OPINION
FOLEY, Judge.Appellant Charles Suter was charged with killing an antlerless deer in violation of Minn.Stat. § 97.48, subd. 1, and Commissioner’s Order No. 2125, section 13(e). The charge is a misdemeanor under Minn.Stat. § 97.55, subd. 1. The appellant waived his right to a jury trial. Instead, both parties submitted the matter to the trial court on stipulated facts. The trial court found the defendant acted intentionally in firing his gun in the direction of the deer, and therefore, guilty of violating the Commissioner’s Order. The trial court imposed a fine of $100 together with costs and the statutory surcharge or 10 days in the county jail and stayed the sentence pending this appeal, We affirm.
Facts
On November 7, 1982, Suter entered the woods with a valid deer license intending to hunt deer. He saw three deer enter the surrounding area, realizing one to be an antlerless deer. He watched as two of the deer, a buck and a doe, came into view, with the smallest deer not in sight. He fired once at the buck, however, his shot killed the antlerless deer. Suter did not hold a permit to kill an antlerless deer.
Issue
Do the stipulated facts sustain the trial court’s finding that Suter had the intent necessary to hold him criminally liable for the killing of an antlerless deer without a permit in violation of Minn.Stat. § 97.48, subd. 1, and Commissioner’s Order No. 2125, § 13(e)?
Analysis
The Minnesota legislature has delegated general powers to the Commissioner of Natural Resources including the following:
The Commissioner may extend protection to any species of wild animal in addition to that accorded by chapters 97 to 102, by further limiting or closing open seasons, areas of the state, or by reducing limits with respect to any or all areas of the state, whenever he finds such action necessary to guard against undue depletion or extinction, or to promote the propagation and reproduction of such animals.
Minn.Stat. § 97.48, subd. 1. Consistent with constitutional requirements, a legislature must establish a “reasonably clear policy or standard of action” to guide the agency’s exercise of discretion. Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 311, 126 N.W.2d 778, 780 (1964).
Here, the relevant statute identifies the means by which the commissioner may extend such protection as “further limiting *374or closing open seasons, areas of the state, or * * * reducing limits with respect to any or all areas of the state * * *.” Minn.Stat. § 97.48, subd. 1. Additionally, that statute requires the commissioner to find “such action necessary to guard against undue depletion or extinction, or to promote the propagation and reproduction of such animals.” Minn.Stat. § 97.48, subd. 1.
The language of Minn.Stat. § 97.48, subd. 1, provides a sufficient “standard of action” to guide the commissioner. Pursuant to his authority, the commissioner promulgated Order No. 2125, Minn.Admin. Reg. 438 (1982). Section 13(e) of that order stated in part that “[ajnyone who shoots at or kills an antlerless deer must have an antlerless permit for the permit area in which the antlerless deer is taken.” Commissioner’s Order No. 2125, 7 Minn.Admin. Reg. 438, 450 (1982).
The legislature established further guidelines when it provided that:
Except as specifically permitted in chapters 97 to 102, no person may take, buy, sell, transport, or possess any protected wild animals of this state * * * without first procuring a license therefor as provided in section 98.46 or in section 98.48.
Minn.Stat. § 98.45, subd. 1. The legislature also classified a violation of any provisions in Chapters 97 to 102 or of a commissioner’s order as a misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. § 97.55, subd. 1. We hold that the legislature’s delegation of authority to the commissioner and the commissioner’s promulgation of Order No. 2125, complies with constitutional requirements.
Here, the language of the relevant statutory provisions and commissioner’s order mentions no intent requirement. In the absence of any language of intent, Minn. Stat. § 97.48, subd. 1, and Commissioner’s Order No. 2125, § 13(e) do not require any showing of specific intent.
Substantial case law supports the principle that “the legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal without regard to the intention, knowledge or motive of the doer.” State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191, 114 N.W.2d 88, 89 (1962); State v. O’Heron, 250 Minn. 83, 85, 83 N.W.2d 785, 786 (1957). Furthermore, the legislature has power to define what acts constitute criminal conduct and power to prescribe punishment for such acts. State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn.1978).
The Minnesota Supreme Court discussed this principle in Kremer. That court noted that:
It is not essential that the wrongdoer should intend to commit the crime to which his act amounts, but it is essential that he should intend to do the act which constitutes the crime.
Kremer, 262 Minn, at 191, 114 N.W.2d at 89 (citing 5 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 2409). In Kremer, the defendant was charged with driving through a “red flashing” light in violation of a city ordinance. The trial court had found the defendant (1) could not stop as his car brakes failed to operate, (2) had experienced no prior brake trouble, and (3) had no knowledge that his brakes were defective. On the grounds that the only relevant issue was whether the defendant did the act, however, the trial court found the defendant guilty. Kremer, 262 Minn, at 191, 114 N.W.2d at 89.
The Kremer court analyzed the rationale for imposing absolute liability in criminal cases. That court noted that:
[E]ven though a person does not criminally intend the harm caused by his acts, he “usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities.”
State v. Kremer, 262 Minn, at 191, 114 N.W.2d at 89 (1962), (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256, 72 S.Ct. 240, 246, 96 L.Ed. 288, 297 (1952)).
Recognizing that the facts showed “no negligence and no intent to do the act which turned out to be criminal,” the Kremer court refused to sustain the defendant’s conviction. Under such circumstances, that court noted that the rationale of imposing absolute liability does not ap*375ply. State v. Kremer, 262 Minn, at 191, 114 N.W.2d at 89.
In discussing this concept of absolute liability, the Kremer court indicated that if the defendant in that case had gone through a stop light that he did not see, “a court could be justified in finding him guilty of a violation of the ordinance involved. When the driver intends to proceed forward, or is negligent in any way, he can be held liable for his acts.” Kremer, 262 Minn, at 192, 114 N.W.2d at 89.
Here, although Suter did not intend the resulting harm, he undisputably intended to fire his gun in the direction of the deer. When one is hunting for deer and shoots in the direction of deer known to be in the area, he risks liability for shooting a deer for which he has no permit. The necessary intent is supplied by the intentional firing of the gun.
Policy reasons support this conclusion. The United States Supreme Court recognized that public welfare may make it necessary to declare certain acts a crime, irrespective of the actor's intent. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68, 30 S.Ct. 663, 666, 54 L.Ed. 930, 935 (1910). The facts of that case involved the use and expiration of a permit to cut timber. The Shevlin court noted that:
When the permit was issued, plaintiffs in error knew the limitations of it, and they took it at the risk and consequences of transgression. The state sought to guard against its wilful or accidental abuse. Permits had been abused and the lands of the state despoiled of their timber. The offenders were difficult to detect, or, if detected, the character of their acts, whether wilful, accidental, or involuntary, equally difficult to establish * *.
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69, 30 S.Ct. 663, 666, 54 L.Ed. 930, 935 (1910).
These same considerations apply with equal force to the facts of this case. Suter entered the woods with only a deer license, not an antlerless permit. He assumed the risk of liability when he shot at the buck knowing an antlerless deer was nearby. Any other result would impose an almost impossible burden of proof on the state.
The defendant further contends that the trial court erred when it allegedly found defendant criminally liable on the basis of negligence. The order of the trial court contains ambiguous language concerning a finding of negligence and a finding that the defendant acted intentionally. Though the trial court refers to negligence, that is not the controlling factor. Even if the trial court erroneously considered the issue of negligence, its result is still correct.
Decision
Based on the stipulated facts and case law, Suter assumed the risk of liability when he entered the woods intending to hunt deer and acted deliberately in firing his gun at a deer, while knowing that an antlerless deer was in the area. The trial court properly found him in violation of Minn.Stat. § 97.48, subd. 1, and Commissioner’s Order No. 2125, section 13(e).
Affirmed.