dissenting:
I dissent from the position taken by the majority; I would reverse. Because the majority’s statement is more conclusory than factual, I present this statement of facts.
In June 1979, defendant, Alberta Peebles, and her husband, Eugene Peebles, were jointly indicted on 111 counts of theft and 1 count of conspiracy to commit theft. The conspiracy count charged as follows:
“Eugene Peebles and Alberta Peebles committed the offense of conspiracy in that they knowingly with the intent that the offense of theft of property of the State of Illinois in excess of $150.00, be committed, agreed by and between themselves to the commission of said offense, and did, as an act in furtherance of said agreement, among others, the following: on or about April 2nd, 1975, July 2nd, 1975 and August 23, 1977, Alberta Peebles falsely denied to agents of the Illinois Department of Public Aid that her husband resided with her and supported her and their family, further Eugene Peebles concealed his support of his family and his presence in the home by various deceptions and that Eugene Peebles and Alberta Peebles jointly benefited from the receipt of Illinois warrants, food stamps and medical services on hundreds of occasions from December 29, 1967 through September 20th, 1978, ***.”
The cases of the codefendants were severed, and after a jury trial Alberta was acquitted of theft but convicted of conspiracy and sentenced to two years.
On June 22, 1967, Alberta applied for public assistance because her husband had deserted her. On an ADC absent parent form, dated June 16, 1967, Alberta reported that her husband made voluntary contributions of food and paid the rent. In January 1968, the Illinois Department of Public Aid determined that Alberta and her children were in need of “substantial medical treatment.”
Between 1968 and 1976, caseworkers filled out redetermination of eligibility forms during or after visits to Alberta’s home. On the forms Alberta reported to her caseworkers that Eugene was absent. Alberta applied for food stamps on March 25,1975, and on April 7,1977.
Alberta reported to the Department of Public Aid her various addresses as follows:
Address Date
6425 South Parnell February 1966
10535 South Perry November 1971
12110 South Emerald February 26,1975
10755 South Eggleston 9106 South Harvard ' 1976
Eugene Peebles’ addresses were listed on exhibits as follows: the Parnell address was listed on an employment record dated March 27, 1968, and on the signature card for an account opened by Eugene on March 19, 1970, at the Michigan Avenue National Bank; the Perry address was listed on a signature card dated May 19, 1972, for a currency exchange, on Eugene’s employment record dated October 23, 1973, and on an account card for an account opened April 3, 1974, at the Michigan Avenue National Bank for a business owned by Eugene; the Emerald address appeared on statements issued between March 31 and June 30, 1976, for a joint account of the Peebles at the Union National Bank of Chicago and on an application for unemployment compensation for Eugene; the Harvard address appeared on an application for unemployment compensation and on Eugene’s unemployment compensation checks dated May-July 1976, on a signature card for an account opened January 13, 1976, at the Union National Bank of Chicago for a business owned by Eugene, as a change of address on the signature card for the currency exchange, and on a joint income tax return dated May 25, 1978.
The State introduced the following documents as evidence of a conspiracy between Alberta and Eugene:
1. Eight public aid checks issued to Alberta Peebles between 1969 and 1972 which were also endorsed by Eugene.
2. A mortgage dated October 12, 1971 between Eugene and Alberta Peebles and Mortgage Associates for $19,400 and signed by the Peebles for property located at 10535 South Prairie.
3. Signature card at a currency exchange. Eugene signed a signature card on May 19, 1972 and Alberta signed a card on October 22, 1973; she was authorized to cash checks for Eugene on June 14, 1976.
4. Alberta endorsed two public aid checks to one of Eugene’s business accounts in the Union National Bank on February 18-19, 1976.
5. Statements of account dated March 31-June 30, 1976 for a joint account in Alberta’s and Eugene’s name which was opened at the Union National Bank of Chicago. Five of Eugene’s unemployment checks were deposited in this account in 1976.
6. An unemployment compensation check cashed at the currency exchange was signed by Eugene and Alberta Peebles and addressed to E. Peebles at the Harvard Street residence.
7. A public aid check addressed to Alberta was endorsed by Eugene and Alberta and negotiated at the Michigan Avenue National Bank in an account maintained by Eugene.
JoAnn Cobb, a caseworker for the Illinois Department of Public Aid, testified for the State. Alberta Peebles was one of her clients. Cobb described a visit to Alberta’s house on August 11, 1977, as follows:
“I went into the home that morning and one of the children answered the door and I asked for the mother. They told me to come in. Mrs. Peebles came down the stairs. I was directed to the kitchen area which I believe would have been to my left and at that time I noticed there was a gentlemen there that was in the kitchen area preparing breakfast and Mrs. Peebles let me know that her husband had returned to the home and she was no longer in need of assistance and I should cancel her case.”
When asked to elaborate further, Cobb said:
“I came into the home. The gentleman was in the kitchen. At that time I did not know who he was but there was a striking resemblance to him and one of the children and Mrs. Peebles did advise me that she and her husband had reconciled and that he was back into the home fulltime employed. There was no need for supplement and I was to cancel the case.”
Robin Lee Kunze was qualified as a handwriting expert and testified that Alberta signed public aid checks issued to her between January 1975 and March 1976, a food stamp application dated March 25, 1975, and an affidavit, two public aid checks which she deposited in a business account of Eugene’s on February 18-19, 1976, and an unemployment compensation check issued to Eugene dated July 16,1976.
Henry Nembhard had been employed by Eugene in the latter’s accounting business in 1974 and 1975. He testified that Eugene introduced Alberta to him as his wife and that he saw her on two other occasions in 1974 when she visited Eugene’s place of business.
The State rested and Arthur Turner testified for the defense. Turner stated that he has known Eugene Peebles since 1969 but never knew him to live with Alberta.
Bobbie Richards, the Peebles’ daughter, testified that she lived ■with her mother until 1972, and her father did not live with her mother from 1967 to 1972.
In my opinion, this cause should be reversed because no act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred within the limitations period.
In Illinois, the elements of conspiracy are defined as follows:
“A person commits conspiracy when, with the intent that an offense be committed, he agrees with another to the commission of that offense. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense unless an act in furtherance of such agreement is alleged and proved to have been committed by him or by a co-conspirator.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 8 — 2(a).)
The limitation period for conspiracy is three years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 3 — 5(b).) The indictment charged that defendant committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy on April 2, 1975, July 2, 1975, and August 23, 1977. Defendant was indicted in June 1979. To come within the three-year period, the State must have alleged and proved an act in furtherance of the conspiracy between June 1976 and June 1979.
According to the majority, defendant committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy in August 1977 when she told her caseworker that she and her husband had reconciled and that she no longer needed public assistance. The majority found that defendant’s statement constituted an act in furtherance because it was an act to conceal the conspiracy by reducing or destroying the potential for detection. In People v. Meagher (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 597, 603, 388 N.E.2d 801, the court stated:
“*** [Conspiracy includes subsequent efforts at concealment, but only if those efforts are proximate in time to the commission of the principal crime. When acts or declarations directed towards concealment are distant from the commission of the offense, they are subject to such grave doubts as to their trustworthiness that they should not be admissible under the co-conspirator exception.”
I do not understand, nor does the majority satisfactorily explain, how defendant’s statement that she no longer wanted public assistance constituted an act in furtherance of a conspiracy to fraudulently procure public aid. If defendant had said that she wanted to continue receiving assistance, such a statement could be construed as an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The inference to be drawn from the majority’s ruling is that any statement made by defendant could be construed as an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The conclusion renders meaningless the concept of “an act in furtherance of a conspiracy” because the majority’s finding makes such an act out of any statement the defendant may have made. In my opinion, defendant’s statement that she no longer required public assistance was not an act in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit theft.
Further, the majority suggests that the jury concluded the defendant not only lied in stating that she and her husband had reconciled, but also that it concluded the couple resided together for the entire time defendant received public assistance. Such a suggestion is not warranted. The jury was aware that defendant received public assistance and yet concluded there was no theft. This verdict suggests to me that the jury in fact found that there was no continuous cohabitation. At best, the prosecution’s evidence suggests that at times Alberta and Eugene Peebles had the same mailing address. In my opinion, use of a mailing address over a period of years is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the addressee resides there. It merely creates an inference that the addressee may reside there.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of the trial court.