(concurring). The material facts involved in this case are not in dispute. Plaintiff, a resident of the city of Saginaw, was notified, pursuant to statute, by the sheriff of Saginaw county that she had been drawn for service as a circuit court juror for the September, 1958, term. Said notice further directed that she report to the court on September 8th, at 2 o’clock in the afternoon.
Plaintiff endeavored to comply with the instructions given her by the notice, and went to the county courthouse on the date mentioned. After entering the building and prior to her reaching the courtroom, *663or the office of the county clerk, she fell and sustained a serious injury. On January 13, 1959, she filed application for hearing and adjustment of claim with the workmen’s compensation department of the State, such claim being based on the theory that on the day she received the injury in question she was an employee of the county of Saginaw. The defendants denied liability, and the case proceeded to hearing before a referee who found in plaintiff’s favor. The workmen’s compensation appeal board affirmed the award made, holding that plaintiff was an appointee for hire within the statutory definition of the term “employee” as set forth in section 7 of part 1 of the workmen’s compensation act.* Said section defines the term as including:
“Every person in the service of the State, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except any official of the State, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, elected at the polls.”
It may be noted in passing that said section specifically covers certain persons, including volunteer members of a fire department and safety patrol officers, but contains no specific reference to jurors.
From the action of the appeal board defendants, on leave granted, have appealed. The primary question at issue is stated by counsel for each of the parties as follows:
“Is a petit juror an employee (as that term is defined in the Michigan workmen’s compensation act) of the county which summons him for jury duty?”
On behalf of appellants it is contended that a juror summoned for service in the circuit court of a county *664of the State is not an employee. Emphasis is placed on the nature of the relationship created, the functions of a juror, and the fact that when summoned for service such juror is required to act as a paid of the judicial machinery of the court, in the absence of an existing reason or reasons for being excused therefrom. On behalf of appellee it is argued that the manner in which a juror is selected may be regarded as an “appointment”, and that the appeal board was correct in so holding. It is also insisted that in case of doubt an injured employee should not be deprived of the benefits of the act. Obviously this statement assumes the existence of the relationship of employer and employee which is, of course, the question at issue in the instant controversy.
A juror called and accepted for service acts as an essential part of the judicial system of the State. The service is one that may be required on the theory that it is the duty of every qualified citizen to render it when called to do so. The status of the juror is analogous in certain respects to that of one who is drafted under law into the military service of government. Under our system of selecting jurors the relationship between the county and the individual juror does not rest on contract, express or implied, but, rather, is founded on requirements of statute law. One who is summoned for such duty has no option other than to comply with the mandate served on him. His duties are prescribed by the law of the State, and he is not subject to direction by the county. The amount to be paid for jury service is, likewise, fixed pursuant to law, and is not a matter of agreement. The ordinary incidents pertaining to the relationship of employer and employee are not present. In view of the status of the juror we think that if the legislature had intended to include him in the statute and to ascribe to him the status of an ordinary employee under contract, or under an ap*665pointment which he would be at liberty to reject, specific provision to that end would have been made.
The ordinary employee who is subject to the workmen’s compensation law is limited to the recovery of benefits under the statute as the exclusive remedy against his employer, in lieu of rights of action that previously existed. CL 1948, § 411.4 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.144). If a juror is subject to the act, then such restriction is applicable notwithstanding the fact that the relationship is created under mandatory provisions of the State law. Likewise, the county on which the law imposes certain duties and obligations with reference to the functioning of the judicial system of the State, if deemed as to jurors an employer within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation act, is subject to restrictive provisions thereof. In the absence of express provisions to that end, it is a fair conclusion that the legislature did not intend that the particular relationship with which we are here concerned, created as it is by law, should be subject to the workmen’s compensation act.
The duties of a juror are concerned with the administration of the law of the State. The county, through certain designated officials, acts merely as a governmental agency for and on behalf of the State. The actual work of the juror deals with the administration of justice pursuant to law, rather than to the rendition of service to the county in which the juror serves, except as the county is a part of the State. The work of the circuit court is not limited to the trial and disposition of cases involving* the county as such, or residents of, or property within, the county, except insofar as the State-imposed liability to pay the operating expenses of the court is concerned.
We note that the workmen’s compensation appeal: board in concluding that plaintiff was “an appointee-*666for hire” did not undertake to designate what particular officer or officers made the appointment. Statutory provisions relating to the selection of jurors for service in circuit court, which apply to Saginaw county, are set forth in CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 602.120 et seq. (Stat Ann and Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.245 et seq.). Plaintiff’s name was drawn and she was notified to appear pursuant to such provisions. In accordance therewith the supervisor and township clerk of each township, and the aider-man of each ward or assessment district in a city, are required to prepare from the assessment rolls a list of citizens, having the qualifications of electors, to serve as jurors, and to forward the lists so prepared to the county clerk. Further provisions relate to the drawing of names, under certain safeguards, of men and women who shall be called for jury service at each term of court. Parties whose names are so drawn are then notified to appear at a designated place and time, as was the plaintiff in the instant case. The prescribed manner of drawing the names permits of no discretion as to who shall be called.
Plaintiff herein was not accepted for service and, in fact, did not attend the meeting in the afternoon of September 8, 1958, presumably called for the purpose of instructions by the court to the prospective jurors, and the consideration of requests to be excused from service, together with such other matters as the presiding judge of the court might raise. An “appointment” for the rendition of any service necessarily implies a consideration of the selection made, but the drawing of names taken from the lists submitted by the local officers under the Michigan statute is wholly by chance. Prior to the time that prospective jurors whose names are drawn are notified to appear the only opportunity for the exercise of discretion or judgment lies in the preparation of *667the lists of names by township or city officials. May it be said that the preparation of the lists from the assessment rolls amounts to an appointment?
Attention has been directed to the decision of the supreme court of Ohio in Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St 131 (171 NE 35, 70 ALR 1244). It was there held that one while actually serving as a juror in a county court was an employee of such county within the meaning of the Ohio workmen’s compensation act. The Ohio system for the selection of jurors differs from that of Michigan, such selection being made by a jury commission, and the court in effect found that the action of the commission in the given case amounted to an appointment for hire. The court further indicated in its opinion that the fact that the service was mandatory and for a consideration fixed by law did not prevent the application of the workmen’s compensation law of the State of Ohio to the relationship created. It does not appear that the question whether the services of the juror were in fact rendered to the county was given consideration. It may be noted in passing that this decision is the only one called to our attention in which a juror has been held to be an employee of the county in which the service was rendered. It may be noted also that in reaching the conclusion indicated the court disagreed with the position that the industrial commission of Ohio had taken.
The industrial commission of Minnesota has taken a position recently in accord with that of the Ohio commission in the case above referred to. In 2 separate proceedings involving injuries to jurors the Minnesota commission declined to accept the theory that the relation of employer and employee of the county existed. The reasons for such holding are indicated in the following excerpt from the opin*668ion in Matseh v. County of Dakota, decided October 3, 1958, quoted by appellants in their brief.
“Here we have a citizen, subject to the demands under the authority of the State or its subdivisions, to render certain services because of her citizenship. Jury duty is one of the services required of a citizen. Service in the armed forces is another. In either case, the citizen does not have the right to say T will,’ or ‘I will not’ serve. That decision is made for him by the sovereign authority.
“When one is chosen to serve as a juror he is notified of his selection and required to answer the summons by appearing in person before the court. He doesn’t say — as was said in the G-ospel — ‘I have married a wife and can’t attend’; or ‘I have bought a team of oxen and have to try them.’ No; he answers the call. If he does not appear he may be forcibly brought before the court and held in contempt.
“This procedure does not have in it the relationship of employer and employee, as contemplated by the workmen’s compensation act.
“There is a fee paid for the service of a juror, but this is not to be considered as a wage. It is merely a gratuity covering the expense that a juror may be put to in answering the call. The same relationship exists in the ease of soldiers who are called to arms. There is no relationship of employer and employee, but a response in performance of a civic duty for the privilege of enjoying his citizenship.”
The supreme court of Colorado in Board of County Commissioners of the County of Eagle v. Evans, 99 Colo 83 (60 P2d 225), held that a juror who suffered an injury while serving as such was not a county employee within the meaning of the compensation act of that State. The Colorado statute defines the term “employee”, substantially as does the Michigan act, as follows:
*669“Every person in the service of the State, or of any county * # * , under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, except an elective official of the State, or any county.”
In the opinion of the court it was said (pp 85-87)
“We cannot think the status of a juror is that of an employee serving, to quote the statute, hy ‘appointment or contract of hire, express or implied.’ Jurors are selected, summoned and serve pursuant to statute. CL 1921, §§ 5839-5849. Their compensation is fixed hy like authority. CL 1921, § 7905, as amended. SL 1929, p 425, c 119. It is true that except in instances where jury fees are taxed to parties litigant, the county must discharge that burden; but neither the service of the juror nor the obligation of the county, as we conceive, comes of appointment or contract. The county does not negotiate with a citizen for his services as a juror, nor does the citizen apply to the county for such preferment. When a citizen is summoned to jury service he responds to process running in the name of the people, which imports such dignity that it commands respect, and is of such force that none disobeys. Bj^ the majesty of the law, therefore, not by contract, he becomes a juror. Neither he nor the county is consulted as to whether, or when, he shall serve, or as to the duration of his service or the compensation therefor. A juror, it seems proper to say, has to do with the gravest affairs of men, and what he determines as to matters submitted to him is not subject to control from any source whatever. The legislative branch of the government has not said that a juror is an employee of the county, and it does not lie with the judicial branch- to belittle the functions of his great office by so declaring. Indeed, we are not at liberty to extend the statutory provisions. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 88 Colo 573 (298 P 955). Jury service, as has been said, ‘is a temporary employment from which the person is relieved as soon as the duty is *670performed. The duty to serve as a juryman is an obligation to tbe community in wbicb be resides, and his consent to serve is not essential. His position as a juryman is not the result of contract.’ The Queen v. Lui Self, 8 Haw 434. ‘A juror * * * is neither appointed nor elected to his position of duty.’ People v. Hopt, 3 Utah 396, 401 (4 P 250). Por extended discussion of general principles in varying instances, see Mann v. City of Lynchburg, 129 Va 453 (106 SE 371); Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Shaner, 127 Ohio St 366 (188 NE 559); Vaivida v. City of Grand Rapids, 264 Mich 204 (88 ALR 707); Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission, 35 Cal App 31 (169 P 260); Board of Trustees of Crutcho Township v. State Industrial Commission, 149 Okla 23 (299 P 155); Murray County v. Hood, 163 Okla 167 (21 P2d 754). We have given attention to Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St 134 (171 NE 35, 70 ALR 1244, 1248), cited by counsel for defendant in error. That is the only case of which we are advised where a juror has sought an award of compensation benefits, and there the juror prevailed. The learned court of that pronouncement is greatly to be respected, but we are not persuaded to its view of the office of a juror, or as to the genesis of his selection. In no conceivable sense, we think, is a juror engaged by or for the county by appointment, or contract of hire, or at all. He functions as part of the judicial machinery, and is as indispensable to its ongoing as is the judge of the court where he serves. The Ohio court observed that the question was ‘close,’ and reviewing it subsequently, remarked in like manner. Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Shaner, supra.”
The above decision of the Colorado court was cited and followed in Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 61 NM 52 (294 P2d 625).
We are in accord with the reasoning on which the Colorado and New Mexico decisions are based. Plaintiff was not an employee of the county of Sag*671inaw within the meaning of the term as used in the workmen’s compensation act of the State of Michigan. She was summoned under the statute for the' rendition, or possible rendition, of public service in connection with the judicial system of the State,, and her status at the time of the injury must be determined accordingly. Discussion of other questions considered by counsel in their briefs is not required.
The order of the workmen’s compensation appeal board is reversed.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, J.CLS 1956, S áll.7 (Stat Ann 1960 Eev § 17.147).