dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I think it should be made abundantly clear at the outset that the issue here does not involve whether the psychologist *188was qualified to testify as an expert since the trial court ruled that he was so qualified. An objection had been made on behalf of appellee to the qualification and this objection was overruled. Were the opinion of the majority based upon the argument of the appellee that the trial judge had erred in his determination that the psychologist was in fact qualified — a point urged in this Court by the appellee — my view might be somewhat different.
The majority opinion here stands for the proposition that no psychologist — however well qualified — may ever express an opinion in Maryland as to whether an individual is a defective delinquent. Not only is such a holding out of step with the modern view taken by the majority of courts in this country as to the admissibility of the expert opinion of a psychologist, it is out of step with the plain implication of our earlier cases.
It is true that we have not spoken directly on the issue of whether a psychologist is competent to give an opinion on whether an individual is or is not a defective delinquent. However, in Purks v. State, 226 Md. 43, 171 A. 2d 726 (1961), a psychologist was qualified in the trial court as an expert witness. He testified as to his interview with the defendant and to the range of testings that had been made at the time. He was permitted to read to the jury the whole of a copy of his original report made, as Judge Horney put it for the Court, “in the regular course of his duties at [Patuxent institution and [which] had become a part of the permanent records of the institution — in reply to a question as to the results of such tests.” The question on appeal was “limited ... to ‘the question of the admissibility of the reports objected to.’ ” The Court said it was “contended that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the director of the institution and the psychologist to read into the evidence over objection the reports that had been prepared as a result of the examinations of and interviews with the appellant.” The Court held “that the appellant was not prejudiced by the admission of such reports as evidence.” However, in Schlatter v. Director, 238 Md. 132, 134, 207 A. 2d 653 (1965), Judge Marbury said for *189the Court, citing Purks, “We have held that reports of the Patuxent Institution and of examining psychologists are admissible in evidence in a case where the question was whether the individual was a defective delinquent.” That opinion also cited Pierson v. Director, 235 Md. 654, 202 A. 2d 644 (1964), in which it was contended that “[i]t was reversible error to admit into evidence the findings and conclusions of various members of the Patuxent Institution staff, the contents of the staff report, and the expert opinion of Dr. Boslow [(the director of the institution)] based thereon.” It was pointed out in the course of the opinion in Pierson that an examination by a psychologist was a part of the Patuxent procedure as required by statute. Judge Marbury there said for the Court that “a careful re-examination of Section 7 (a) of Article 31B leads us to the conclusion that the language contained therein is in itself sufficient to render the staff report admissible.”
I am unable to understand any difference between the qualification of an individual to express an opinion on whether an individual is or is not a defective delinquent and the qualification of an individual to express an opinion on whether an individual is legally insane at the time of the commission of a crime, the latter issue being that before the Court in State v. Tull, 240 Md. 49, 212 A. 2d 729 (1965). I agree with the majority that in that case Judge Hammond pointed out for the Court that the psychologist there proffered as a witness “gave no evidence or indication of his qualifications other than to testify that he was chief clinical psychologist at Perkins.” However, it is significant that in the course of that opinion Judge Hammond observed for the Court:
“The Courts have divided on whether a psychologist is qualified to express an opinion as to mental disease or condition, as opposed to giving factually the results of his tests on and observations of the patient. See the cases and text and law review writers referred to in the Annotation ‘Qualification of nonmedical psy*190chologist to testify as to mental condition or competency,’ 78 A.L.R.2d 919, and a full discussion of the subject and authorities in Jenkins v. United States (Ct. App. D.C. En Banc), 307 F. 2d 637, in the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions. See also 39 Minn. L. Rev. 235 and 39 Marquette L. Rev. 239, and cf. Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 217 F. 2d 818 (4th Cir.). The admissibility of opinion testimony by a psychologist generally is made to turn on the extent of the education, training and experience of the particular nonmedical psychologist offered as a witness. For example, Macdonald, Psychiatry and the Criminal, quoted in State v. Padilla (N. Mex.), 347 P. 2d 312, 318, says at p. 162:
‘It is important to be aware of the limitations as well as the merits of psychological tests. It would be unreasonable to demand of the psychologist a decision as to criminal responsibility. In some cases he may be able to answer this question but not invariably, as there is no psychological test designed to determine the criminal reponsibility of a suspect.’
Macdonald adds at p. 171: ‘The clinical psychologist is not expected to answer questions concerning the M’Naghten Rules in their application to the suspect.’
“In the Padilla case the Court reversed in part because a psychologist without sufficient education, training and experience had been permitted to give his opinion as to the áccused’s sanity and criminal responsibility. The Court said (p. 318):
‘We adopt the modern trend of authority in allowing a properly qualified psychologist to give his opinion as an expert as to the result of *191tests made by him, but that such testimony should be limited to that which the witness is qualified to offer on the basis of his professional training and experience and which he can substantiate by evidence that would be acceptable to recognized specialists in the same field. See Macdonald, supra, p. 172; Medical Trial Technique Quarterly, 1957 Annual, pp. 9-18; 39 Minnesota Law Review 235; 33 Chicago Kent Law Review 230.
According to the authorities in the field, the minimum qualifications for a psychologist before being allowed to testify as an expert is that he has had at least five years of postgraduate training in clinical psychology, has a degree of doctor of philosophy and has spent at least one year as a psychology interne in a mental hospital approved by the American Psychological Association. See Macdonald, supra, p. 162; and Medical Trial Technique Quarterly, 1957 Annual, supra.’
The Court added that occasionally a witness might be offered who did not meet these standards but who should be heard because of his ‘exceptionally broad experience and training.’
“See also Jenkins v. United States, supra, where the Court indicated a broad general agreement, without express reference, with the views expressed in Padilla, saying at p. 645 of 307 F. 2d that the proposed witness ordinarily should qualify as an opinion witness if he has a Ph.D. degree in psychology, four or more years of acceptable professional experience in diagnosis and treatment in a hospital or clinical setting in association with psychiatrists or neurologists, and is a diplómate of the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology.” Id. at 55-57.
*192In Crews v. Director, 245 Md. 174, 225 A. 2d 436 (1967), one of the issues before the Court was that the trial court had “erred in permitting Dr. Croce, the Associate Director of Patuxent and the chief of its Psychiatric Department, to testify as an expert witness concerning the applicant’s mental condition,” the basis of the objection being “that Dr. Croce was not licensed to practice medicine in the State of Maryland.” I find significant the language used by the Court in its holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony:
“The common law does not require that an expert witness on a medical subject shall be a person licensed to practice medicine. Wilson v. State, 243 Ala. 1, 8 So. 2d 422 (1942); 2 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 569 and cases cited therein. In Maryland this requirement has not been introduced by statute in respect to defective delinquent proceedings.
“We believe the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit aptly stated the proper view concerning the competency of medical experts in Jenkins v. United States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 307, 307 F. 2d 637, 644 (1962):
‘The kinds of witnesses whose opinions courts have received, even though they lacked medical training and would not he permitted by law to treat the conditions they described, are legion. The principle to be distilled from the cases is plain: if experience or training enables a proffered expert witness to form an opinion which would aid the jury, in the absence of some countervailing consideration, his testimony will be received.’
Our predecessors agreed with this principle when they defined ‘medical experts’. merely as ‘persons possessing technical knowledge in relation to matters with which the mass of mankind are supposed not to be acquainted.’ Ager v. Baltimore *193Transit Co., 213 Md. 414, 420, 132 A. 2d 469, 472 (1957).
“The crucial factors in determining the admissibility of any expert testimony is the actual experience of the witness and the probable probative value of his opinion. Provided the witness’ other professional experience qualifies him as an expert in the field of mental science and disease, he is competent to render an opinion on that subject in our courts, even though he is not licensed to practice medicine in Maryland.” (Emphasis in Crews.) Id. at 178-79.
In Hall v. Director, 245 Md. 687, 226 A. 2d 669 (1967), as correctly stated by the majority, the issue was not whether a psychologist could offer an opinion but a contention that the trial court erred “in permitting Dr. Florenzo, a staff psychologist at Patuxent, to express an opinion that the applicant was a defective delinquent, even though he failed to produce the tests upon which that opinion was based.” I find significant, however, that the court said:
“A Patuxent staff psychologist — in fact, Dr. Florenzo — has been held competent to render an opinion on the question of whether the defendant is a defective delinquent. Caplin v. Director, 244 Md. 103, 223 A. 2d 166 (1966), where, as here, his scientific competence is unchallenged.” Id. at 691.
The majority view at the present time appears to permit a properly qualified psychologist to give his opinion as to an individual’s mental health. The leading case is that of Jenkins v. United States, 307 F. 2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962), quoted and cited in Tull and Crews.
To the list of opinions set forth by the majority in footnote 2 taking the view I take here should be added Reese v. Naylor, 222 So. 2d 487, 490 (D. Ct. App. Fla. 1st D. 1969); People v. Hawthorne, 293 Mich. 15, 22-25, 291 N. W. 205 (1940) (concurring opinion joined by a majority of the court)-, State v. Padilla, 66 N. M. 289, 298, 347 P. 2d 312 (1959) *194(quoted extensively by this Court in State v. Tull, supra); Carter v. State, 376 P. 2d 351, 359-60 (Okla. Crim. 1962); Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1973); Watson v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 5, 8, 273 S.W.2d 879 (1954); and Rollins v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 575, 581, 151 S.E.2d 622 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 1026 (1967).
In the context of evaluation of whether an individual is a defective delinquent I find instructive Hidden v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 217 F. 2d 818 (4th Cir. 1954), to which the Court referred in State v. Tull, supra. The controversy there arose over permanent disability clauses in two life insurance policies. The issue was whether Hidden had become totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the policies. A psychologist was offered as a witness on behalf of the insured. He held a doctor of philosophy degree in clinical psychology. He had had experience in that field in Army hospitals. At the time of trial he was engaged in private practice and also as chief psychologist at Springfield State Hospital. He testified that in his practice patients were referred to him by psychiatrists so that patients might be subjected to a battery of psychological objective tests in order to determine and diagnose their personal problems and their emotional and nervous condition without asking the patients personal questions about themselves. One of the psychiatrists who testified for the insured said that in forming his opinion he depended in part upon the objective^ tests made by the clinical psychologist. It must be remembered that the testing of a psychologist is an integral part of the evaluation at Patuxent. Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 31B, § 7 (a). As Judge Soper put it for the court, “Upon objection, the testimony of this witness was excluded on the ground that he was not qualified as an expert, and an offer to show that in his opinion the insured is totally and permanently disabled, and was in this condition in 1949, was rejected.” He went on to say for the court:
“We think, however, that the objection to the ruling on the admissibility of the testimony of the psychologist is well taken. The uncontradicted *195evidence received at the trial tended to show that the expert was qualified in his field by academic training and by experience; and also that the objective tests which he described, although perhaps not well known to the general public, were recognized as helpful by medical experts in psychiatry. Moreover, one of the psychiatrists, whose testimony was received, based his opinion as to the condition of the insured in part upon the objective tests given by the psychologist to the insured in this case. Accordingly it is our view that the evidence should have been received, and we are unable to say that its exclusion was harmless since the expert testimony played so large a part in the trial of the case.” Id at 821.
I think the expert should be permitted to give his opinion. The weight to be accorded that opinion is for the trier of fact. Hence, I would reverse.
Judge Grady has authorized me to say that he joins in the views expressed in this opinion.