CONCURRING OPINION BY
Judge McCullough.I concur in the result reached in part I (the Foundation carries out the governmental function of fundraising on the University’s behalf) and part II (the portion of *510minutes relating to the management of those funds are public records) of the majority opinion. I also join in parts III and IV of the majority’s opinion (relating to attorney fees and costs and standing).
However, I strongly object to the majority’s interpretation of section 506(d)(1) of the Right to Know Law, which states that:
A public record that is not in the possession of an agency but is in the possession of a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the agency, and which directly relates to the governmental function and is not exempt under this act, shall be considered a public record of the agency for purposes of this act.
65 P.S. § 67.506(d)(1). The majority concludes that “the language is plain” that all contracts entered into by a governmental entity carry out a governmental function. (Majority op. at 12-18.) Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I believe that this broad interpretation in fact ignores the plain language of the statute and instead renders the words “to perform a governmental function” mere surplusage.
I write separately because I am unable to join the concurring opinion’s analysis of the alter-ego doctrine. The fact that this issue is not before us is, I believe, significant. In my view, the suggestion that we hold an entity to be “an instrumentality” under these circumstances is unnecessary. Instead, applying the statutory terms to the facts presented, I would hold that where, as here, a private entity has contracted to perform a service for a government agency, and such service is determined to be a governmental function of the agency, records related to such service are considered public records pursuant to section 506(d)(1) of the Right to Know Law.