files a dissenting opinion joined by CATHELL, J.
*247Dissenting Opinion by WILNER, Judge.
1 concur in the Court’s sustaining of Bar Counsel’s exception and its overruling of Lanocha’s exception. Subject to one critical caveat, 1 agree as well that, under the facts here, a reprimand would be the appropriate sanction to be imposed. The caveat is the one that I noted in my dissent in Attorney Grievance v. Stein, 378 Md. 531, 545-49, 819 A.2d 372, 380-82 (2003). In my view, the only effective and practical way to enforce MRPC 1.8(c) is to require the errant lawyer to disgorge the fruits of his violation of the Rule by renouncing, or causing any family member who is selected as the beneficiary to renounce, the legacy obtained in violation of the Rule.
It may well be, and for purposes of this case I am willing to accept, that Mr. Lanocha’s version of what occurred is entirely accurate—that he did nothing to induce Ms. Straw to leave a substantial part of her Estate to Lanocha’s daughter and that she insisted on making that gift—but we will never really know, because Ms. Straw is dead and cannot testify. That is the problem in every one of these cases: we get only one side of the story.
The Court agrees that compliance with the Rule is mandatory and that a violation “follows inexorably” when the requirements of the Rule are not satisfied. But notwithstanding the rhetoric, it insists on making the Rule a toothless and clawless tiger by providing no effective sanction for its violation. I continue to believe, and with each new case continue to believe even more firmly, that the way to avoid violations of the Rule is “the simple expedient of requiring the lawyer, as a minimal sanction for violating the Rule, to disgorge what the lawyer wrongfully created. If lawyers know that a violation of the Rule will bring them no financial gain, they will have no incentive to violate the Rule, and that, above all else, is what will protect the public.” Id. at 548, 819 A.2d at 382.
The legacy here was not to Lanocha but to his adult daughter, and Lanocha has argued that he had no control over his daughter’s acceptance of the legacy, that it was not within his power to have her renounce it. I am unwilling to accept that as a given. For one thing, there is nothing in the record *248to indicate that he ever asked her to renounce it. A caveat was filed to the Will, and Lanocha was advised at that time by his own lawyer that what he had done was in violation of the Rule. I am deeply skeptical that, if Lanocha had informed his daughter that the result of her accepting the legacy might well be his suspension from the practice of law for violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct, she would nonetheless have insisted on accepting the legacy.
I would suspend Mr. Lanocha indefinitely.
Dissenting Opinion by BATTAGLIA, J., which CATHELL, J., joins.
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that a reprimand is commensurate with the sanctions that we have imposed in cases involving violations of Rule 1.8(c). Based on the language of Rule 1.8(c), as well as the reasoning of this Court’s opinions in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stein, 873 Md. 531, 819 A.2d 372 (2003), and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 821 A.2d 414 (2003), in which this Court ordered an indefinite suspension, I also would impose the sanction of an indefinite suspension upon Mr. Lanocha. In determining that a reprimand is appropriate, the majority distinguishes Stein and Brooke based on the fact that in both cases the attorney who prepared the will was also the beneficiary of a substantial testamentary gift.
The version of Rule 1.8(c) that was in effect at the time of Mr. Lanocha’s violation provided:
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as a parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where:
(1) the client is related to the donee; or
(2) the client is represented by independent counsel in connection with the gift.
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(c) (2004).1 As we noted in Stein:
*249The Rule is qualified in only three ways: (1) if the gift is not ‘substantial,’ (2) if the client is related to the attorney, or (3) if the client has consulted with independent counsel.
Stein, 373 Md. at 537, 819 A.2d at 375-76. This Rule makes no distinction between testamentary gifts made directly to the attorney and those made to relatives of the attorney.
The majority’s reliance on the fact that Mr. Lanocha’s daughter is an adult is misplaced. Rule 1.8(c) contains no exception for substantial gifts to adult children of the attorney. Moreover, the assumption that in order for Mr. Lanocha to benefit from the bequest to his daughter, he would have to either share in it or maintain some control over it, is flawed. Certainly, the Rule anticipated that “parents” of the lawyer would be “adults,” such that adult status should not presumptively mitigate the attorney’s violation of the Rule.
The majority also relies upon the hearing court’s determination that
[tjhere is no indication that duress or improper influence were brought to bear on Ms. Straw by Respondent or anyone else. Ms. Straw was not represented by independent counsel in connection with the will although Mr. Lanocha suggested that she consult counsel. Ms. Straw did not wish to consult an attorney she did not know nor involve a stranger in her personal affairs.
The finding of a violation of Rule 1.8(c), however, does not turn on affirmative evidence of duress or improper influence by the attorney. Rather, such improper influence is presumed merely from the fact that the attorney drafted the testamentary instrument in which either the attorney or the attorney’s relative benefitted. If the attorney advised his or her client that the client should seek independent counsel, which the client refused, and the attorney was reticent to withdraw from the undertaking because of the relationship with the client, the *250very concerns that gave rise to the prohibition are present. The closeness of the relationship with the client mandates the intervention of independent counsel to insure that the client is not being influenced by the attorney.
Furthermore, this Court has previously observed:
[although some courts have imposed a reprimand for attorneys who draft such instruments, such decisions are typically under the Canons of Professional Ethics as opposed to the more stringent Rule 1.8(c). See Florida Bar v. Miller, 555 So.2d 854 (FIa.1990); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics and Conduct v. Winkel, 541 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1995); In re Prueter, 359 N.W.2d 613 (Minn.1984); State v. Horan, 21 Wis.2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963). But see In re Mangold, 148 N.J. 76, 689 A.2d 722 (1997) (reprimanding attorney for violation of New Jersey's Rule 1.8(c) without discussion of circumstances of violation).
Stein, 373 Md. at 543-44, 819 A.2d at 379. The majority relies on two cases from other jurisdictions in support of its determination that a reprimand is appropriate: State v. Eisenberg, 29 Wis.2d 233, 138 N.W.2d 235 (1965), in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court reprimanded an attorney under the Canons of Professional Ethics for drafting a will that resulted in a substantial inheritance for the attorney’s mother; and In re Disciplinary Action Against Boulger, 637 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 2001), wherein the North Dakota Supreme Court reprimanded the attorney based on the application of the North Dakota Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which provided in the case of a conflict of interest caused by negligence that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction. Both are distinguishable from the case at bar based on the provision governing the imposition of the reprimand and provide no support for reprimanding Mr. Lanocha rather than indefinitely suspending him under our precedent.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority’s determination that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction and would impose an indefinite suspension.
Judge CATHELL joins in this dissenting opinion.
. As the majority notes, by Rules Order dated February 8, 2005, Rule 1.8(c) was revised, effective July 1, 2005. The revision does not alter *249the independent counsel requirement of prior Rule 1.8(c), nor does it distinguish between gifts made to the attorney and those made to the attorney’s relatives.