dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the order of the circuit court. The complaint at issue in this appeal is a one-count amended complaint that alleges that the school district and its employees were negligent in maintaining their football facility and practice field and that, as a result of this negligence, Gene was injured when he tripped on a bumper at the shot-put pit while running from the dressing room to the practice field during a summer football camp. The amended complaint further alleges that the school permitted students to participate in such activities at the football facility and on the field in question. Taking the allegations in the amended complaint as true, I find that a dismissal of the negligence count, which is the only count in the amended complaint, is proper as a matter of law because the defendants are immune from allegations of negligence pursuant to section 3 — 106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745 ILCS 10/3 — 106 (West 2008)).
The majority asserts that because the property upon which Gene was injured was located on school grounds and being used by the defendants for a summer camp, there is, at a minimum, an inference that the property in question was being used for educational purposes. In so doing, the majority misinterprets the term “educational” as it is used when evaluating whether an area of property on school grounds falls within the ambit of section 3 — 106. The Illinois Supreme Court has clearly stated that there is recreational school property and non-recreational school property. Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 383 (1995) (the sidewalk area outside the school where children were permitted to play during recess was held to be recreational as a matter of law). In addition, this court has recognized that a school complex is scattered with recreational property. Batson v. Pinckneyville Elementary School District No. 50, 294 Ill. App. 3d 832, 837 (1998).
Moreover, the case law makes clear that property can have more than one intended use and that a piece of property can be used for both educational (compulsory) and recreational (recess/extracurricular) purposes. See Ozuk v. River Grove Board of Education, 281 Ill. App. 3d 239, 244 (1996), citing Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 383. The key question in determining whether a particular area on school property falls within the purview of section 3 — 106 is whether it is permitted or intended to be used for recreational activities. See Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 383. In Ozuk, the plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell in a school gymnasium. Ozuk, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 241. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for negligence, finding that section 3 — 106 afforded the defendant immunity from those allegations. Ozuk, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 242. The appellate court reversed, finding that there was a question of material fact about whether the gymnasium was used only for compulsory physical education, in which case section 3 — 106 would be inapplicable, or whether the gymnasium was also encouraged, intended, or permitted to be used for recess, extracurricular events, or other recreational, noncompulsory activities, in which case section 3 — 106 would apply. Ozuk, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 244.
In contrast to Ozuk, the facts alleged in the amended complaint, aside from the plaintiffs conclusory allegation that the property was educational, leave no doubt that the property on which Gene was injured was permitted or intended, at least in part, to be used for extracurricular events or other noncompulsory recreational activities. Paragraph 10 of the complaint alleges that Gene was participating in a summer football camp at the defendants’ football facility at the time he was injured. Paragraph 11 alleges that the football facility also serves as a multipurpose sports venue. Paragraph 12 alleges that the property was used and intended and permitted to be used not only for physical education but also for interschool athletics, which are by their nature noncompulsory and extracurricular. Paragraph 14 alleges that Gene encountered and tripped on a bumper that was used at the shot-put pit, which paragraph 19 alleges should have been removed until track season, which is another extracurricular activity. Accordingly, whether or not the property in question is used for compulsory educational activities, the facts alleged in the complaint make clear that the property is also intended and permitted to be used for recreational purposes. For these reasons, the circuit court was correct in finding that section 3 — 106 applies to immunize the defendants from the plaintiffs cause of action based on negligence, and the majority incorrectly asserts that a dismissal of the negligence count was premature.
I also disagree with the majority’s finding that the one-count amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct. The only allegations that the amended complaint contains with regard to the proximate cause of Gene’s injury are that “[defendants negligently maintained said football facility in that it [sic] allowed said bumper to extend above ground level and to become obscured by weeds” and that “ [defendant negligently maintained said field in that it did not mow and cut the weeds so that the students would have a safe place to run[ ] or remove the bumper till track season.” (Emphasis added.) The amended complaint contains no alternative allegations of willful and wanton conduct on the part of the defendants. Furthermore, “[a] public entity may be found to have engaged in willful and wanton conduct only if it has been informed of a dangerous condition, [if it] knew others had been injured because of the condition, or if it intentionally removed a safety device or feature from property used for recreational purposes.” Dinelli v. County of Lake, 294 Ill. App. 3d 876, 884 (1998). However, the amended complaint contains no allegation that the defendants had been told that the bumper was obscured by weeds or that the defendants knew that others had been injured because of the bumper. Simply put, the amended complaint contains no allegation of willful and wanton conduct on the part of the defendants.
The majority relies upon this court’s holding in Manuel v. Red Hill Community Unit School District No. 10 Board of Education, 324 Ill. App. 3d 279 (2001), as authority for its finding that the bare allegation in paragraph 14 of the amended complaint that Gene was instructed by the coaching staff to run from the dressing room to the practice field is sufficient to support a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct. In Manuel, this court found that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct because the complaint alleged that the defendant knew of the condition of the premises and the plaintiffs physical impediment. 324 Ill. App. 3d at 288. These allegations of knowledge, both of the condition of the premises and of the plaintiffs physical impediment, were sufficient to give rise to a question of whether the defendant displayed an utter indifference or conscious disregard for the plaintiff’s safety. Manuel, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 288. Manuel does not stand for the proposition that the mere act of instructing a plaintiff in such a way that the plaintiff encounters a condition supports a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct. To expand the holding in Manuel in this way is to convert every act of instruction into willful and wanton conduct regardless of whether the instructor knew or recklessly disregarded a dangerous condition, in effect destroying the willful-and-wanton exception in the Act and allowing a cause of action for negligence despite the terms of the Act.
Finally, I also question the value of the majority’s disposition in terms of providing practical guidance to the circuit court. It seems to me that the majority disposition offers, at best, confusing direction regarding how the circuit court is to proceed in this matter.