since both present and past counsel for the City did not examine or did not grasp the significance of this document in their prior reviews of the case, counsel who has been in the case for about eleven months, participating in pre-trial preparation and discovery and concededly vital to Plaintiff, should now be disqualified.
“It has always been this Court’s intention to accommodate counsel in connection with any differences that may *193arise in the course of a litigation, so long as the request is reasonable and the interests of other parties are not prejudiced thereby. For the preceding reasons, we believe these criteria have not been met, and consequently the City’s oral motion should not be entertained.”
Given the facts of this case and the controlling principle that a motion to disqualify must be promptly filed, I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the City’s motion to disqualify and proceeding with this already protracted and complex litigation. The public’s interest in the integrity of the legal profession may still be protected for the ethical questions raised may, if necessary, be dealt with in a separate proceeding which does not interfere with the trial itself.
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion. In Redd v. Shell Oil Co., supra, the court considered an appeal from disciplinary proceedings in which the trial court imposed sanctions upon an attorney for his sponsorship of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel which the court had denied. After extensive pre-trial activity in Redd, trial was scheduled to commence on Monday, July 15, 1974. On Friday, July 12, 1974, plaintiff filed its final pre-trial memorandum. Defendant filed a motion to disqualify plaintiff’s attorney on that same day, based upon supposed breaches of Canons 4 and 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility purportedly revealed by facts set forth in plaintiff’s pre-trial memorandum. Although the court of appeals noted “there were indications at least of the existence of a conflict,” id. at 315, it did not analyze the merits of the motion, but affirmed the denial of the motion solely on the basis of its untimely presentation. The court stated:
“[I]f [defendant] had filed the motion some months prior to the date of the trial it would have merited serious attention and consideration. Why he postponed the filing until the Friday before the Monday on which the trial was to commence is inadequately explained. He maintains that it was because the proposed pre-trial order signaled *194the use of information [acquired by an associate during his former employment]. We can only say that this assertion is farfetched. It seems more likely that the motion was held in reserve until the most expedient time came along to file it. From the date that [the associate] commenced work with the . . . law firm [representing plaintiff] in early February, 1974, the fact of his employment was known and the motion could have been filed at that time.”
Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
Like the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, I recognize the trial court’s proper exercise of its discretion to uphold the integrity of the trial process by ensuring that trial be conducted as promptly and efficiently as possible. Accordingly, I would affirm the unanimous order of the Superior Court affirming the order of the trial court denying the City’s oral motion to disqualify Mr. Brown.
Because I believe the trial court properly denied the motion as untimely, I need express no opinion as to whether, even assuming that Port Corporation should be treated as a client of Mr. Bracken, the City has standing to protest Mr. Brown’s representation of American.