concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur with the majority’s result regarding count I, I must respectfully dissent to the result reached regarding count II.
Our supreme court has defined conduct considered “extreme and outrageous”:
“Conduct is of an extreme and outrageous character where ‘recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor [ ] and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” ’ [Citation.] Such conduct must be differentiated from the ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities’ that are part of the costs of complex society from which the law provides no protection. [Citation.] Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is judged on an objective standard based on all the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 392 (1994).
Our supreme court also previously noted that defendant’s conduct must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community. Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1992). Based upon the facts in this case, I do not believe that the conduct in the instant action rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.
Although I do not condone defendant’s actions, I do not believe that the conduct is so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all bounds of human decency. See Miller v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 181 Ill. App. 3d 954, 957 (1989). The reason for Parker’s termination, “for touching women,” an act admitted to by Parker, was only told to the employees of the bank, its officers, and management. It was not told to customers or publicized in the local newspaper. Although it may not have been necessary to disclose the reason for Parker’s termination, I do not believe that Becker’s conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous.
The decision as to where to draw the line for allowing intentional infliction of emotional distress actions “is based in large part on common sense and intuition more ‘subtle than any articulate major premise.’ ” Miller, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 957, quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76, 49 L. Ed. 937, 949, 25 S. Ct. 539, 547 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Upon reviewing the record, I do not believe that Becker’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.