(dissenting). Section 7 of part 1 of the workmen’s compensation act, CLS 1956, § 411.7 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.147), provides in part as follows:
“Sec. 7. The term ‘employee’ as used in this act shall be construed to mean:
“1. Every person in the service of the State, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except any official of the State, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, elected at the polls.”
The parties in this case seek to have us determine whether or not a petit juror is a county employee within the meaning of section 7 so that if injured in the course of such service the juror would be entitled to receive disability benefits under the act.
Plaintiff fell and broke her hip as she was reporting for jury duty on the first day of the September, 1958, term of court. She had ascended the steps leading to the main floor of the Saginaw county courthouse and had passed through the vestibule when she tripped and fell, sustaining the injury. She was to receive per diem plus mileage for that day’s attendance. She did not receive it because of a rule of the Saginaw county clerk that to be paid for mileage and a day’s attendance she must reach the courtroom. The appeal board of the workmen’s compensation department affirmed a referee’s award of compensation benefits to plaintiff for her disability on the ground that she was an employee of the county within the meaning of section 7, above quoted, because she was an appointee for hire.
The questions raised in the application for leave to appeal and in the appeal itself are: Is a petit juror an employee (as that term is defined in the Michigan workmen’s compensation act) of the *652county which summoned such person for jury duty? Is interest allowable on an award under the workmen’s compensation act when the cause of action arose prior to the date of decision in Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis, 358 Mich 510?
Justice Souris in his opinion for reversal has written that one drawn and summoned as a petit juror is not a juror until he presents himself to the court for determination of his qualifications to serve. This question was not raised before the hearing-referee ; was not raised before the appeal board; and is not raised in this Court by either of the parties. The case has been argued and briefed from the beginning on the assumption plaintiff was a properly selected and lawful petit juror at the time of her injury. Plaintiff’s exhibit 4 (a questionnaire for jurors) had been completed by her and disclosed no statutory disqualification to serve as a juror.
Before determining whether a petit juror is an employee as defined in the Michigan workmen’s compensation act it is necessary to make a determination as to when a party selected becomes a juror. Looking to the various definitions as given by writers and courts, we can and do arrive at a point where we can say the existence of a juror begins.
Although we do not have in Michigan a statutory definition of the word “juror,” the statutory language seems clear that those drawn and summoned are considered to be “jurors.” CL 1948, § 602.120 (Stat Ann § 27.245), provides that the township supervisor and clerk of each township and the supervisor or assessor, as the case may be, and aldermen of each ward or assessment district in a city shall make a list of persons to serve as petit jurors for-the ensuing year. CL 1948, § 602.127 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.252), provides for the deleting of' names of persons serving during the preceding year *653and the method of selection of additional names to replace those deleted, the manner in which the comity clerk shall file the names in his office, the manner of packaging, and’ the preparation of the names for drawing.
CL 1948, § 602.128 (Stat Ann § 27.253), provides as follows:
“Sec. 128. The persons whose names shall he so returned shall serve as jurors for 1 year, and until other lists from the respective townships or wards shall he returned and filed.”
CL 1948, § 602.130 (Stat Ann § 27.255), provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Sec. 130. At least 14 days before the holding of any circuit court at which such juries shall be required by law, the clerk of the county where such court is to be held shall draw from the petit jurors the names of 24 persons, and any additional number that may have been ordered by the court, to serve as petit jurors.”
Other pertinent sections of the statute providing the qualifications of persons listed as jurors, the method of drawing jurors, notice to persons drawn, statutory exemptions, court excusal of jurors, and payment of mileage and per diem, are set forth in the footnote.*
50 CJS, Juries, § 1, p 715, defines a juror as “a man who is sworn or affirmed to serve on a jury; * * * any person selected and summoned according to law to serve in that capacity, whether or not the jury has been actually impaneled.”
In 31 Am Jur, Jury, § 3, p 9, the following is found:
*654“Judicial definitions of ‘jurors,’ ‘jurymen,’ and ‘veniremen,’ as the law dictionaries will reveal, are rare. Nevertheless, judicial and legislative usage have given these words definite meanings. The meaning of ‘jurors,’ however, varies with the context in which it occurs. Most broadly, ‘jurors’ or ‘jurymen’ means persons on the jury list or roll— all those persons in a county, city, district, or other-area listed for jury service, either permanently or1 for a definite period such as a year. However, the word is seldom used in this broad sense. Somewhat less broadly and somewhat more frequently, the word is used to mean those persons whose names have been drawn from the jury list or roll and placed in the jury wheel or box. Quite commonly, the word is employed to denote veniremen — those persons whose names are drawn from the wheel for a venire or special venire and who are summoned by a writ of venire and are thereby upon the jury panel for a term of court, or part of a term, or for choosing jurors for a particular case.”
2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (Rawle’s 3d ed), p-1769, defines “juror” as “any person selected and summoned according to law to serve in that capacity, whether the jury has been actually impaneled and sworn or not.”
In Marvin v. District Court of Polk County, 126 Iowa 355 (102 NW 119), it was held that a member of a regular jury panel, who had not been sworn to try an issue in any particular case, was a “juror” within their statute (Code [1897], §4461) giving the court power to punish for contempt an attempt to influence a juror. A similar ruling was made in State v. Maddox, 80 SC 452 (61 SE 964).
In Jackson v. Baehr, 138 Cal 266 (71 P 167), plaintiff was summoned as a regular juror. He was in attendance 13 days but only served in the jury box in the trial of cases for 3 days, the other 10 days either being excused or not impaneled upon any *655jury. He sought compensation under the statute providing fees “for each day’s attendance” for the 13 days. The county auditor opposed such action, •claiming plaintiff was only entitled to 3 days’ compensation. The California court, quoting from Mason v. Culbert, 108 Cal 247 (41 P 464), said (p 269) :
“ ‘A juror may be in attendance upon court with■out being impaneled to try any cause, and for every ■day of such attendance the statute authorizes him to be compensated. The per diem provided by the statute is not intended to be in the nature of a salary for the time he is serving as a juror, or as wages for trying a cause, but rather as a compensation for the time during which he is withdrawn from his •ordinary avocation and in actual attendance upon the court.’ ”
'The court held plaintiff was entitled to receive payment for 13 days.
In an Illinois case, People v. Newmark, 312 Ill 625 (144 NE 338), the court held the term “jurors” includes all persons selected according to law for the purpose of serving as jurors whether they have been .actually impaneled and sworn.
In City Loan & Savings Co. v. Buckley, 145 Ohio St 281 (61 NE2d 316), a case involving provision for payment and taxation of juror fees, the court said (p 284):
“The only question remaining is whether fees may be taxed for the jurors who are called and report for duty, or for only those who actually serve as members of the jury in the trial of the case.
“Throughout the provisions of the statute, * * # .all who are brought into court to serve as jurors pursuant to summons are designated ‘jurors.’ It is made the duty of the trial judge ‘to cause to be interrogated all jurors summoned for service.’ There is no word of distinction anywhere in the act be*656tween those who actually serve in the trial of the case and those who are excused after being brought into court and interrogated as to their qualifications to serve.”
In the case of United States v. Marsh (CCA 5), 106 F 474 (45 CCA 436), under statutory provisions which provided United States clerks shall receive as a fee “for administering an oath or affirmation, except to a juror, 10 cents,” the court held a clerk is-not entitled to a fee for swearing persons summoned to serve as grand or petit jurors to answer on their voir dire as to their qualifications, since the term “juror” is used in the statute in its generally accepted sense as meaning any person selected and summoned according to law to serve in that capacity. See, also, State v. McCrystol, 43 La Ann 907 (9 So 922).
We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff in the-instant case was a “juror” at the time of her injury.
We now approach the question, whether a petit juror is an employee of the county which summoned such person for jury duty (as the term is defined in the Michigan workmen’s compensation act). The-workmen’s compensation act is remedial legislation and this Court has often said its beneficial jorovisions were enacted primarily for the benefit of those engaged in pursuits subject to its provisions. See Lahti v. Fosterling, 357 Mich 578, and Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis, 358 Mich 510. The act is to be broadly and liberally interpreted. As stated by Justice Smith in the case of Kramer v. Charlevoix Beach Hotel, 342 Mich 715 (8 NCCA 3d 133), in discussing the objectives of the act (p 723) :
“In order that such act accomplish its objectives of relieving and protecting the wage earner, it is almost universally held that it should be extended ‘to include all employments and services which can reasonably be said to come under its provisions’ and *657so construed ‘that in a doubtful case an injured employee may not be deprived of the benefits of the act.’ ”
Defendants-appellants contend that the word “appointment” as used in section 7 of part 1 of the Michigan workmen’s compensation act has a special meaning in relation to public employees; that obviously a juror is not an employee by virtue of a contract of hire with the county which has summoned him; and that he is not an appointee to an employment. They argue that a person selected and summoned as a juror must attend and perform or be subject to the statutory penalty for refusal; that he has no right to decline to perform; and that a contract of employment implies freedom to accept. They rely entirely upon the Colorado case of Board of County Commissioners of the County of Eagle v. Evans, 99 Colo 83 (60 P2d 225). The referee found the plaintiff in the instant case was an employee by appointment of hire. The appeal board affirmed, calling attention to the last paragraph of section 1 of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act which, reads as follows:
“Every employee going to or from his work while on the premises where his work is to be performed, and within a reasonable. time before and after his working hours, shall be presumed to be in the course of his employment.” CLS 1956, §412.1 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.151).
See Freiborg v. Chrysler Corp., 350 Mich 104, and Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 350 Mich 92, for construction of this section.
In the Colorado case, supra, the petitioner contracted pneumonia while serving as a juror. The statute defining the term “employee” was substantially the same as that found in the Michigan act. The court held the status of a juror was not that of *658an employee serving, to quote the statute, by “appointment or contract of hire, express or implied.” The Colorado decision was followed by New Mexico in the case of Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 61 NM 52 (294 P2d 625).
The Ohio court in Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St 134 (171 NE 35, 70 ALR 1244), affirmed an award granting compensation under a similar statute. The juror in the Rogers Case, after having been dismissed for the day and while descending the stairs in the courthouse, fell and was injured. In affirming the award the court said (pp 135-139) :
“The question is a close one and is likewise a new one. Section 1465-61 [general code] quite definitely extends the benefits of the workmen’s compensation act to all persons in the service of the State or of any county ‘under any appointment or contract of hire, * * * except any official of the State, or of any county,’ and the 2 questions here presented are whether a juror is a person in the public service of the State or county under an appointment of hire, and, if so, whether he, as an official, comes within the exception of that section.
“There are many definitions of an ‘officer,’ none of which is sufficient to determine the status of every agency through which the State acts; but the outstanding characteristic common to all definitions of an officer is the possession by him of some sovereign power.
“It is the contention here of the industrial commission that a juror in Ohio is a quasi officer, because it is asserted that he performs some of the functions of a sovereign; yet it is conceded by the industrial commission that all deputies, assistants, and clerks of officers fall within the class of employees in the service of the State or county under an appointment of hire, and do not fall within the exception as to officers. We are unable to see the distinction. We recognize that jurors, as assistants to the court, find *659facts and render a verdict npon which a judgment may be entered, and the rendition of a judgment thereon authoritatively determines rights of individuals and rights of the State; but the force, authority, finality, and effectiveness of a verdict is wholly dependent upon the judgment entered thereon by the court. The hearing of evidence, the weighing of evidence, and the verdict of the jury are steps in the progress of the cause in court for determination, and essential thereto, but not more so than the filing of the pleadings and the issuing of process by a deputy clerk, and the service of process by a deputy sheriff, and may be as effectively waived; and, whatever may be said of the operative force and sovereign character of some of the acts of deputy clerks and deputy sheriffs, the verdict of a jury has no operative force until a judgment is entered thereon by the court. While the verdict of the jury contributes to the jurisdiction and power of the court to enter the judgment, the act of sovereignty, the authoritative establishment of rights, is performed by the court.
“While the exercise of the function of a juror contributes to the jurisdiction and power of the judge to perform a sovereign act, just as the performance of duty by innumerable deputies, clerks, and assistants to other officials contributes to the jurisdiction and power of such official to perform sovereign acts, it falls short of an exercise of sovereign power by its lack of power to make its verdict an independent, self-supporting finality. A juror possesses no sovereign power, and, since it is not claimed that he has any other characteristic of an officer, he is not an officer within the exception of section 1465-61, general code.
“Jurors in Ohio are selected by a jury commission; their names are placed in a wheel, and they are blindly drawn out of the jury wheel as they are needed. By their manner of drawing, an element of chance enters into their final selection, but when drawn, their selection by the jury commission be*660comes a definite appointment for such service. There is no element of chance in the mode of selection by the jury commission for deposit in the wheel. They are selected with reference to their judgment and qualifications as jurors, and with reference to their geographical location; and when they are drawn from the wheel, their definite selection is accomplished.
“We are unable to draw a distinction between the selection of a juror by the jury commission and the appointment of such juror by the jury commission; nor are we able to interpret such selection or appointment as being any the less a selection or appointment, because an element of chance enters into the determination of whether the selection or appointment of such juror shall eventually result in his being required to perform jury service. His appointment however, differs from the appointment of deputies, clerks, and assistants to other officers, in that such deputies, clerks, et cetera, are appointed to positions provided for by law, at a compensation fixed by law or in a manner provided by law, and are at liberty to accept or decline such an appointment. A juror is appointed to a position created by law, for a compensation fixed by law, but has no option to decline such appointment. Does that fact so distinguish a juror from every other public employee, other than officers, as to require a holding that, while a juror is appointed, he is not appointed for hire® For we agree with the commission that the words ‘of hire’ in section 1465-61 qualify the word ‘appointment’ as well as the word ‘contract.’
“The commission seems to have arrived at the conclusion that the appointment was not ‘of hire’ by the process of reasoning that since the juror has no option to decline the appointment, and the compensation provided for jurors is so meager that, generally speaking, it does not represent adequate compensation, he therefore does not serve for the purpose of receiving such compensation, but serves only because he cannot escape such service. While *661that process of reasoning would not operate to defeat the claimant in the instant case, since she had served beyond the compulsory period, and had hot exercised her option to decline to perforin further jury service, we do not rest our decision upon the peculiar facts of this case.
“While, theoretically, every person labors of his own free will, in reality, man labors for a reward, and accepts it, whether he ascribes his breaking of stone to a purpose to earn a wage, or a purpose to build a temple. Provision for the payment of jurors for jury service is made by law, and jurors generally accept such compensation for such service. Indeed, the State would be powerless to compel such service without affording compensation. The legislature having fixed the compensation, it does not lie within the power of an administrative body to determine that such compensation is inadequate; nor does the fact that the juror has no option to decline such appointment render the appointment any less one for hire, since theoretically the consideration provided by law for the service is adequate.”
Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed) defines “appointment” as the designation of a person to hold an office or discharge a trust. Plaintiffappellee was personally chosen and summoned to present herself in court on September 8,1958. Thus in the ordinary sense of the word she received an “appointment” to jury duty. She was asked to discharge a trust, a debt of citizenship. Words in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless from their context or from the statute it appears a different sense was intended. Hammons v. Franzblau, 331 Mich 572, 574.
Considering the broad and liberal interpretation to be applied to the Michigan workmen’s compensation act and its remedial intent, we vote in the instant case to follow the reasoning of the Ohio court *662and to affirm the appeal board’s award of compensation under the act for plaintiff’s injury.
The remaining question has to do with the allowance of interest on the award. The workmen’s compensation appeal board provided that the award would draw interest from the due date thereof until the time of payment in accordance with Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis, supra. The date of plaintiff’s injury in the instant case was September 8,1958. The date of the decision in the Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis case was January 4, 1960.
Defendants contend the statement by Justice Voelker in Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis (p 517) that “This decision shall not, however, be regarded as retroactive,” prohibits the awarding of interest on payments in a case which arose prior to the Wilson decision. We do not agree with this contention. By such provision the Court intended to prevent the reopening of cases already adjudicated. Therefore, the limitation does not apply to the present case and the appeal board properly awarded interest.
The order of the workmen’s compensation appeal board should be affirmed. Plaintiff should have costs.
Black, J., concurred with Kavanagh, J.CL 1948, § 602.121 (Stat Ann § 27.246).
CL 1948, §§ 602.131-602.135 (Stat Ann §§ 27.256-27.260).
CLS 1956, § 602.136 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.261).
CL 1948, § 602.138 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.263).
CL 194S, § 602.139 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.264).
CLS 1956, § 602.147 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.272).