dissenting.
This case presents a horrifying, revolting factual setting: a teacher—a professional entrusted with the well-being of students-preyed on a student for sexual gratification. Yet, particularly in light of the gruesome nature of these charges, our role as judges demands that it be irrelevant whether it is personally gratifying to sustain Gilbert Young’s removal as a teacher, or personally abhorrent to retain him in that position of trust. In this case, the Court’s task is to interpret faithfully and with fidelity a statute *72duly adopted by the Legislature. If that statute is clearly written, we are obliged to enforce it as written. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 177, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) (“ ‘If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our interpretive process is over.’ ” (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195, 927 A.2d 543 (2007) (citation omitted))); Patel v. NJ Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 200 N.J. 413, 419, 982 A.2d 445 (2009) (same); Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg’l High Sell. Dist., Monmouth County, 199 N.J. 14, 24, 970 A.2d 354 (2009) (same).
The statute at issue is clear, unequivocal, and leads to an unambiguous result. It provides, in relevant part, that
[a] complaint [alleging child abuse or neglect] made against a school employee that has been classified as unfounded by the [Department of Children and Families] shall not be used against the employee foe- any pmpose relating to employment, including but not limited to, discipline, salary, promotion, transfer, demotion, retention or continuance of employment, termination of employment or any right or privilege relating to employment.
IN.J.S.A. 18A:6-7a (emphasis supplied).]
The meaning of that plain language cannot be the subject of dispute: regardless of the wisdom of the legislative choice, the Legislature has made the self-evident judgment that a child abuse or neglect complaint against a school employee classified as “unfounded” cannot—in the statute’s mandatory language, shall not— be used to discipline a school employee. And, obviously, what the Legislature has decreed cannot be done affirmatively certainly cannot be done indirectly. Yet, that is precisely the result condoned by the majority. By cloaking the disciplinary charges as “conduct unbecoming” when the charges are firmly and exclusively rooted in the original but declared-unfounded child abuse or neglect complaint, the Court has permitted that which the Legislature explicitly forbade, thus rendering that statute utterly superfluous and meaningless.
It is uncontested that a complaint alleging child abuse or neglect was made against Young. It is also uncontested that the Department of Children and Families classified that complaint as “un*73founded.” The only question remaining, then, is whether that complaint and/or the facts giving rise to it1 can be used to support disciplinary action against a teacher or whether, as unequivocally mandated by the Legislature, that complaint “shall not be used against the employee for any purpose relating to employment, including but not limited to, discipline, ... termination of employment, or any right or privilege relating to employment.” N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7a.
Seeking to avoid the inevitable, the majority struggles mightily to proclaim an ambiguity in the statute. Yet, this statute is plainly written; there is no ambiguity in it. The only obstacle to its enforcement according to its explicit terms is an understandable disquiet in the result mandated by the direct application of this straightforward and unambiguous statute, a disquiet I too share.
That said, it is not this Court’s task to decide whether a statute duly adopted by the Legislature is wise. If plainly written, it is this Court’s obligation to enforce a statute—any statute—as the Legislature has written it. Regardless of how unpalatable the result, the statute before us is clear, unequivocal and unambigu-
*74ous. Therefore, in the circumstances presented in this case, our obligation is and remains clear: the statute should be enforced as written, and its correction should be left to the Legislature, the body that created it. Said again: if the plain words of a statute fail to achieve the Legislature’s goals, it is for that branch of government to fix its own mistakes.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.2
For affirmance—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS—6.
For reversal—RIVERA-SOTO—1.
Any attempt to differentiate between a complaint and the facts giving rise to a complaint is utter sophistry; a complaint without facts is meaningless. See, e.g., R. 4:5-2 (requiring that any “pleading ... shall contain a statement of the facts on which the claim is based”); see also Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.J.Super. 22, 29-30, 465 A.2d 530 (App.Div.1983) (holding that, "[t]o be adequate, a [complaint] must contain a statement of facts on which a claim is based, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985). That, however, should not end the inquiry.
Due respect for the statute's plain language does not leave the school district powerless. If the allegations of the unfounded complaint nevertheless were sufficient to sustain Young's prosecution, the proper course was simple: a referral should have been made to the local investigative and prosecution authorities, and an ensuing independently secured conviction—an event entirely independent of the earlier unfounded abuse and neglect complaint—more than sufficiently supports tenure charges. See N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 (authorizing discipline of tenured teacher for “just cause”). That is the proper remedy here, one that avoids neutering the clear provisions of this statute by relegating it to the immaterial status of a record-purging device.
The tenure charges against Young should have been foreclosed by the application of NJ.S.A. 18A:6-7a. For that reason, there is no need to address Young’s separate—and, on this record, entirely without merit—assertion that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain the disciplinary charges.