dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion of the court primarily for three reasons. First, the opinion assumes facts that are not in the record. Second, the opinion ignores the accepted principles of estoppel and waiver which have heretofore been the reasons assigned for not adhering to the statutory limitation periods in compensation cases. Third, the opinion in effect creates an open end statute of limitations once an estoppel has been established.
First, as a basic premise for its decision the court uses some conclusional language not supported by the record either factually or inferentially. The opinion on several occasions uses the word “misrepresentation” and assumes that the claim agent for Travelers Insurance Company misrepresented something to the claimant and “incorrectly advised claimant that $3,309.24 was the maximum figure for his disability.” There is no evidence to support either the conclusion that a misrepresentation had been made or that the advice was incorrect.
Following his injury in January 1970, the claimant returned to work on September 2, 1970. He had been paid weekly disability benefits by Travelers until he returned to work. He had been under the care of Dr. Watson, who had made periodic reports to Travelers in which he described the prognosis as “guarded” in one report and as “good” in another. Dr. Watson never advised Travelers that a fusion of one or both ankles was a possibility. After the claimant returned to work, Dr. Watson examined him on September 14, 1970, and again on December 4, 1970, and on each occasion sent reports to Travelers. In January 1971, following the December 4, 1970, report, the claim agent for Travelers contacted the claimant. Claimant never saw a doctor for his injuries thereafter until he again went to see Dr. Watson about 11 months later in December 1971. He then contacted Dr. Watson because he was still having pain in his feet and he was having difficulty walking on rough surfaces. At that time Dr. Watson told him of the possibility of a fusion on one or both feet.
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that the compensation paid to claimant in January 1971 was not full compensation for the disability that existed at that time. The claimant himself did not question the adequacy of the amount, and continued to work without consulting a doctor until December 1971. About seven months later, at the suggestion of Dr. Stuttle, to whom he had been referred, he contacted an attorney, and finally an award was made based on a 40% loss of use of the left foot and 30% loss of use of the right foot. The fact that disabilities of this extent were found to exist at that time does not indicate that a settlement based on a 1714% loss of use of both feet was not adequate for the condition that existed almost two years earlier in January 1971, which was before Dr. Watson had indicated the possibility of a fusion. It is not accurate to characterize the discussion the claim agent had with the claimant as a “misrepresentation” or to say that he incorrectly advised the claimant of the value of his claim.
My second objection to the opinion relates to its application of the principle of estoppel. The opinion relies upon Kaskaskia Constructors v. Industrial Com. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 532, and Pope v. Industrial Com. (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 560. These cases are inapposite. In each there was an alleged representation made to the claimant shortly before the statute of limitations ran. In reliance upon the representation, claimant took no action to protect the claim. In the case before us the statute of limitations did not start to run until after the alleged representation. It was on the basis of this representation that the settlement was made. The check in payment of the settlement arrived a few days later. This check constituted the last payment of compensation, and the claimant, under the statute, had one year thereafter within which to file his claim. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.6(c)(3).) No claim was filed until November 1972, about 21 months later.
In Pantle v. Industrial Com. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 365, as in this case, there was an extended delay in filing a claim. The claimant took no steps to ascertain if a written claim had to be filed to collect compensation. This court stated:
“To prevail on the theory of estoppel it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that he had relied upon some acts or representation of the respondent and had no knowledge or convenient means of knowing the true facts.” (61 Ill. 2d 365, 371.)
Thus, it is not enough for one relying on estoppel to establish only the reliance upon a representation made to him. He also must prove that he had no knowledge of the true facts or a convenient means of knowing them.
The majority opinion ignores this additional requirement, which assumes a degree of importance in cases involving extended delays as in Pantle and in this case. Here, the claimant did nothing to ascertain whether the compensation he received was adequate. Even in December 1971, when he first learned from Dr. Watson of the possibility of a fusion, he did nothing to ascertain the adequacy of his compensation even though he was still well within the limitation period. It was not until November 1972, 11 months after he learned of the possibility of a fusion and about 21 months after the last payment of compensation, that he filed his claim. He has made no attempt to show that he did not know or that he did not have a convenient means of knowing or that he was prevented from ascertaining that he had to file a claim within one year after the last payment. Nor did he attempt to show that he did not know that his disability was more extensive than that for which he had been compensated. In fact the only evidence on the subject is to the contrary, because the visit to Dr. Watson two months before the expiration of the limitation period should have alerted him to his increased disability. The majority opinion clearly ignores the, accepted requirements of estoppel as stated in Pantle. The claimant has not offered any proof which would support the principle of estoppel, and any finding by the. Industrial Commission that Travelers was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
The final reason for this dissent concerns the effect of the opinion on the statute of limitations. It appears that once a misrepresentation has been made the statute becomes open ended. How long can a person sit idly by and rely upon a representation? Here, because a claim agent told claimant that he was only entitled to so much money the statute of limitations was not a bar to a claim filed 21 months later, with no showing why, under the facts of this case, it was reasonable to permit such a delay. Presumably, the same logic would permit a claim to be filed any number of months or years after the representation relied upon. Under the statute cited above, a claim must be filed within one year from the date of injury or the last payment of compensation. It would appear logical that some restriction related to the rule of reason should be placed upon the tolling of the limitation period because of estoppel.
For the reasons stated in this dissent, the decision of the Industrial Commission should be reversed.
MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this dissent.