concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority in its conclusion that our court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. In addition, I concur in the majority’s finding that the Pittsburgh Press possesses the right to intervene to vindicate its right of access to all pleadings and pretrial proceedings. However, I must dissent from the majority’s findings regarding the Pittsburgh Press’ right of access to pretrial discovery information.
After substantively evaluating the claims of the Church Parties and the Pittsburgh Press regarding access to pretrial discovery materials, the majority concludes that the trial court erred both in granting intervention to the Pittsburgh Press to assert its right of access to the discovery materials and in denying the Church Parties’ motion to seal all discovery information.
With regard to the discovery issue, Judge Fike of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County ruled that:
The motion for seal of other discovery is denied at this time as premature. If such other discovery is initiated, the parties may present objections or motions for protective orders in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, as the circumstances may warrant. Copies of all notices, interrogatories, requests and other documents shall immediately be served upon all other parties.
Trial Court Order, Dec. 23, 1988.
The trial court denied appellants’ motion to seal discovery as premature, but invited appellants to “present objections or motions for protective orders in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, as the circumstances may warrant.”
In effect, Judge Fike’s order has postponed a decision on discovery until the discovery phase is initiated and the defendants have registered a complaint. We cannot, as the trial court could not, decide the motion to seal discovery where discovery has not yet commenced. It is quite possi*519ble that in the future the court may rule in favor of a motion to seal discovery. However, until such time as the trial court makes a specific appealable ruling and the appellant is aggrieved thereby, the discovery question is not ripe for review. Thus, clearly the majority’s substantive evaluation of this issue was improper as premature. I would, therefore, affirm the trial court’s December 23, 1988 Order in its entirety.