These are appeals by the Commonwealth from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia suppressing an incriminating statement given by the accused, Eric P. Ryles, to police and certain physical evidence seized pursuant to a warrant obtained as a result of the information provided in the statement. The suppression court determined that the statement was obtained in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 and Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977) [Hereinafter: Davenport], and that the physical evidence was the fruit of the illegally obtained statement.
The Commonwealth argues that properly interpreted Davenport does not mandate suppression of the statement or its fruits and that, even if Davenport mandates suppression of the statement, its fruits should not be suppressed.
The facts are as follows:
Police arrested Ryles without a warrant at 1:45 p. m. on June 4, 1978 at 1236 North 18th Street, Philadelphia for the homicide of Olivia Parker. He was transported to the Police Administration Building where he arrived at 2:20 p. m. At 2:55 p. m., he was advised of his constitutional rights as dictated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), which he indicated he understood and waived. He then gave the police background information, such as name, address and age. At 3:20 p. m., an interview was begun. Approximately twenty minutes later, the interviewing detective noticed certain dark stains on parts of *550Ryles’ body. As a result, the detective consulted his supervisor and a search warrant was prepared. While the warrant was being prepared, the interview continued. At approximately 5:30 p. m., Ryles admitting stabbing, but denied raping, the victim. He also advised police of the whereabouts of bloodied clothing he had secreted.
While the statement was being taken, other detectives took the search warrant to arraignment court for judicial approval. At 5:55 p. m., the court approved the warrant. At approximately 6:15 p. m., a detective telephoned the arraignment court to advise the judge that Ryles would be brought to court for a priority arraignment. A message to this effect was left for the assigned judge, and the detective was told the judge would get the message.1 At 6:55 p. m., the taking of Ryles’ statement was interrupted so that the search pursuant to the warrant could be executed. After the search concluded about 7:17 p. m., Ryles read and signed the statement.
At 7:30 p. m., Ryles was taken to arraignment court where he arrived at 7:38 p. m., or five hours and fifty-three minutes after arrest. The judge, although assigned for a eight-hour shift which began at 4:00 p. m., was not present. The judge had left the court for supper after approving the warrant, had not received the telephone message, and had not left a message where he could be located as was customary. Ryles remained in the courtroom while police searched the building and surrounding area for the judge, but he could not be located.2 Finally, at 8:08 p. m., the judge returned and arraignment took place at 8:10 p. m., or six hours and twenty-five minutes following arrest.
As a result of the statement, a second search warrant was obtained and executed. Physical evidence, particularly *551clothing, was seized as a result of the search pursuant to this warrant.
The statement and physical evidence obtained pursuant to the second warrant were ordered suppressed in the trial court. The court denied the motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the first warrant.
In Davenport, our Supreme Court, after consideration of experience with Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972) [Hereinafter: Futch ], which first announced a suppression rule as a means to enforce Pa.R.Crim.P. 130, announced a six-hour per se rule. The rule required suppression of any statement obtained between arrest and arraignment if arraignment does not occur within six hours of arrest. But, in fixing the relevant period, the court specifically stated a six-hour period would establish “a workable rule which can be readily complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances.” Davenport, supra, 471 Pa. at 286-87 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 306 n. 7. [Emphasis added.] The issue instantly is therefore whether the circumstances presented establish exigent circumstances under Davenport such that suppression is unwarranted. We rule they do.
An examination of Futch and its progeny clearly indicates the Supreme Court’s rulings to effectuate prompt arraignment had as their focus control of the conduct of police. Instantly, the police complied with Davenport when they brought Ryles to court within six hours and attempted to ensure availability of a judge. Accordingly, we hold the unavailability of the judge instantly constitutes an exigent circumstance3 and suppression under Davenport should not have been granted.
*552There can be no doubt that suppression is a drastic remedy designed to deter illegal conduct and protect an individual’s rights. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973). In particular, suppression represents a judicial response to illegal activity by those not immediately subject to the supervisory authority of the courts, i. e., an indirect sanction on those the courts cannot directly sanction which renders fruitless the illegal activity and thereby deters that activity. Instantly, the reason the arraignment did not occur within six hours was the unavailability of the judge; hence, there is no illegal activity to deter. Furthermore, even if the conduct of the judge in absenting himself should be deterred4 because it too interferes with the individual’s right to a prompt arraignment, that deterrence can be achieved by our courts through their supervisory authority without resort to suppression of evidence, which interferes with society’s interest in justice, at least where the illegality does not necessarily render the evidence unreliable as here.
We are fortified in our holding by the federal rule which, while not on all fours with Davenport, recognizes unavailability of a magistrate as a factor justifying delay in arraignment. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972) cert. denied 410 U.S. 927, 93 S.Ct. 1361, 35 L.Ed.2d 588 (1972); United States v. Del Porte, 357 F.Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y.1973) aff’d sub nom. United States v. St Jean, 483 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1973). We are also fortified *553by the Supreme Court’s references in Davenport, supra 471 Pa. at 286-87 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 306 n. 7, to the standards and goals of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice, Corrections § 4.5 (1973), and to the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 130.2 (1975) which indicate the responsibility of police is to take an accused before a judicial officer. In all respects, the police instantly complied with their responsibility within the time allowed by Davenport and the absence of the judicial officer was beyond their control.5
Even assuming the Davenport rule was not violated, Ryles contends the suppression court’s order should be affirmed because he was taken into police custody without probable cause and all evidence secured after his arrest was tainted by this initial illegality.6
“Probable cause exists if ‘the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.’ Commonwealth v. Culmer, 463 Pa. 189, 195, 344 A.2d 487, 490 (1975).”
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 473 Pa. 116, 123 n.5, 373 A.2d 1076, 1082 n.5 (1977). Further, since the suppression court found probable cause for the arrest, in reviewing the evidence to determine if the standard was met, an appellate court considers only the evidence, presented by the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as *554remains uneontradicted.7 Commonwealth v. Perkins, supra. So viewed the record establishes the following:
The body of the victim was discovered by her boy friend in her bedroom at 1236 North 18th Street at about 10:00 a. m. The bedroom which the victim occupied was located in the front of the second floor of a boarding house. There were two other bedrooms on the second floor as well as three or four on the third floor. Ryles was the occupant of the rear second-floor bedroom.
When the police arrived at the scene, the victim's body, which was obese, was on the floor and was naked except for stockings pulled down around her ankles and a cloth on the upper part of her body. She had been stabbed numerous times. She was lying on her back with her legs spread in what appeared to be blood, and a chair, as well as bedding, was stained with blood. The room was in disarray. Three footprints made with blood were observable on the floor and, given the imprint, were apparently made by sneakers.
The second floor rear bedroom, i. e. Ryles’, was also in disarray with men’s clothing thrown around and drawers open. No other rooms in the house were upset. On the floor of Ryles’ room, police found magazines and photographs depicting nude women including those of nude, obese women.
The police also learned from the victim’s sister that, at 11:00 p. m. the prior evening, she had received a phone call from the victim during which the victim told her only Ryles and the victim were present in the house because her boy friend had just left. The police also learned that, while not present at 11:00 p. m. the prior evening nor when the body was discovered, two other males resided at the hcuse. Further, the door to Ryles’ room was ajar when police arrived.
*555The police were also advised that Ryles was behind in the rent, although it was not clear to them whether the victim was necessarily connected to rent collecting or ownership.8
At 1:45 p. m., Ryles arrived at the boarding house. An officer observed he was wearing a jacket with no shirt or undershirt underneath it, pants, socks, and sneakers. The officer also observed a dark stain, although he could not observe the color, on top of one of the sneakers which led him to believe it could have been blood. The officer arrested Ryles.
Essentially, the evidence shows that a sexual attack may have been involved because of the condition and position of the victim’s body9 and Ryles’ room had pictures of nude obese women and he returned home not fully clothed; that sneakers may have been worn by the assailant and Ryles returned home with a stained sneaker; that the only two areas in disarray in the house were Ryles’ and the victim’s; and, that Ryles was the last person known to be in the house with the victim before her body was discovered.
Ryles argues this knowledge was insufficient to justify a belief in a man of reasonable caution that Ryles committed the crime. We do not agree. That Ryles may have been involved could be inferred from his attire, particularly the stained sneaker10 and the absence of a shirt, the disarray of only his and the victim’s rooms, the magazines in his room, and he being the last person known to have been with the victim prior to the slaying.
*556While, as the suppression court pointed out, no singular fact may have justified the arrest, cumulatively the facts are adequate to establish probable cause. Commonwealth v. Perkins, supra.11
The order insofar as it granted suppression is reversed, arid the record is remanded.
HOFFMAN, J., files concurring and dissenting opinion.. The message indicated a “cut-off time of 8 p.m.,” but, since the judge did not return until 8:08 p. m. and since he did not get the message, this mistake by the detective cannot be said to have caused the unavailability of the judge, discussed infra.
. The judge may have returned to the court for a brief period at 7:00 p. m.
. We do not mean to imply that the absence of any effort by the judiciary to afford prompt arraignment will also constitute an exigent circumstance. Many counties have established schedules for district judges to make themselves available and others, as in the case instantly, have established working shifts. If a case arose in which no judicial efforts were made to afford prompt arraignment by shifts, schedules, or the like, the drastic remedy of suppression might indeed be warranted because such would necessarily involve a total disregard of the right to a prompt arraignment and because such *552would show an abdication by the courts involved of their responsibility to exercise supervision over judicial activity.
. We do not suggest or imply any improper or negligent conduct was involved. But, we assume it for purposes of our ruling in order to point out that, whatever conduct of an individual member of the judiciary may be involved, the direct supervisory authority of our courts of common pleas and of the appellate courts of this Commonwealth provides an adequate vehicle to deter it without resort to suppression on a per se basis.
In fact, the judge apparently first went to supper, returned briefly, and then went for a walk.
. We need not determine if suppression of physical evidence seized as a result of a statement obtained in a violation of Davenport is warranted since the issue is rendered moot by our determination that the statement was not illegally obtained.
. The trial court ruled probable cause existed. If this was incorrect and probable cause did not exist, the order of the suppression court may not be reversed since there was a legitimate basis for its order even though an incorrect reason was assigned. Commonwealth v. Hetherington, 460 Pa. 17, 331 A.2d 205 (1975).
. To the extent specific findings of fact were made and are supported by the evidence, we must accept them. Commonwealth v. Willis, 483 Pa. 21, 394 A.2d 519 (1978).
. The record is not clear as to this, but apparently the victim either partially owned or was related to the owner or owners of the house. What is clear is that, when the victim’s boy Mend was asked if the victim had any problems or troubles, he said Ryles was two months behind in his rent. This apparently led the officer to understand the victim was involved with the rents.
. Other evidence, such as broken locks on both bedrooms involved suggested a burglary, but, contrary to the position taken in Ryles’ brief, all other possibilities need not be discounted to establish probable cause.
. Subsequent investigation has evidenced that the sneakers he wore when the attack occurred were not those he was wearing when arrested. But, this is irrelevant.
. Since we rule there was probable cause to justify the arrest, we need not explore the question of whether or not the challenged evidence was the “fruit” of the arrest.