The opinion of the Court was delivered by
*238HANDLER, J.Plaintiffs in these cases are the parents of two profoundly retarded, school-age children who reside in State institutions for the mentally retarded. These parents are responsible by statute for the costs of institutional care and maintenance provided to their individual children based upon financial ability to pay except as reduced by a small credit attributable to certain specific educational expenses. Plaintiffs contend that this credit is insufficient to cover all educational expenses actually incurred and that, notwithstanding their financial ability to pay, any charges to them for educational services provided to their children are forbidden by the “thorough and efficient” education clause of the New Jersey Constitution guaranteeing a free education to all school-age children. Plaintiffs also assert that their state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws have been violated because parents with similarly mentally retarded children able to live at home receive from the State comparable educational benefits entirely free of charge. It is further argued that they are entitled to relief under federal legislation dealing with physically and mentally disabled children, which legislation now arguably requires a state to accept full financial responsibility for the total educational expenses associated with the institutional care provided to any such children.
In the Guempel case, the trial court rejected the claims of the plaintiff-parent based upon the State Constitution’s education clause as well as his claims, under various federal statutes. 159 N.J.Super. 166 (Law Div.1978). The court did find, however, that plaintiff was entitled on state and federal equal protection grounds to an educational credit equal in amount to the average per capita cost of educational benefits provided to noninstitutionalized mentally retarded children. Id. at 191-193. While on appeal to the Appellate Division, the case was directly certified by this Court pursuant to R. 2:12-1. 81 N.J. 279 (1979). The Levine case was disposed of below on summary judgment in favor of the defendants which judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division. 160 N.J.Super. 591 (App.Div.1978). We *239granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification and that case was joined with Guempel for oral argument. 81 N.J. 270 (1979). The New Jersey Public Advocate and the New Jersey Association for- Retarded Citizens, Inc. participated as amici curiae in this joint appeal.
I
It is important in this case to be mindful of what is not at issue. There is no contention made in this litigation that the quality of the residential care provided to Linda Guempel or Maxwell Levine is inadequate or that the educational services available to them are not on a par with those afforded to similarly disabled, but noninstitutionalized, children. Nor does this case present the question of whether parents without sufficient financial means to pay the institutional and related educational costs for the care of their children can nonetheless be required to do so. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-24(7). Rather, what is directly at issue is whether parents who do not otherwise question their moral or legal obligations to support their children and who are fully capable of paying their support can on constitutional grounds be relieved of the costs associated with their total residential care.
For reasons which are fully set forth in this opinion, we conclude on this central issue that such parents with the financial ability fully to support their children are not constitutionally entitled to require the public to assume this obligation. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that there remain alternative non-constitutional grounds which provide opportunities for further relief under applicable statutory and administrative provisions governing the costs of educational services furnished to institutionalized school-age children.
A
An understanding of the issues presented in this appeal must commence with a full appreciation of the tragic afflictions of *240each of the two children involved. Linda Guempel is a 19-year-old retarded woman who is a resident at Hunterdon State School in Clinton. According to the testimony of her father, Linda began experiencing mild seizures when she was one year old. A specialist, upon examining the infant, determined that she was mentally retarded. For a short time thereafter Linda remained at home, but, eventually her abnormal behavior and inability to be trained had adverse effects upon her family and resulted in her placement in 1965 in a residential school for the mentally impaired in Middletown, Delaware.
Linda remained at this school for five years; despite some achievements in toilet training, feeding, dressing, and rudimentary play, however, Linda’s continued hyperactive and self-destructive behavior caused the school to require her withdrawal. She was then admitted to the Hunterdon State School in October 1969. At that time her IQ was estimated to be between 20 and 35; but upon a reevaluation in 1972, she was found to be profoundly retarded based on estimated cognitive functioning (IQ (Slosson) 14, Mental Age: 1 year 8 mos.) and adaptive behavior (Vineland Social Maturity Scale, Social Age: 1 year 8 mos.). A further reevaluation in 1977 showed little, if any, change in Linda’s condition since 1972.
At the Hunterdon State School, the approximately 1000 residents are divided among 18 residential cottages segregated by sex and, to some extent, by degree of impairment. As does Linda, all of the residents of her particular cottage exhibit severe behavioral problems. Linda spends the major portion of her time in this cottage and in an adjacent play area. Her participation in the school’s curriculum is in a program of the lowest or most basic level that emphasizes development of body awareness, sensorimotor skills and rudimentary self-care skills such as eating, toileting, grooming and dressing. The director of the school’s Adaptive Learning Center explained that a large part of that curriculum is similar to that ordinarily undertaken in nursery school or kindergarten.
*241Maxwell Levine is even more gravely impaired than is Linda Guempel. Maxwell, a ten-year-old crib-confined child, was found in early infancy to have a “diffuse static encephalopathy relating to . perinatal [1] difficulties . associated with significant brain damage.” When Maxwell was slightly more than one year old, a physician noted that he remained in “a frog position” with his hands clenched and that he exhibited no control over head movements.
In January 1974 Maxwell was admitted to the nursery unit of the North Jersey Training School at Totowa, a public institution for all levels of mentally retarded persons over five years of age. Maxwell was examined upon his admission by the school’s director of pediatrics, who diagnosed the child’s condition as “[cjerebral [e]neephalopathy—[s]evere—[d]ue to cerebral anoxia” and noted that “this is a severely brain[-]damaged boy who shows no evidence of any type of awareness or development [and who] will always be a permanent crib case [needing] complete care,” A clinical psychologist also examined Maxwell at that time and classified him as profoundly retarded with an estimated IQ of 1. Shortly after his admission, the school’s Classification Committee similarly characterized Maxwell’s condition as profound mental retardation with an estimated IQ of 1, motor development at the one-month-old level, no vocalization or language skills, and an extremely low adaptive behavior rating. As of March 1979, according to reports made by the school’s various service departments, Maxwell had made certain advances despite never having been scheduled as of that time for regular programming. The reports noted, for example, “that he does make sounds, follow objects, and responds to noise”; that while he “demonstrates pleasure” in response to movement, familiar faces and voices “by smiling and moving his head toward the stimulation, he is unable to follow through and complete any movement or activity upon request,” and that *242while he “attempts to right [his] head” when he is pulled to a sitting position, “head lag” is still present.
The record contains little amplification of Maxwell Levine’s daily routine at the North Jersey Training School in Totowa. It appears that while Maxwell is completely confined as a “crib case,” some physical therapy and auditory reaction testing have recently begun to be administered. He remains, however, totally dependent upon “[c]omplete attendant care.”
B
Since Linda and Maxwell receive care at State institutions, they both fall within the coverage of the institutional maintenance support program of Title 30 applicable to both mental institutions and mental retardation institutions. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-24; see generally New Jersey Legislative Office of Fiscal Affairs, Program Analysis of Institutional Maintenance Support Payments (1974) (hereinafter cited as Program Analysis). Under these provisions, the costs of maintenance of a patient in a State or county “charitable institution” (including “all necessary expenses incurred by the institution in his [or her] behalf”) are to be borne primarily by the patient personally and secondarily by that patient’s close relatives with sufficient financial ability to pay. N.J.S.A. 30:4-66. Thus, plaintiffs, as the parents of Linda and Maxwell, were required to pay at least some of the costs attributable to the residential care and maintenance of their children. These required payments form the nub of the instant controversy.
As noted, the institutionalized individual and his or her financially responsible relatives are liable for all necessary expenses incurred for the individual’s maintenance. Ibid.] I Program Analysis, supra at 22. The amount actually assessed, however, is arrived at only after a multi-step process involving several governmental agencies, triggered by the admission of the individual to the institution. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-25.1 et seq. After an investigation of family and financial circumstances, the family’s required monthly contribution is determined under the so-*243called annual “Treasury Formula.”2 N.J.S.A. 30:4-34, 30:4-56, 30:4-60, 30:4-76; I Program Analysis, supra at 20; II Program Analysis, supra at 37. An institutional per capita cost figure, determined by the State House Commission, N.J.S.A. 30:4-78, is, in the case of school-age children, then reduced by an educational credit for certain specific educational expenses, resulting in an adjusted per capita cost figure.3 If the monthly contribution figure based on the Treasury Formula equals or exceeds this adjusted per capita cost figure, the assessment to the individual and his or her family is limited to that adjusted per capita cost, the maximum amount assessable.4 N.J.S.A. 30:4-60. Otherwise, the figure derived from the Treasury Formula becomes the amount assessed to the individual and his or her family. The difference between the adjusted per capita institutional cost and the patient’s required contribution in these latter cases is then paid by the State and the individual’s county of residence, with the particular allocation between those two entities determined by the individual’s payment classification.5
*244The annual income of Linda Guempel’s father in recent years has exceeded $100,000; as a consequence, the Guempels have been assessed the maximum adjusted per capita rate.6 The Levines, on the other hand, have been assessed significantly less than the maximum adjusted per capita rate for the care provided to Maxwell because of their lesser ability to pay. Plaintiffs contend that the residential care provided to their institutionalized children qualifies, at least in part, as “education” within the meaning of the “thorough and efficient” education clause of the New Jersey Constitution, N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1. Consequently, they assert initially that the statutory scheme under which they are assessed for this residential care violates the rights of their children to have a free public education as guaranteed by this constitutional provision.
II
A
The New Jersey Constitution, N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1, states:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.
The history of the Constitution’s free public education clause is surprisingly scant. The clause became part of the State’s organic law through an 1875 amendment to the school fund *245provision of the New Jersey Constitution of 1844.7 N.J.Const. (1844), Art. IV, § 7, par. 6 (as amended, election Sept. 7, 1875, proclamation Sept. 28, 1875). See R. F. Butts, Public Education in the United States: From Revolution to Reform 173 (1978). This amendment was one of a series of recommendations made by a Constitutional Commission appointed' by the governor in 1873. Proclamation by the Governor, April 29, 1873. See Proceedings of the 1873 New Jersey Constitutional Commission as reported in the Trenton True American, July 9-Nov. 18, 1873 (collected and bound). The clause was carried over intact to our State’s present 1947 Constitution, NJ.Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, par. I.8
One important theme does emerge from a review of the concededly limited history underlying this constitutional education clause in terms of its overriding purpose. It is apparent that the framers of this clause believed a constitutional right to an education to be an essential condition of an enlightened democracy and effective representative government. D. Murray, History of Education in New Jersey 29, 38 (1899); R. West, Elementary Education in New Jersey: A History 15-16 (1964); see also N. Burr, Education in New Jersey 1630-1871, at 244-258 (1942). “The importance of education to our democratic society,” as “the very foundation of good citizenship,” has long been accepted as a basic tenet of American government. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873, 880 (1954); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 24 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739-740, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, 741 (1969); Butts, Public Education in *246the United States, supra at 14-15, 45-46; see also Comment, “The Constitutionality of Colorado’s School Finance System,” 50 U.Colo.L.Rev. 115, 136 (1978). It has been widely acknowledged that an appropriate education for citizens is necessary to democratic self-government, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1185, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 1637 (1943), and for the full enjoyment of the rights of citizenship, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1312, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 60 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (there is an inextricable link between education and the rights of free speech and association and of participation in the electoral process). See generally J. Conant, Thomas Jefferson and the Development of American Public Education (1963).
The significance of public education in terms of citizenship and representative democracy has been recognized by the New Jersey courts on the relatively few occasions that they have been called upon to construe and explain our Constitution’s education clause. In Landis v. Ashworth, 57 N.J.L. 509 (Sup.Ct. 1895), for example, the court, in rejecting a claim that a school district did not have the power to tax, addressed the education clause added to the 1844 Constitution by the 1875 amendment and observed that the fundamental purpose of that clause
was to impose on the legislature a duty of providing for a thorough and efficient system of free schools, capable of affording to every child such instruction as is necessary to fit it for the ordinary duties of citizenship . . . . [57 N.J.L. at 512.]
Cf. Commonwealth v. Hartman, 17 Pa. 118, 119-120 (Sup.Ct. 1851) (giving similar interpretation to the then-existing Pennsylvania Constitution’s “education” clause, Pa.Const. (1838), Art. VII, § 1), cited with approval in Trustees of Rutgers College v. Morgan, 70 N.J.L. 460, 473 (Sup.Ct.1904), aff’d per curiam as modified 71 N.J.L. 663 (E. & A.1905).
More recently, in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973) (Robinson I), this Court, in the first of a series of precedent-setting *247decisions9 dealing with the constitutionality of the State’s system of financing public education, held that the then-existing system of school financing was a violation of the constitutional “thorough and efficient” education clause. Id. at 515, 520. Chief Justice Weintraub there touched upon the essential purpose of a free public education in a democracy as embodied in that provision:
The Constitution’s [“thorough and efficient”] guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market.
[Id. at 515.]
This ultimate goal of the constitutional education clause was also recognized and articulated by the Legislature in its enactment of the Public School Education Act of 1975. L.1975, c. 212, § 1 et seq.; N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-1 to 18A:7A-33. This act states that “[t]he goal of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools [is] to provide to all children in New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic location, the educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically, economically and socially in a democratic society.” N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-4.10 See Note, “School Finance Reform—Judicial Com*248pulsion of Legislative Compliance with ‘Thorough and Efficient Education’ Mandate,” 30 Rutgers L.Rev. 814, 819 (1977).
There can be little doubt that the constitutional provision for public education, designed to serve the needs of an enlightened citizenry in a democratic society, was intended by its framers to be expansive in application. See Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 508-509; Tractenberg, “Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way,” 27 Rutgers L.Rev. 365, 416 & n.255 (1974). The content of the Constitution’s education clause is infused with the dynamism inherent in the education process itself. Thus, advances in the field of education, as well as in allied fields such as medical science and human psychology, progressively create opportunities for ever-greater numbers of children, previously impervious to instruction, to become amenable to education.11 The constitutional education clause possesses the elasticity to envelop any such growth in the capacity and potential of children to absorb and to profit from educational endeavors. Hence, such children, as they generally become educable, also become automatically the beneficiaries of the constitutional right to a free public education. In this sense, the constitutional educational guarantee is self-executing and self-vindicating.
Given this analytic framework, the central issue in this case may now be posed more precisely, viz., whether the State Constitution’s free education clause, the essential purpose of which is to maximize public education so that citizens may *249“function politically, economically and socially in a democratic society” (N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-4), includes within its guarantee profoundly retarded institutionalized children and the total-habilitation programs entailed in their residential care. We think not.
B
Society has an obligation to provide for the care of mentally retarded persons. The receipt of such care has been recognized by virtually all of the states, including New Jersey, as a right in such individuals deserving of the fullest protection, with some jurisdictions predicating that right on a constitutional basis and others conferring it by statute. See Levinson, “The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children,” 12 Valparaiso U.L.Rev. 253, 255 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Levinson, “Minimally Adequate Education”); Comment, “The Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education,” 55 Neb.L.Rev. 637, 639 n.5 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Comment, “Handicapped Child Has a Right”); see also R. Martin, Educating Handicapped Children: The Legal Mandate (1979). Many courts have, therefore, on either constitutional or statutory grounds, considered the habilitation necessary in the daily care of a profoundly retarded child to be the functional equivalent of an educational right. E. g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 373, 395 (M.D.Ala.1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5 Cir. 1974); see Halpern, “The Right to Habilitation,” in The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law 385 (President’s Committee on Mental Retardation 1976); Comment, “Handicapped Child Has a Right,” supra, 55 Neb.L.Rev. at 668-672.
Indeed, the progressive and evolutionary nature of the education profession, coupled with a growing understanding of mental disabilities and improved methods for dealing with mentally retarded children, has furnished a strong basis for some courts to determine that all such children are entitled to the rights and benefits of an appropriate “education” fully equivalent to those accorded to non-mentally retarded persons. See, e. g., Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F.Supp. 583, 603-604 (E.D.Pa.1979); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F.Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C.1972); Pennsylvania *250Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.Supp. 279, 296, 302 (E.D.Pa.1972); In re G. H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D.Sup.Ct.1974).12
As previously indicated, however, the State’s constitutional education clause has a somewhat different focus from the care of the mentally impaired. It is designed primarily to enhance the educational opportunities of children in order to foster the educated citizenry that is indispensable to an effective democratic society. Ante at 245-248. Still, a great number of retarded children, including many with fairly pronounced mental and emotional impairments, have the capacity for improvement through such education and the potential thus to lead constructive social and political lives. Their education is therefore protected fully and completely by the education clause of the Constitution. Comment, “Handicapped Child Has a Right,” supra, 55 Neb.L.Rev. at 637 n.2.
Nevertheless, the sad fact endures that there is a category of mentally disabled children so severely impaired as' to be unable to absorb or benefit from education. It is neither realistic nor meaningful to equate the type of care and habilitation which such children require for their health and survival with “education” in the sense that that term is used in the constitution. Cf. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Dolan, 89 Misc.2d 1003, 1006, 392 N.Y.S.2d 980, 984 (Civ.Ct.1977) (“[e]fforts *251to develop the capacities of a mentally retarded child to the fullest extent possible may be education in the philosophical sense but it is not education in the legislative sense”). The constitutional mandate for a free public education simply does not apply to these unfortunate children. See Armstrong v. Kline, supra, 476 F.Supp. at 590-592, 600; Cuyahoga County Ass’n for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F.Supp. 46, 52 (N.D.Ohio 1976) (upholding Ohio’s educational statutes excluding from the system of free public schools those mentally retarded children found “incapable of profiting substantially from further instruction”); Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Haas, 15 Ill.2d 204, 213, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Sup.Ct.1958) (“While this constitutional guarantee [to free public education] applies to all children in the State, it cannot assure that all children are edueable. The term ‘common school education’ implies the capacity, as well as the right, to receive common training, otherwise the educational process cannot function.”); In re the “A” Family, 602 P.2d 157, 163 (Mont.Sup.Ct.1979); Haggerty & Sacks “Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education,” 50 Temple L.Q. 961, 983 n.125 (1977); Handel, “The Role of the Advocate,” supra, 36 Ohio St.L.J. at 355; Note, “Legal Remedies for the Misclassification or Wrongful Placement of Educationally Handicapped Children,” 14 Colum.J.L. & Soc.Problems 389, 393-394, 407 (1979); Comment, “Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the Mentally Retarded,” 34 Ohio St.L.J. 554, 555-558, 568-569, 571-575 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Comment, “Toward a Legal Theory”).
Concededly, it is difficult to differentiate those mentally retarded children minimally capable of absorbing education and, hence, constitutionally entitled to an appropriate education, from those children so impaired that they cannot be educated at all, in the constitutional sense. Nevertheless, this complex definitional task has been essayed and workable guidelines have been formulated to assist in the classification of those mentally impaired children who are constitutionally entitled to a free *252public education. See, e. g., Armstrong v. Kline, supra, 476 F.Supp. at 587-588.13
For present purposes, the Public School Education Act of 1975, L.1975, c. 212, N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-1 et seq., can serve as the primary exemplar of such standards. That act attempts a comprehensive categorization of mentally-handicapped children, viz:
Each child classified pursuant to section 18A:46-8[14] as mentally retarded shall be similarly further identified, examined and classified into one of the following subcategories:
a. Educable mentally retarded children, who are those who may be expected to succeed with a minimum of supervision in homes and schools and community life and are characterized particularly by reasonable expectation that at maturity they will be capable of vocational and social independence in competitive environment^];
b. Trainable mentally retarded children, who are so retarded that they cannot be classified as educable but are, notwithstanding, potentionally capable of selfhelp, of communicating satisfactorily, or participating in groups, of directing their behavior so as not to be dangerous to themselves or others and of achieving with training some degree of personal independence and social and economic usefulness within sheltered environments .... [N.J.S.A. 18A:46-9 (emphases added).]
As for the children falling into these two categories of mental retardation, their entitlement to a free thorough and efficient public education under our State Constitution is clear, aside from any statutory rights to such an education. Thus, those children referred to in the statute as “educable” enjoy a “reasonable expectation that at maturity they will be capable of *253vocational and social independence in [a] competitive environment.” N.J.S.A. 18A:46-9(a). The education of such youngsters obviously fulfills the beneficent purpose of the constitutional education clause. Cf. Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 515 (the purpose of education is “to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market”); Landis v. Ashworth, supra, 57 N.J.L. at 512 (the purpose of education is “to fit [a child] for the ordinary duties of citizenship”); N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-4 (the purpose of education is “[to] prepare [children] to function politically, economically and socially in a democratic society”).
The constitutional goal of fostering an effective citizenry through education is served by also including “trainable” children within the ambit of the Constitution’s education clause. These children are “potentially capable of self-help and of achieving with training some degree of personal independence and social and economic usefulness,” albeit only “within sheltered environments.” N.J.S.A. 18A:46-9(b).
The statute further deals with children who are “subtrainable” (with a maximum overall IQ level of 24), i. e., those whose mental deficiencies do not bring them even to the level of “trainable mentally retarded children” (N.J.S.A. 18A:46-9(b)). N.J.A.C. 10:44-10.3(b)(5); see N.J.A.C. 10:46-2.3(a)(2).
[These “subtrainable” children] are . so severely mentally retarded as to be incapable of giving evidence of understanding and responding in a positive manner to simple directions expressed in the child’s primary mode of communication and who cannot in some manner express basic wants and needs. [AI.J.S.A. 18A:46-9(c).] 15
These “subtrainable” children, by definition, have no capacity for even the minimal levels of performance or achievement which the thorough and efficient education clause of the State Constitution addresses. Hence, apart from the humanitarian and compassionate instincts which naturally impel society to concentrate public resources and governmental attention upon these unfortunate, most gravely impaired children, the State *254Constitution does not through its education clause make this moral commitment.
Plaintiffs and amici stress, however, that despite these differences between profoundly mentally retarded children and those retarded children capable of education or training, a “thorough and efficient” education includes one appropriate to the minimal capacities of all such children and is clearly required to be provided by state statutory law. Plaintiffs on this basis argue that they are entitled to complete financial relief under the current educational statutes and that these laws possess constitutional force because they are coextensive with the constitutional mandate of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools. The short rejoinder to this argument, however, is that it fails to recognize that the Legislature can grant, and in the enactment of L.1975, c. 212 actually has accorded, educational rights that go beyond basic constitutional requirements. See Trustees of Rutgers College v. Morgan, supra, 70 N.J.L. at 471-472; Landis v. Ashworth, supra, 57 N.J.L. at 512; see also Lullo v. International Ass’n of Fire Fighters Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 414-415, 420-421 (1970).
In sum, the children involved in this appeal, Linda Guempel and Maxwell Levine, according to the record, fall within the mentally retarded statutory group of “subtrainable” children set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:46-9(e). They are “so severely mentally retarded as to be incapable of giving evidence of understanding and responding in a positive manner to simple directions expressed in the child’s primary mode of communication and [to be unable to] in some manner express basic wants and needs.” Ibid. Their best interests, in light of their grave afflictions, require that they be institutionalized in order to receive constant and complete habilitation. While such total residential care secondarily includes services minimally analogous to formal instruction more typical of schools and educational institutions, these children are not capable either of receiving or of benefit-ting from any additional instruction or education as such. Consequently, the residential care which they require for their day-to-day well-being, including the minimal incidental instruc*255tion involved, does not qualify as “education” within the meaning of the education clause of the New Jersey Constitution, N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1. Accordingly, plaintiffs, as the parents of these children, are not constitutionally entitled to have the institutional care of their children furnished free of charge at public expense. Their claims for such reimbursement predicated directly upon the education clause of the New Jersey Constitution must therefore be rejected.
Ill
Plaintiffs next assert that the costs of the institutional care of their children imposed upon them under the State statutory scheme violate their rights to equal protection under the federal and State Constitutions. The trial court in the Guempel case held on state and federal equal protection grounds that residents of state schools must be given a deduction against their per capita costs in an amount equal to the average per capita sum spent for those noninstitutionalized mentally retarded children enrolled in the day care center program. 159 NJ.Super. at 191-192. The court based this holding upon a belief that both “institutions” have a similar custodial purpose and that both serve similar groups of children; it found “something constitutionally invidious” in allowing the nonresidential child the equivalent of $5,500 worth of educational services while giving an institutionalized child an educational expense credit of only $309.68. Id. at 190-191.
The Appellate Division in the Levine case specifically disapproved of the trial court’s holding in Guempel that parents of school-age children residing in state facilities are entitled on equal protection grounds to a credit equal to the average annual per capita cost of day training. 160 N.J.Super. at 595-596. The appellate court first reasoned that there exist “sufficient significant differences and distinctions” between children in day training and those in residential facilities to warrant separate classifications and disparate treatment. Id. at 596. In the case of residential services, the State, by providing for all of the child’s needs 24 hours of every day, 365 days a year, “acts in the place *256of the parents”; in contrast, parents of day training students “are themselves providing all of such needs to the child, with the exception of the educational services supplied by the day care center.” Ibid. The court concluded that these differences, when coupled with the greater cost to the State of residential services, justified the assessment of per capita costs to parents of institutionalized children while no such costs are imposed upon those parents of noninstitutionalized children. Ibid.
“The equal protection of the laws means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the protection of the laws enjoyed by other persons or classes of persons under similar conditions and circumstances, in their lives, liberty, and property, and in the pursuit of happiness, both as respects privileges conferred and burdens imposed.” Washington National Insurance Co. v. Board of Review, 1 N.J. 545, 553 (1949); accord, Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 79 (1978). Stated differently, “[ejqual protection is the guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a similar manner and that people of different circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same.” J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. N. Young, Constitutional Law 520 (1978) (footnote omitted); see Tussman and tenBroek, “The Equal Protection of the Laws,” 37 Calif.L. Rev. 341, 344 (1949). While this “constitutional requirement of equal protection is met by legislation which treats in a like or similar manner all persons within a class reasonably selected,” Mason v. Civil Service Comm’n, 51 N.J. 115, 128 (1968), it does not prohibit all statutory differentiation, McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 316 (1980) (“some discriminatory impact and some imperfections in the groupings or categories will not invalidate the classification”); Trap Rock Industries, Inc. v. Kohl, 63 N.J. 1, 5 (1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 860, 94 S.Ct. 74, 38 L.Ed.2d 110 (1973). See Idaho Dep’t of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 101, 98 S.Ct. 327, 328, 54 L.Ed.2d 324, 327 (1977). Thus, a court, when presented with such a question, “must first determine what burden of justification the [particular] classification . must meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and the individual interests affected.” Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa *257County, 415 U.S. 250, 253, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1080, 39 L.Ed.2d 306, 312 (1974) (footnote omitted).
This Court has noted that under the conventional analysis of equal protection claims, “the burden is on the party attacking the classification to show that it lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective. The notable exception to this test occurs in situations where the classification involves ‘suspect’ criteria or impinges upon ‘fundamental’ rights. In these cases the burden is on the state to show that the classification serves a ‘compelling state interest.’ ” Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6, 37-38 (1976); accord, State v. Senno, 79 N.J. 216, 225 (1979); Robbiani v. Burke, 77 N.J. 383, 391-392 (1978); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 253 (1975); see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 17, 93 S.Ct. at 1288, 36 L.Ed.2d at 33. Equal protection is implicitly guaranteed by our State Constitution. N.J.Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 1; see McKenney v. Byrne, supra, 82 N.J. at 316; Peper v. Princeton University Bd. of Trustees, supra, 77 N.J. at 79. This Court has frequently recognized that the approach called for by a challenge to a state statute upon state equal protection grounds parallels that used under the federal Constitution. McKenney v. Byrne, supra, 82 N.J. at 316-317; see Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 352-354 (1978), app.dism. sub nom. Vornado, Inc. v. Degnan, 439 U.S. 1123, 99 S.Ct. 1037, 59 L.Ed.2d 84 (1979); Tomarchio v. Township of Greenwich, 15 N.J. 62, 69; Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., supra, 80 N.J. at 37-44. Thus, for the “strict scrutiny” or “compelling state interest” test to be applicable here, it must be shown either that profoundly mentally impaired children constitute a suspect classification or that their habilitation, including incidental education, is, or implicates, a fundamental right. If one of these two showings is made, this more exacting equal protection test will come into play rather than the rational relationship test. See Velmohos v. Maren Engineering Corp., 83 N.J. 282, 294 (1980); cf. Matthews v. Atlantic City, 84 N.J. 153, 169-170 (1980) (restrictions upon right to run for municipal office affect the right to vote and are therefore subject to greater scrutiny).
*258To the extent that habilitation for the profoundly retarded is equated with an “appropriate education,” ante at 249-255, is such an education a “fundamental right”? This Court has stated that “[t]he only rights which are ‘fundamental’ in this regard are those expressly guaranteed or clearly implied by the federal constitution.” Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., supra, 80 N.J. at 38; accord, State v. Senno, supra, 79 N.J. at 226. The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected the position that education is such a fundamental right. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, supra, 411 U.S. at 35, 93 S.Ct. at 1297-1298, 36 L.Ed.2d at 44 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any' basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”); see Nowak et al., supra at 684-686; but see Levinson, “Minimally Adequate Education,” supra, 12 Valparaiso U.L.Rev. at 261 n.41; Wald, “The Right to Education,” supra at 835-837.
As for our own New Jersey Constitution, the right to a free public education is there expressly guaranteed, N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1, and, thus, as defined by this Court {ante at 244-249), does constitute a fundamental right. The habilitation efforts required in the care of statutorily sub-trainable, profoundly impaired children {N.J.S.A. 18A:46-9(c)), however, are not included within this constitutional guarantee and, thus, are not components of that fundamental right. Ante at 254-255. Thus, the particular services here in question do not constitute a fundamental right for either state or federal equal protection purposes.
The issue remaining is whether the classification here involves a suspect criterion. See State v. Senno, supra, 79 N.J. at 226-227 (quoting from San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d at 40, and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 591 (1973) (plurality opinion)); Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., supra, 80 N.J. at 38-39 n.15.
*259In some contexts, persons afflicted with mental impairments might appear to qualify in a constitutional sense as a “suspect class.” See State v. Senno, supra, 79 N.J. at 226-227; Burgdorf & Burgdorf, “A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a ‘Suspect Class’ under the Equal Protection Clause,” 15 Santa Clara Law. 855, 915 et seq. (1975); cf. Burt, “Beyond the Right to Habilitation,” in The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law, supra at 425 (mental retardation as a “semisuspect classification”); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1080 n.17 (1978) (same). The constitutional comparison in this case, however, relates to all school-age children who because of their profound mental retardation constitute a class—the statutorily subtrainable (N.J.S.A. 18A:46-9(c)). The narrow question for equal protection purposes, therefore, is whether as among statutorily subtrainable, school-age children, a differentiation of such children based solely upon the circumstance of institutionalization serves to render such a classification “suspect.” We conclude that it does not.
Professionals in this field have recognized that mentally impaired persons sharing many characteristics may be classified into “subgroups” in terms of their level of retardation. National Association for Retarded Children, Facts on Mental Retardation 4 (1971), cited in Comment, “Handicapped Child Has a Right,” supra, 55 Neb.L.Rev. at 637-638 n.2, and Comment “Toward a Legal Theory,” supra, 34 Ohio St.L.J. at 555-556; see Armstrong v. Kline, supra, 476 F.Supp. at 588-589; see also ante at 248 & n.11, 252-254. “[Although the mentally retarded as a class share many characteristics, each level presents its own special problems and needs, and each demands some specific response by society.” Comment, “Toward a Legal Theory,” supra, 34 Ohio St.L.J. at 556. Obviously, the difference between the two categories within the class under consideration here—institutionalized profoundly retarded and noninstitutionalized profoundly retarded—turns upon the need for, and the fact of, total 24-hour-per-day professional habilitation. And, as the record here reveals, the relevant factors dictating institutionalization as the means for such habilitation are not spurious, *260illusory or capricious; they have to do with the child’s mental capacity and behavioral characteristics. See also N.J.S.A. 30:4-24. These are real and objective criteria which underlie the classification of such children. Since the equal protection analysis requires a focus upon the purpose and “nature of the classification and the individual interests affected,” Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra, 415 U.S. at 253, 94 S.Ct. at 1080, 39 L.Ed.2d at 312, we are entirely satisfied that the classification here is not a suspect one.
There is a clear distinction between the educational services incidentally included as a constituent part of the total habilitation required for the institutionalized subtrainable children and those which are made available to the subtrainable children at day care centers. Even though profoundly retarded children who are institutionalized receive “educational” services analogous to those received by nonresidential, day-care-training children, the education available to the former is strictly subordinate to and functionally integrated with the child’s total 24-hour-per-day habilitation.16 For example, in this case Linda Guempel spends most of her time in her cottage and play area; her only contact with the school’s curriculum consists of attempting to develop minimal self-care skills, e. g., eating and dressing. And Maxwell Levine, totally crib-confined, undergoes only brief physical therapy and auditory reaction testing. See Halpern, “The Right to Habilitation,” supra at 394-395; cf. Burt, “Beyond the Right to Habilitation,” id. at 417, 419. The lower court in the Guempel case correctly characterized the functions of such residential institutions as “in the area of care, custody and safekeeping”; education is there only of secondary significance, 159 N.J.Super. at 188,190. That finding is consist*261ent with the decision of the Appellate Division in the Levine case. 160 N.J.Super. at 596.
Since education and its functional relationship to the total care of a profoundly retarded, institutionalized child necessarily differ from that which may otherwise be available to a nonresidential child, the question that remains is whether there is a rational relationship between the differential funding of educational services for institutionalized children and the overall objectives of state policy dealing with profoundly retarded children. One of the critical and paramount goals of the complex of statutory educational programs addressed to children is for them to become responsible and effectively functioning adults. N.J. S.A. 18A:7A-4. This goal applies equally to those children who, though mentally retarded, are capable of benefiting from an education. Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 30:6D-1 et seq.; State Facilities Education Act of 1979, L.1979, c. 207 (N.J.S.A. 18A:-7B-1 et seq.).
This commendable objective has been translated into providing such handicapped children with a statutory right to receive their care through the “least restrictive alternatives.” See Martin, Educating Handicapped Children, supra at 28, 57 et seq.; Abeson, Bolick & Hass, “A Primer on Due Process: Education Decisions for Handicapped Children,” 42 Exceptional Children 68, 69 (1975); Haggerty & Sacks, “Education of the Handicapped,” supra, 50 Temple L.Q. at 972; Note, “Enforcing the Right to an ‘Appropriate’ Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,” 92 Harv.L.Rev. 1103, 1118 (1979); Comment, “Handicapped Child Has a Right,” supra, 55 Neb.L.Rev. at 672-673; Comment, “Toward a Legal Theory,” supra, 34 Ohio St.L.J. at 574-575.17 Courts have also endorsed *262this educational philosophy under the rubric of “mainstreaming,” that is, encouraging to the greatest extent possible a life of normality for profoundly retarded children. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 612 F.2d 84, 114-115 (3 Cir. 1979), cert. granted 447 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 2984, 64 L.Ed.2d 853 (1980);18 Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F.Supp. 528, 533 (S.D.N.Y.1980), aff’d 632 F.2d 945 (2 Cir. 1980); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F.Supp. 180, 184-185 (S.D.W.Va.1976); In re the “A” Family, supra, 602 P.2d at 163.
Although we recognize that plaintiffs may be entitled to statutory relief with respect to their claims of fiscal discrimination (see Point IV, post at 263-268), the asserted disparate or differential funding of educational services furnished to profoundly retarded institutionalized children vis-á-vis those not institutionalized can be related rationally to the broad goals or policies serving to upgrade the quality of life for disabled children. Where the State itself provides the bulk of the child’s care, i. e., habilitation and residential facilities, the parents may reasonably be required to reimburse the State to a far greater extent than in instances in which the parents are themselves directly fulfilling their parental caretaking obligations. This is wholly consistent with and gives effect to the unquestioned moral obligation of parents to pay for the care of their children. State v. LeVien, 44 N.J. 323, 330-331 (1965); see also Department of Mental Hygiene v. Dolan, supra, 89 Misc.2d at 1006-1008, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 984-985; In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 662, 345 N.E.2d 556, 560, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 17 (Ct.App.1976), app. *263dism. 429 U.S. 805, 97 S.Ct. 39, 50 L.Ed.2d 66 (1976). Moreover, such differentiation is not here applied unfairly or harshly since the statutory scheme challenged by plaintiffs takes into account their financial ability to pay. N.J.S.A. 30:4-60, 30:4-66; see ante at 242-244. More important, this funding scheme encourages “mainstreaming” in its broadest sense. It provides a financial disincentive to parents who place their children in residential institutions; conversely, it helps those parents of profoundly retarded children who make the sacrifices entailed in keeping their children at home thereby enabling such children to lead a fuller life. Cf. Ridgely v. Secretary of Dep’t of Health, Education & Welfare, 345 F.Supp. 983, 993 (D.Md.1972), aff’d 475 E.2d 1222 (4 Cir. 1973) (portions of Medicare statute providing similar disincentives in favor of caring for the elderly at home); see generally Ewing, “Health Planning and Deinstitutionalization: Advocacy Within the Administrative Process,” 31 Stan.L.Rev. 679 (1979).
As the parents of institutionalized children, the plaintiffs’ equal protection grievance focuses upon their payment for educational services which are provided without charge to similarly afflicted children who live at home with their own families. We conclude, for the reasons set forth, that this grievance does not equate with discriminatory treatment on a constitutional plane. Plaintiffs have not been subjected to unequal protection of the laws by the requirement to pay in accordance with their financial ability a substantial portion of the costs of the total residential care, inclusive of educational services, that is provided to their profoundly retarded institutionalized children.
IV
A final issue, raised in the Guempel case but equally applicable to Levine, concerns plaintiffs’ entitlement to remedial relief under federal law. See generally Schwartz, “Federal Rights of Handicapped Children,” 182 (116) N.Y.L.J. 1 (1979). Because of the interrelationship of the pertinent federal statutes, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-794 (1975) (as amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmen*264tal Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub.L. 95-602, titles I-IV, 92 Stat. 2955-3003) [hereinafter referred to as Rehabilitation Act] and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1461 (1978) (Pub.L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)) [hereinafter referred to as the Handicapped Children Act], and the State statutory and administrative scheme, this issue necessarily implicates the threshold question of whether plaintiffs are entitled to greater financial aid from the State under the applicable state laws.
It is not clear from the record in this case whether the educational credits accorded plaintiffs in fact comply with the above-described complex statutory scheme governing the costs of institutionalization of mentally retarded children. Because of both the inadequacy of the record on this point and the factual and legal complexity of this issue, we deem it necessary to remand the cases for appropriate administrative proceedings in order to determine the precise amount that should be allowed as a credit for education and associated services under pertinent statutory law to parents of institutionalized, profoundly retarded school-age children. The outcome of such administrative proceedings will undoubtedly affect plaintiffs’ federal claims. Determination of those claims at this juncture, therefore, would be premature.
The State Department of Education has promulgated a set of regulations designed to implement the broad goals of special education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:46-1 et seq. and 18A:46A-1 et seq. See N.J.A.C. 6:28-1.1 et seq. These regulations incorporate, as well, the goals and standards of the Federal Handicapped Children Act. The term “free appropriate education,” as used in those regulations, is defined so as to encompass both special education and related services which are provided “at public expense . . . and without charge to parents and guardians, . . . [which] meet the standards established by the State Department of Education, . . . [and which conform to] the pupil’s individualized education program . . .” N.J.A.C. 6:28-1.2. Additionally, the State Public School Education Act of 1975 (N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-1 et seq.) also directs the *265appropriate State or local education agency to promulgate educational standards and curricula designed to meet the needs of the entire student population. N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-6, 18A:7A-7. Such standards reflect the broad array of “related services” included in the definition of a “free appropriate education.” N.J.A.C. 6:28-1.2. Thus, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6:28-10.5(d), the Division of Mental Retardation in the Department of Human Services is required to provide commensurate education programs and services to severely and profoundly retarded children in State residential institutions as well as to noninstitutionalized children enrolled in day training centers.
In addition to the Public School Education Act of 1975, the educational needs of institutionalized retarded children are specifically the concern of other recently enacted legislation. The Developmentally Disabled Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 30:6D-1 et seq. (L.1977, c. 82), requires specifically that such institutionalized profoundly retarded children shall be provided “a thorough and efficient education suited to such person’s age and abilities.” N.J.S.A. 30:6D-5(c). Similar requirements are also contained in the State Facilities Education Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-1 et seq. (L.1979, c. 207); see Committee Statement, L.1979, c. 207. Reflecting in some measure this complex and comprehensive statutory scheme to provide for the educational and related needs of mentally impaired children, the parties in Guempel stipulated and the trial judge found that the educational programs and services provided to both institutionalized and non-institutionalized profoundly retarded children are substantially similar. Guempel, supra, 159 N.J.Super. at 190-191; see also Levine, supra, 160 N.J.Super. at 596.
Despite such statutory provisions requiring appropriate educational treatment for the mentally impaired, however, it does not appear that the administrative scheme currently used to compute the basic per capita costs of institutional care at State institutions, including particularly the education deduction, was designed to ensure compliance with the statutorily-prescribed components of a thorough and efficient education. This present computation system was apparently initiated in 1918 (L.1918, c. *266147; N.J.S.A. 30:4-49 et seq.) and was specifically designed to determine per capita residential costs for persons of all ages in every public charitable institution, correctional facility and public hospital and then to allocate responsibility for those costs among the State, the county of residence, and the individual. See ante at 242-243. It was not particularly attuned or responsive to the requirements of school-age retarded children, including their educational needs. Moreover, with respect to the State-operated system of day care training centers, the Department of Human Services (then the Department of Institutions and Agencies) has borne the entire cost of such facilities and programs from their inception, patterning the system on the local public school model. See N.J.S.A. 18A:46-18.1, 30:4-165.2. Nevertheless, while the day training centers do provide similar services, it does not appear that the costs of these services can be facilely applied to State institutions; nor does it appear that the accounting practices for the computation of costs as initially adopted under Title 30 for application to institutionalized children can be adapted so as to include the full range of services provided without charge to parents of day training pupils, services which institutionalized children are now statutorily entitled to receive.19 N.J.S.A. 30:6D-5(c), 30:6D-9.
*267All of these questions embrace a very complex subject matter which is most appropriately the concern of governmental specialists. New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 562-563 (1978); In re William B. Kessler Memorial Hospital, 78 N.J. 564, 577-579 (1979) (Handler, J., concurring); see Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654, 93 S.Ct. 2488, 2494, 37 L.Ed.2d 235, 242 (1973); Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37-38, 92 S.Ct. 815, 817-818, 31 L.Ed.2d 17, 25 (1972). Consequently, there should here be a remand of these cases to the appropriate administrative agency so that plaintiffs’ entitlement to adequate monetary relief from the cost of care and habilitation may be considered in depth with the requisite administrative expertise. Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Schulman, 78 N.J. 378, 386-387 (1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 900, 100 S.Ct. 210, 62 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 136, 140-142 (1962). To the extent that these matters span the concerns of several governmental agencies or bodies (i. e., Department of Education, Department of Human Services, Department of the Treasury, State House Commission), it may be anticipated that an orderly procedure before the most appropriate tribunal will be undertaken. N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 et seq. (Office of Administrative Law); N.J.A.C. 19:65-14.1 through 19:65-14.8 at 12 N.J.R. 362-376 (1980); see Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 36-38 (1980); Hinfey v. Matawan Regional Board of Educ., 77 N.J. 514, 531-533 (1978). Moreover, insofar as the questions to be resolved require special understanding and insights for their correct resolution, our administrative processes contemplate that persons suitably qualified by expertise, experience and compe*268tence will determine these issues, at least in the first instance. Hackensack v. Winner, supra, 82 N.J. at 37-38.20
Accordingly, the judgments below are modified and the matters are remanded for resolution consistent with this opinion.
“Pertaining to, occurring in, or involving the period shortly before, during, and shortly after the time of birth.” 2 J. Schmid, Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine, at P-83 (1978).
For an explanation of this formula promulgated by the Department of the Treasury and a series of tables applying it, see I Program Analysis, supra, Appendix B at 89 et seq.; see also II Program Analysis, supra at 38.
The parties in Guempel stipulated that these educational costs deductible for the per capita cost of institutional care are limited to the salaries of certified teachers, their fringe benefits and the cost of certain educational supplies and equipment at the particular institution. There was also trial testimony by an official in the Department of Human Services to this same effect. 159 N.J.Super. at 172-173. See post at 266 n. 19 for the actual computation of these costs in Guempel. The Levines also received a comparable educational cost deduction. 160 N.J.Super. at 594.
The State Board of Institutional Trustees, formerly the State Board of Control (N.J.S.A. 30:1-1), is statutorily charged with fixing the cost of maintenance of private paying patients by each institution. N.J.S.A. 30:4-60, 30:4-67; see N.J.A.C. 10:37-1.1 et seq. In actuality, however, this cost is pegged at the adjusted per capita cost set for each institution by the State House Commission. N.J.S.A. 30:4-78; see I Program Analysis, supra at 25. For the composition of the State House Commission, see N.J.S.A. 52:20-1.
If the required monthly contribution is less than half of the adjusted per capita cost for the particular institution, the patient is classified as a “county indigent with contributions”; the county retains the contributions and the *244adjusted per capita cost is divided evenly between the county and the State. If the required monthly contribution is more than one-half of the adjusted per capita cost involved, the individual is a “county excess patient”; the State retains the contributions and pays the full adjusted per capita cost to the institution. If it is determined that the patient and his relatives can contribute nothing towards the maintenance costs, the patient becomes a “county indigent with no contribution”; the county and the State each pay half of the adjusted per capita cost. I Program Analysis, supra at 2, 4-5, 24. Other categories also exist which are not relevant to this discussion. Ibid:, see N.J.S.A. 30:4-52.
See post at 266 n. 19.
The Legislature had enacted a statute in 1867 creating a state board of education to supervise and control public education in the State and providing some degree of public funding. L.1867, c. 179, amended L.1871, c. 527. See D. Rosser, 100 Years of Free Public Education in New Jersey (1971).
Other state constitutions contain similar “thorough and efficient” provisions. E. g., Pa.Const., Art. 3, § 14. See Comment, “San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: A Study of Alternatives Open to State Courts,” 8 U.S.F.L.Rev. 90, 107 n. 113 (1973).
This case, aptly termed a “saga” by Judge Botter in Iuppo v. Burke, 162 N.J.Super. 538, 540 (App.Div.1978), certif. den. 79 N.J. 462 (1978), had a long and complicated history, as its full citation in this Court alone will indicate: Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973) (Robinson I) cert. den. sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973); 63 N.J. 196 (1973) (Robinson II), cert. den. sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973); 67 N.J. 35 (1975) (Robinson III); 67 N.J. 333 corrected opinion printed at 69 N.J. 133 (1975) (Robinson IV), cert. den. sub nom. Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 217, 46 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); 69 N.J. 449 (1976) (Robinson V); 70 N.J. 155 (1976) (Robinson VI) (enjoining expenditure of funds for public schools), amended 70 N.J. 464 (1976), injunction vacated 70 N.J. 465 (1976).
See generally Berke & Sinkin, “Developing a ‘Thorough and Efficient’ School Finance System: Alternatives for Implementing Robinson v. Cahill,” 3 J.L. & Educ. 337 (1974); Tractenberg, “Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way,” 27 Rutgers L.Rev. 365 (1974); Note, “Robinson v. Cahill; A Case Study in Judicial Self-Legitimization,” 8 Rut.-Cam.L.J. 508 (1977).
lt has been estimated that in 1970 approximately 3% of the general population was mentally retarded, including 2.4 million persons under 21 years of age. Of this latter number, about 1.5% (36,000) were classified as “Profound (IQ 0-20)” and 3.5% (84,000) as “Severe (IQ 20-35)”; the remainder were considered either “Moderate (IQ 36-52)” (6% or 144,000) or “Mild (IQ 53 +)” (89% or 2.1 million plus). National Association For Retarded Children, Facts on Mental Retardation 15 (1971), as cited in Comment, “The Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education,” 55 Neb.L.Rev. 637, 638 n.2 (1976); ami Comment, “Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the Mentally Retarded,” 34 Ohio St.L.J. 554, 556 n.3 (1973); see also R. Anderson & J. Greer, Educating the Severely and Profoundly Retarded 7-10 (1976).
Many commentators have also taken this position. See, e. g., Dimond, “The Constitutional Right to Education; The Quiet Revolution,” 24 Hastings L.J. 1087, 1088, 1097-1098, 1105-1106 (1973) (see also discussion of PARC and Mills cases at 1116-1118); Gilhool, “Education; An Inalienable Right,” 39 Exceptional Children 597, 603 (1973); Handel, “The Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child’s Right to an Effective Minimal Education,” 36 Ohio St.L.J. 349, 357, 365 (1975); Levinson, “The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children,” 12 Valparaiso U.L.Rev. 253, 255, 261 (1978); McClung, “Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?,” 3 J. Law & Educ. 153 (1974); P. Wald, “The Right to Education,” in 2 Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped 831 (1973); Comment, “Handicapped Child Has a Right,” supra note 11, 55 Neb.L.Rev. at 647-648, 661-662; see generally Symposium, “The Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded,” 23 Syracuse L.Rev. 991 (1972).
In Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F.Supp. 583, 587-588 (E.D.Pa.1979), the court recognized degrees of mental retardation, including as one class the “severely and profoundly impaired” and found that there can be differences in the education programs from child to child “in light of the nature and severity of the [particular] child’s handicapping condition.” See also Comment, “Handicapped Child Has a Right,” supra note 11, 55 Neb.L.Rev. at 637 n.2 (“[t]he terms ‘mild,’ ‘moderate,’ ‘severe’ and ‘profound’ . . describe levels of mental retardation, determined by considering both ‘measured intelligence’ and ‘impairment in adaptive behavior’”); ante at 248 n.ll see generally American Ass’n on Mental Deficiency, Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation (1977 Rev.).
N.J.S.A. 18A:46-8 provides that each child identified as “handicapped” under N.J.S.A. 18A:46-6 shall be examined and presumptively classified according to the type of handicap present.
The statute denominates these noneducable and nontrainable children as ‘eligible for day training.” N.J.S.A. 18A:46-9(c).
In a sense, this difference is reflected statutorily. The Developmentally Disabled Rights Act, L.1977. c. 82. N.J.S.A. 30:6D-1 et seq., for example, requires that every developmentally disabled person between the ages of 5 and 21 in residence or full-time attendance at any public or private facility shall be provided “a thorough and efficient education suited to such person’s age and abilities.” N.J.S.A. 30:6D-5(c). “Education” as such, however, is only one of the many health and social services specified to be furnished for the developmentally disabled. N.J.S.A. 30:6D-3(b).
The right to treatment through the “least restrictive alternatives,” which includes, of course, alternatives to institutional care, has been the subject of wide commentary. E. g., Chambers, “Right to the Least Restrictive Alternative Setting for Treatment,” in 2 Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped 991 (1973); Ferleger & Boyd, “Anti-Institutionalization; The Promise of the Pennhurst Case,” 31 Stan.L.Rev. Ill (1979); Spece, “Preserving the Right to Treatment; A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Consti*262tutional Right to Treatment Theories,” 20 Ariz.L.Rev. 1 (1978); Note, “Legal Remedies for the Misclassification or Wrongful Placement of Educationally Handicapped Children,” 14 Colum.J.L. & Social Problems 389 (1979).
Many of the issues currently before this Court in the instant case are now before the United States Supreme Court in Halderman and its companion cases, although those cases deal primarily with the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6000 et seq. Certiorari was granted in those cases on June 9, 1980. See also Ferleger & Boyd, “Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of the Pennhurst Case,” 31 Stan.L.Rev. 717 (1979).
The computation of the cost of institutionalized care involves the use of certain accounting assumptions which include some but not all of the total education and associated services furnished to residential retarded children. Ante at 243 n.3. The parties stipulated in the Guempel case to the following cost figures for the Hunterdon State School:
Per Capita Cost Per Capita Education Adjustment Adjusted Per Capita Cost
1972 $ 7,666.55 $171.81 $ 7,594.74
1973 8,506.75 178.19 8,328.56
1974 9,934.38 212.43 9,721.95
1975 10,170.67 218.33 9,952.34
1976 10,699.45 370.40 10,329.05
1977 11,397.19 332.47 11,064.72
1978 12,704.99 309.68 12,395.31
See 159 N.J.Super. at 173. The trial court, in considering the adequacy of *267the educational credit available to the Guempels, a total of $309.68 in 1978, concluded that equivalent annual educational services provided to nortresidential children at day care training centers were worth $5,500. Id at 191. The State points out, however, that other funding sources have not been taken into account and that the fiscal comparison is therefore not accurate. A determination of the precise value of the free services received by day care training students as well as their application to institutionalized children would here require further inquiry and findings of fact.
a remand for administrative agency proceedings would address some federal concerns. Both the Rehabilitation Act and Handicapped Children Act provide that parents are entitled to a due process hearing to resolve disputes on “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1978); see Note, “Administrative Rights of Handicapped Children to Educational Opportunities: Recent Developments in New York Law,” 14 Coium.J.L. & Social Problems 491, 518 et seq. (1974); see also Stemple v. Prince George’s County Bd. of Educ., 623 F. 2d 893 (4 Cir. 1980); 45 C.F.R. § 84.36 (1979) (due process procedural safeguards under the Rehabilitation Act). After the present suits were instituted, the State Department of Education established a procedure to comply with these federal due process requirements. N.J.A.C. 6:28-1.9
Such an administrative proceeding at this point would obviate a decision as to whether the federal statutes provide a private cause of action. It may be noted on this point, however, that at least with respect to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1975) (as amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub.L. 95-602, §§ 119, 122, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982), most courts which have ruled on this question Have found that a private right of action exists thereunder. See, e. g., Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 130-131 (5 Cir. 1980); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 865 (2 Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8 Cir. 1977); Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Educ., 490 F.Supp. 948, 949 (D.N.J.1980); see also Note, “Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitation Section 504 After Southeastern," 80 Colum.L.Rev. 171 (1980). Cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, - U.S. -, - 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555, - (1980) (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 creates a statutory right of action against state officers for violation of federal statutory rights or entitlements).