*177Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:I join in the order for remand only because I find some possible ambiguity in the record. Were it not for this, I would affirm the order of the lower court denying appellant’s petition for an increase in support.
The scope of appellate review in support proceedings is limited, and we will not disturb the lower court’s determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. Commonwealth ex rel. Hauptfuhrer v. Hauptfuhrer, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 301, 310 A.2d 672 (1973). This is especially true where the credibility of a witness is at issue, since “the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses is in a better position than the Superior Court to decide the issue on its merits.” Commonwealth ex rel. Friedman v. Friedman, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 66, 67, 297 A.2d 158, 159 (1972) (allocatur refused, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. xxxv).
Here the lower court believed appellee’s testimony, and found his net weekly income from his full-time position at Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital1 and his part-time position at the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy to be $545. The existing support order was $400 a week, or nearly 75% of appellee’s net weekly income. In the lower court’s opinion, to increase this order would have been “unreasonable, confiscatory and punitive.”
The lower court recognized that during the six-month period when appellee was working as a practicing pathologist at St. Agnes Hospital, he was earning at an annual rate of $80,143. The court did not base its order on that figure, however, because it found that that employment was temporary and that appellee had left it for valid reasons. The court stated: “... respondent testified that for sixteen years he had been primarily a *178professor of pathology, devoted to the academia [sic] aspects of medicine; that he had taken other employment for the purpose of clearing up his debts; and that after six months, having accomplished that goal, he returned to academia.”
The majority holds that the lower court abused its discretion in two respects — first, when it admitted into evidence any testimony concerning the debts of appellee and second, when it found that appellee’s testimony was credible. I cannot agree with the majority on either of these points.
It is true that when a modification of a support order is requested, the court looks at the change of financial circumstances subsequent to the entry of the order. It is also true, as the majority points out, that the debts to which appellee referred in his testimony did not arise subsequent to the entry of the order but existed at the time of entry. Thus evidence of the debts was not evidence of a change of circumstances. What the majority overlooks, however, is that evidence of the debts was not admitted as evidence of a change of circumstances but only to explain appellee’s acceptance of and resignation from employment at St. Agnes Hospital; the evidence was not used by the court to calculate the proper amount of the support order. Admission for that limited purpose was certainly proper. Appellee’s desire to pay accumulated debts was a reasonable explanation of his six-month stint at St. Agnes. Although the debts were considered in the calculation of the original support order, we should not penalize appellee for trying to pay them more quickly than the order contemplated.
The majority also challenges the credibility of appellee’s statements that he left St. Agnes after only six months because the debts were paid and he wished to return to teaching. I find no reason to disbelieve appellee.2 In fact, as the lower court states, appellee’s *179entire professional career, with the exception of those controversial six months, had been devoted to teaching.3
I do not differ with the majority’s statement of the law. The court may indeed consider the earning power of the obligor spouse as well as actual earnings, and that consideration is particularly important in cases where the obligor spouse has voluntarily left employment with an extreme reduction in pay. Commonwealth ex rel. McNulty v. McNulty, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 247, 311 A.2d 701 (1973). It is also true, however, that a support order should not be confiscatory. Commonwealth ex rel. Goichman v. Goichman, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 311, 316 A.2d 653 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Hauptfuhrer v. Hauptfuhrer, supra. Nor will temporary losses or gains justify a reduction or increase in a support order. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldenberg v. Goldenberg, 159 Pa. Superior Ct. 140, 47 A.2d 532 (1946); see also, Bell v. Bell, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 280, 323 A.2d 267 (1974). This court has never said that the wage-earner in a support proceeding must subordinate his valid professional aspirations to the financial expectations of his family. *180Commonwealth ex rel. Haimowitz v. Haimowitz, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 364, 292 A.2d 502 (1972); Weiser v. Weiser, 238 Pa. Superior Ct. 488, 496, 362 A.2d 287, 290 (1976) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Spaeth, J.). See also, Commonwealth ex rel. Burns v. Burns, 232 Pa. Superior Ct. 295, 331 A.2d 768 (1973). That is nevertheless the effect of the majority’s opinion, an effect I regard as particularly unfortunate because of the extent to which it interferes with the discretion of the lower court.
Here, the lower court, after considering appellee’s earning potential, his career history, and his career aspirations, decided that appellee’s actual earnings were a realistic and satisfactory base for an equitable support order. If one excludes for a moment the St. Agnes interval, appellee has actually increased his annual salary from the $39,700 he was earning at Temple at the time of the original support order to the $52,000 he presently earns at Hahnemann. Even if we consider the temporary St. Agnes salary, I cannot say that leaving a higher-paying job in order to teach is an irresponsible decision. $52,000 is after all a respectable annual salary. This is not a case like Commonwealth ex rel. Haley v. Haley, 199 Pa. Superior Ct. 235, 184 A.2d 155 (1962), where the husband left a higher paying position without adequate justification. Nor is it a case like Commonwealth ex rel. McNulty v. McNulty, supra, where the husband left his $155 a week job as a steelworker to become a $56.88 a week bartender.
Nevertheless I would also remand the case to the lower court for further proceedings since I find an unresolved conflict in the record as to what appellee’s net income is. Appellee testified that his net weekly earnings were $545. At that rate, his net annual salary would be $28,340. Yet appellee’s attorney stated, both at the lower court hearing and in his brief to this court, that appellee’s net annual income is $35,765. The attorney’s statements, of course, are not evidence. They are *181significant, however, because they highlight a conflict in appellee’s own testimony. According to appellee, his personal expenses monthly are $1,175 or $14,100 annually. The total of the yearly support payments ($20,800) and appellee’s personal expenses ($14,100) is $34,900. This figure more closely matches the attorney’s statement of appellee’s net annual income than does a calculation derived from appellee’s testimony as to his net weekly income.
The lower court relied on appellee’s figure, and, if that figure is right, I think the lower court’s disposition of the case is correct. If the higher figure is correct, however, the lower court should reconsider, although not necessarily change, its order. The documents appellee submitted regarding his financial condition should resolve the conflict. This court is precluded from reviewing those documents, however, since they were not made part of the record sent to this court as they should have been.
For these reasons, I would remand to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
. The lower court erroneously stated appellee’s annual salary at Hahnemann as $50,000 rather than $52,000. This did not affect its final order, however, for it was based on testimony regarding weekly income.
. I do not suggest that we may never disbelieve testimony in a *179support proceeding. When the record on its face shows the testimony to be clearly evasive or contradictory, we may find the record inadequate to support the legal conclusions of the lower court. Weiser v. Weiser, 238 Pa. Superior Ct. 488, 496, 362 A.2d 287, 290 (1976). (concurring and dissenting opinion of Spaeth, J.) We should not, however, nullify the fact-finding function of the hearing judge. Commonwealth ex rel. Harry v. Eastridge, 374 Pa. 172, 97 A.2d 350 (1953).
. The majority doubts appellee’s commitment to teaching because his duties “are not solely those of a teacher. He is also required to spend much time performing research and engaging in patient care.” Majority opinion at p. 176.
We may judicially notice that medical school professors, unlike some other graduate school professors, do not perform their teaching duties solely in the classroom. A large part of medical teaching is clinical in nature, including teaching “rounds” in the hospital, student observation of patient care, and faculty supervision of student care of patients. Furthermore, research is one of the “academic aspects of medicine.”