(dissenting). I do not agree with the majority opinion in its conclusion that there was error in the judgment because the trial court did not give consideration to the interests of the minor children in the companionship and love of the defendant mother and to her natural right to visit with them and that “provisions should have been made for either sufficient alimony or travel arrangements so as to make her visitation right a reality.” The finding of the court indicates clearly that it fully and properly considered the best interests of the two children in awarding custody to the plaintiff and that, as suggested in Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 741, 345 A.2d 48, it fully recognized the qualified right of the defendant to visit and communicate with the children and expressly provided for it in the judgment by granting custody to the plaintiff “with the right of the defendant to reasonable visitation.”
I fully agree that financial considerations and contributions may properly be considered in work*432ing out the details of the exercise of visitation rights as do a myriad of other considerations such as travel and housing arrangements, vacation and school schedules, adequate supervision of the children and the place, length and frequency of the visits. All of these are details involved in the exercise of any visitation rights. If necessary, the court may properly specify in its decree any or all of the precise details involved. In the majority of cases, however, no such specificity is necessary or desirable and it is left to the parties to work out what visitation is “reasonable.” That was the course followed by the court in this case and I find no error in it.
We cannot ignore an added complication in this case. The judgment was entered December 6, 1976. The plaintiff lives and works in Connecticut and one of the children, Julie, was living with him when the present action was started and has continued to do so since the decree awarding custody of both children to him. On the other hand, after the complaint in the present case was issued in April, 1976, thq defendant, in May, came to Connecticut and took the other child, Karen, back to California where, according to the facts reported in the defendant’s brief filed October 12, 1977, she is “a domiciliary” and “has been living in California, with her mother, since July 18, 1975.”
It is quite obvious that the provision in the court’s decree that the plaintiff should have custody and the defendant should have the right of “reasonable visitation” has, as a practical matter and viewed with the benefit of hindsight, proved not to be workable. That this portion of the decree has subsequently proved unworkable does not, *433however, establish that the judgment as and when entered was erroneous as the majority opinion concludes. Section 46-42 of the General Statutes1 expressly authorizes the Superior Court “at any time” to “make or modify any proper order relative to custody, care, education, visitation and support” of minor children entered in connection with proceedings for the dissolution of a marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
In my view, the trial court did not commit any error in granting to the defendant rights of reasonable visitation. If the parties have since been unable to agree on what is “reasonable” under the circumstances as to any elements of time, place, frequency, expense involved or any other factor entering into “reasonable visitation” and what is for the best interests of the children so that it appears that the visitation portion of the decree as it stands is unworkable, then the remedy lies in a motion in *434the trial court pursuant to § 46-42 of the General Statutes to modify the provisions of the decree in the light of those circumstances. Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 100, 328 A.2d 691.
I would find no error.
“[General Statutes] Sec. 46-42. superior court orders re custody and care OP MINOR Children. At any time after the return day of any complaint under section 46-36 and in any controversy before the superior court as to the custody or care of minor children, the court may at any time make or modify any proper order relative to custody, care, education, visitation and support of such children and may assign the custody of any of such children to either parent, or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. In making or modifying any order with respect to custody or visitation, the court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference, provided in making such initial order the court may take into consideration the causes for dissolution of the marriage or legal separation. In determining whether a child is in need of support and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide such support, the court shall take into consideration all the factors enumerated in section 46-57. When said court is not sitting, any judge thereof may, prior to any action in the premises by the court, make any such order in the cause, including orders of injunction.”