(specially concurring) — While I agree with the ’result reached in the majority opinion, I cannot agree with the legal principle announced therein.
Fundamentally, this appeal presents but one proposition, a legal one. The question is: Where an existing independent consolidated school district desires to extend the limits of, or add territory to, such district, as provided for in section 274.27, Code of 1950, does chapter 276, Code of 1950, provide the sole procedure for attaining such extension ? The majority opinion says yes. With this I must respectfully disagree.
As stated in the majority opinion, the trial court reluctantly followed our recent decision in Cook v. Consolidated School District of Truro, 240 Iowa 744, 38 N.W.2d 265, wherein such a rule is pronounced. Counsel for appellee, in brief and argument, strenuously insist that such decision is not sound and ask for a reconsideration of the question involved. True, as stated in the majority opinion, all members of the court, as now constituted, who were members of the court at the time of the Truro decision, concurred therein, including myself. True, as stated therein, this court recognizes and adopts the rule of “stare decisis”, and we should ignore that rule only after very careful consideration *1281of all factors involved. As stated in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119, 60 S. Ct. 444, 451, 84 L. Ed. 604, 125 A. L. R. 1368, 1375:
“We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in tbe psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.” .
I think the Truro decision is unsound, and even at the expense of demonstrating that I am free of the taint that “consistency is the vice of little minds”, I think the Truro case should be reappraised.
At page 752 of 240 Iowa, page 269 of 38 N.W.2d, it is said: “It was the conclusion of the able trial court that in the enlargement or extension of an existing or old school district by a vote of the electors, whether the district be an independent city, town, or village school corporation, the. inevitable result with either type of school was the formation of a new school corporation, and that the proper statutory steps for forming or establishing a school corporation by vote of the electors should be followed.” At page 753 of 240 Iowa, page 270 of 38 N.W.2d, it is further stated: “The ■ conclusion of the trial court is sound and the grounds on which it is based are reasonable and logical.” In a nutshell — the annexation of territory by an existing school corporation of necessity creates a new school corporation. If this premise be sound, then the Truro decision is sound, as is also the majority opinion in the instant case for, admittedly, only by following the provisions of chapter 276, Code of 1950, may a new consolidated school district be formed.
Section 274.27, Code of 1950, provides: “Whenever it is proposed to extend the limits of, or add territory to, an existing independent city, town, or consolidated district, the voters residing within the proposed extension or addition and outside the existing independent district, shall vote separately upon the *1282proposition. The proposition must be approved by a majority of the voters voting thereon in each of such territories.” Under section 4.1(2), Code of 1950, “words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language.” Technical words and others as may require a peculiar meaning shall be so construed. Section 274.27 says — to “extend the limits of”; to “add territory to”. There is nothing technical about the words “extend” or “add to”. According to Webster, “extend” means “to enlarge, as a surface or volume; to expand; spread; amplify.” By the same authority, “add” means “to make an addition; to augment; increase” and is synonymous with “annex”. As said in Maumee School Twp. v. School, 159 Ind. 423, 425, 65 N.E. 285, 286: “The term ‘annex’ means to add or unite to something already existing.” In Black’s Law Dictionary “annexation” is thus defined:
“The act of attaching, adding, joining, or uniting one thing to another; generally spoken of the connection of a smaller or subordinate thing with a larger or principal thing. * * *. So the incorporation of newly-acquired territory into the national domain, as an integral part thereof, is called ‘annexation’, as in the case of the addition of Texas to the United States.”
Surely it cannot be contended that the annexation of Texas to the United States constituted the formation or organization of a new United States. In Independent School District v. Jones, 142 Iowa 8, 120 N.W. 315, it is said that to extend boundaries refers to changing boundaries of existing districts and not to their creation. See also Whitmire v. Cass, 213 S. C. 230, 49 S.E.2d 1; Middlesex & S. Traction Co. v. Metlar, 70 N. J. L. 98, 56 A. 142.
Section 274.16, Code of 1950, provides for changing the boundary lines of contiguous school corporations by concurrent action of the respective boards of direetoi*s. Section 274.16 contemplates two possible things: (1) Merely a change of boundary line's; (2) the absorption of one district by another district. Section 274.17 recognizes these two possibilities by referring to “change of boundary lines” and “consolidation of districts” with different provisions relative to the then boards of directors. In *1283State ex rel. Stinman v. Spellman, 191 Iowa 1181, 183 N.W. 577, we beld that boundaries of school corporations, including consolidated, might be changed under what is now section 274.16. The majority opinion quotes from this case where it is said that section 2794-a (now part of chapter 276) is also applicable and is proper procedure if it is the purpose to organize and conduct a central school, in other words, to unite two rural districts by forming a consolidated school. I find no fault with that statement. In Arnold v. Consolidated Independent Sch. Dist., 173 Iowa 199, 202, 155 N.W. 278, 279, we said: “We think it would not do to hold that the only change of boundaries of a consolidated district must be under the provisions of Section 2793 or Section 2793-a, Code Supp., 1907 [now included in chapter 274, Code of 1950].” We further said that a consolidated district formed under section 2794-a, Code Supplement of 1913 (chapter 276, Code of 1950), might again avail itself of the same provisions of law and effect a further or second consolidation. In Chambers v. Housel, 211 Iowa 314, 233 N.W. 502, we held that section 4141, Code of 1927 (now 274.23, Code of 1950), is available to a consolidated school district which wishes to extend its boundaries by adding thereto a part of the territory of an adjoining consolidated school district; that section 4133, Code of 1927 (section 274.16, Code of 1950), is not the exclusive remedy. See also Independent School Dist. v. Consolidated School Dist., 227 Iowa 707, 288 N.W. 920.
While some of the cases cited by the majority opinion, as well as herein, do not concern consolidated districts, they all deal with annexation of territory and hold that sections 274.24, 274.23 and 274.16, so far as applicable, are proper. Section 274.2 makes the provisions relative to common schools applicable to all districts “except when otherwise clearly stated, and the powers given to one form of corporation, or to a board in one kind of corporation, shall be exercised by the other in the same manner, as nearly as practicable.” We have held many times that sections 274.16, 274.23 and 274.24 are available to school districts which are not consolidated, and in State ex rel. Stinman v. Spellman, Arnold v. Consolidated Ind. Sch. Dist., and Chambers v. Housel, all supra, that they applied to consolidated *1284districts. There is nothing in chapter 276, that I can find, even hinting that such sections do not apply to consolidated districts, and certainly there is nothing theréin “which clearly states otherwise.”
In my judgment, while chapter 276 is available to a consolidated district acting under section 274.27, such chapter is not the exclusive remedy. This, as I read our decisions, has been the recognized rule up to the time of the Truro decision. The provisions of chapter 274, relative to this question, are more simple and easy to comply with than are those of chapter 276. The majority opinion says we should-not disturb such a recent pronouncement as the Truro case. If it states an erroneous legal principle the sooner it is corrected, the better. I would overrule the Truro decision in so far as it holds that chapter 276 is the exclusive remedy available. I would hold it to be merely inclusive.
As to quo warranto being the. exclusive remedy for raising the question at issue here — The majority opinion deems the issue to be the questioning of the legal corporate status of the' appellee. I deem the issue to be whether the appellee is exercising powers not conferred by law. Both questions are recognized under chapter 660, Code of 1950, as a basis for an action in the nature of Quo Warranto. In Walling v. Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 228 Iowa 503, 511, 292 N.W. 157, we quote from 51 C. J. 314 as follows: “ ‘In the absence of a valid statute conferring equitable jurisdiction, there is no concurrent remedy in equity when quo warranto is available and affords an adequate remedy.’ In State ex rel. Phillips v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 77 Iowa 648, 651, 42 N.W. 509, 510, we said:
“The allegations of the petition are clearly within the purview of the quoted provisions of the statute, by averring that the defendant, by the making of the several kinds of insurance, has been and is still offending against the laws of the state. If thus offending, it must certainly be exercising powers not conferred by law.”
The status of the appellant to bring the action is not questioned in the district court nor in the majority opinion and I *1285assume that this issue was taken care of at the pretrial conference. See State v. Winneshiek Co-Op. Burial Assn., 234 Iowa 1196, 15 N.W.2d 367. I agree that quo warranto rather than equity proceedings is the proper remedy.
. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court on the theory ■that the procedure adopted by appellee was proper and that the annexation was perfected.
Oliver, WeNNERStrum and MulroNey, JJ., join in this special concurrence.