Opinion by
Jacobs, J.,This appeal follows appellant’s conviction, on December 4, 1974, of possession of a prohibited offensive weapon, 18 Pa. C.S. §908,1 following a jury trial held before Judge Wessel.
Appellant was tried on a six-count indictment. He was acquitted on charges of failure to stop at the scene of an accident, failure to identify himself at the scene of an accident, failure to render assistance at the scene of an accident, simple assault, and resisting arrest. He was convicted on the remaining charge, possession of a prohibited offensive weapon (a blackjack), and was thereafter sentenced, on January 10, 1975, to thirty days in jail and to pay a fine of $100.00. No post trial motions were filed. The facts of the case are set out in an “Agreed Statement of Facts”, Appellant’s brief at 3a-6a. In sum, appellant was charged with having passed an unmarked Monroeville Police car at a high rate of speed, and, upon being chased, to have attempted to elude the unmarked car and two marked cars, resulting in his running into one of the marked cars. The blackjack was observed in the front of appellant’s car after he was subdued. Appellant claimed he was unaware of the sirens employed or the identity of his pursuers until just before he made contact with a marked car.
Appellant’s only argument here is that the sentence imposed was excessive under the circumstances of this *537case and that the sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. He claims that the lower court failed to consider his background and other characteristics in imposing sentence, that the lower court should not have considered the charges of which he was acquitted in imposing sentence, and that he was punished on the basis of the charges of which he was acquitted.
We find no merit in appellant’s contentions. The crime of which he was convicted is a misdemeanor of the first degree, allowing imposition of a fine of $10,000.00, 18 Pa. C.S. §1101 (3),2 and imprisonment of up to five years, 18 Pa. C.S. §1104(1).3 In direct contrast to the severity of the permissible máximums, the sentence imposed was that he pay a fine of $100.00 and be imprisoned for thirty days.
It has long been established that the sentence imposed upon a convicted defendant is within the sole discretion of the sentencing judge, Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Pa. 550, 317 A.2d 250 (1974), and that the lower court’s discretion is very broad in the matter of sentencing, Commonwealth v. Cox, 441 Pa. 64, 270 A.2d 207 (1970); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 229 Pa. Superior Ct. 449, 323 A.2d 396 (1974). It is equally well-settled that an appellate court will not find an abuse of that broad discretion, providing that the sentence is within statutory limits, unless the sentence imposed is so manifestly excessive as to inflict too severe a punishment. Commonwealth v. Person, 450 Pa. 1, 297 A.2d 460 (1972); Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 275 A.2d 78 (1971); Commonwealth v. Reese, 230 Pa. Superior Ct. 471, 327 A.2d 189 (1974); Commonwealth v. Warner, 227 Pa. Superior Ct. 291, 324 A.2d 361 allocatur refused, 231 Pa. Superior Ct. xxv (1974).
*538The present sentence is well within the statutory-limits and may hardly be considered “manifestly excessive” in view of the maximum penalty allowed by law. Nor is the instant case affected by appellant’s argument that the lower court abused its discretion here by considering the other charges and by “failing to consider the background” of the appellant. First, the applicable law allows us to find an abuse of discretion on a sentence within statutory limits only where the sentence is “manifestly excessive so as to inflict too severe a punishment,” Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Superior Ct. 32, 34, 332 A.2d 521, 522 (1974), and it is not here. Second, there is authority in our case law allowing consideration of previous arrests, see Commonwealth v. Tisdale, 233 Pa. Superior Ct. 77, 334 A.2d 722 (1975); Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 203, 313 A.2d 342 (1973), and concurrent charges, see Commonwealth v. Tisdale, supra; Commonwealth v. Bilinski, 190 Pa. Superior Ct. 401, 407, 154 A.2d 322, 325 (1959), together with other factors, in imposing sentence. Lastly, Judge Wes-SEL’s opinion states that he did consider the pre-sentence report, and the record reflects that counsel for the appellant had an opportunity at the Sentence Hearing to further inform the court of appellant’s “background and characteristics.”
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1, 18 Pa. C.S. §908 (1973).
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1, 18 Pa. C.S. §1101(3) (1973).
. Act of December 6,1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1,18 Pa. C.S. §1104(1) (1973).