(dissenting).
Two cases decided today involve discharge for insubordination by an employee and have the same result: Windsperger v. Broadway Liquor Outlet, ante p. 142, and Hamilton v. International Dairy Queen, 346 N.W.2d 138 (Minn.1984). Both involve an employee’s angry outburst directed toward a supervisor. Both involve a determination by the Commissioner of Employment Security that the employee was to be temporarily disqualified from unemployment compensation because of statutory misconduct. Both result in this court’s reversal of the commissioner’s determination — the first by extended opinion; the second simply by reference to the first. The basis for the decisions is that an “isolated hotheaded incident” does not interfere with the employer’s business. By this single opinion, I express my dissent in both decisions of the court.
Windsperger
The facts, as succinctly stated by the appeals tribunal and affirmed by the commissioner, are these:
(2) On the morning of May 28, 1982 the claimant left a anote for her employer to the effect that she wanted to leave early on the following day (Saturday, May 29, 1982). The claimant was scheduled to work that Saturday until 3:00 PM.
(3) The employer answered the claimant by writing on the backside of her note to the effect that she could leave at 2:30 PM but not at 1:00 PM. This was the Memorial Day weekend and the employer anticipated a busy day on Saturday.
(4) Throughout the day on May 28, 1982 the claimant attempted to talk with her employer about her leaving early. About 8:00 PM that day, the claimant and the employer discussed the matter. In the course of the conversation, the claimant became quite loud and violently upset when not allowed to leave early. The Claimant continued her arguing at which time the employer indicated to the claimant that he had enough and was warning her. The employer *146warned the claimant to stop three times, and finally told the claimant, “You’re fired.” This all took place within a period of fifteen to twenty minutes. There were customers in the store during this time but these customers were unaware of any arguing or commotion,
(emphasis supplied).
The appeals tribunal concluded:
Based upon a review of the evidence and testimony of record, the tribunal concludes that the claimant, while her discharge was fully justified from the point of view of the employer, is not guilty of willful misconduct within the meaning of [Minn.Stat. § 268.09, subd. 1] and [Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 204 N.W.2d 644 (1973) ].
(emphasis supplied).
The commissioner, reversing the decision of the appeals tribunal, concluded in these words:
In the present case, the claimant was clearly advised that she would not be given the two hours off on what the employer termed one of the busiest days in a retail liquor store. The employer had allowed the claimant to leave one-half hour. The claimant had not set out at the hearing or on review any compelling reason for her early departure. Her persistence in arguing the point after being warned three times by the employer to discontinue clearly indicates a lack of concern for her employment. This representative does not concur with the Appeal Tribunal that this was merely a single instance of poor judgment,
(emphasis supplied).
The majority opinion does not hold that the action of the employee was not misconduct but holds that one incident should not constitute statutory misconduct. “While we cannot condone Windsperger’s irrational outburst at her manager,” the majority acknowledges, it nonetheless holds that “her tantrum does not evince such a willful disregard for her employer’s interests as to justify denying her unemployment benefits.” As a matter of fact, it was not entirely an isolated incident because, as the majority opinion acknowledges, “Wind-sperger had once, over a year before, thrown a three-minute temper tantrum when told she would not be getting a raise.” In Auger v. Gillette Co., 303 N.W.2d 255, 257 (1981), we noted, although in a different episode of misconduct, that “a warning given to employees would have strengthened employer’s proof.” In this case, as the findings of the appeals tribunal make clear, “[t]he employer warned the claimant to stop three times.”
Two elements in the majority’s statement of the rule of law are disturbing. First, the majority seems to say that insubordination is permissible if it occurs only once. I cannot accept the notion that any act of insubordination, however deliberate and inexcusable, is permissible if it happens only once. Second, the majority would hold that insubordination is not disqualifying misconduct if other employees or customers do not observe it. The adverse effect of insubordination is not that it is observed by others but, rather, that insubordination, in disregard of proper standards of behavior, interferes with the efficient and cooperative conduct of business. The employee here was attempting to work her will against her employer without regard for the necessities of the business in which she was employed.
In Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 204 N.W.2d 644, we adopted the construction of “misconduct” as formulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941). The Boynton case involved an employee who had 3 minor traffic accidents during 2 months of employment but failed to report them, one accident involving a minor personal injury of which he was not actually aware. It was in that context that the Wisconsin court articulated the exception that “mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed ‘misconduct.’ ” 237 Wis. *147at 259, 296 N.W. at 640. But for that exception, the general rule of Boynton is that “misconduct” is “such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to his employer.” Id. (emphasis supplied.)
A lower court of Wisconsin, in Lathrop v. DILHR & Presto Products, Inc., No. 163-489 (Wis.Cir.Ct., Dane Cty., March 12, 1979), reads the formulation of Boynton differently from this court’s decisions today. There, during a meeting to discuss some reports of unsatisfactory work, the employee became angry and, in a vulgarity, told his supervisor where he could “stick it.” The court there expressed the opinion that “merely one act of insubordination to a supervisor in the nature of that committed by the employee ⅜ * * may properly be found to constitute misconduct.” I view the circumstances of the case here as a deliberate and insubordinate attempt by the employee to work her will notwithstanding a reasonable order of the employer. No place of employment, large or small, can operate effectively for the benefit of the employer and other employees where an employee for 15 or 20 minutes evinces defiance or a disaffected attitude toward the reasonable exercise of managerial authority.
I am not unaware of the decisions in other states that may be read to support the result reached by the majority of this court. Those decisions might be more persuasive, however, were it not for the distinguishing fact that the insubordinate conduct in this case was in the face of repeated warnings to desist. I observe, too, that similar authorities are not followed by the court in the companion case of Hamilton v. International Dairy Queen.
Hamilton
The findings of fact made by the appeals tribunal of the Department of Employment Security and confirmed by the commissioner are these:
(2) The claimant [director of construction for the employer, International Dairy Queen, Inc.] did not have a good working relationship with his supervisor, the Vice-President for facilities.
(3) The claimant has recently had heart surgery and had been on a leave of absence for an extended period of time, returning in February of 1982. The claimant also has had other serious medical problems. The employer has always accommodated the claimant in any work restrictions that he had due to his medical condition.
(4) On August 13, 1982 the claimant’s supervisor was giving him a personnel evaluation. The possibility of the claimant having to work a twelve to fourteen hour day sometime in the future was discussed. The claimant mentioned that he might not be able to handle such hours with his condition. The claimant wanted to discuss the salary increase he could expect to receive. The supervisor told him he could not discuss it with him. The company policy is not to give the employee the specific figure until it is approved by higher management. The vice-president said something to the effect, “I can do anything I want with you.” The claimant became incensed and said “F..k you, you son of a b...h.”
(emphasis supplied.)
The commissioner concluded:
The claimant contends that he was provoked into the outburst which took place. We do not find that the record supports this contention. While the vice-president of facilities was clearly callous in telling the claimant that he could do anything he wanted with the claimant, the evidence demonstrates that the claimant was sufficiently aware that any actions undertaken by the vice-president of facilities *148would be reviewed by upper management. The claimant was certainly aware that he had avenues to appeal any action taken against him by his supervisor. The claimant’s response in swearing at his supervisor was uncalled for and unexecuseable. The record does seem to demonstrate that the claimant has a temper and it is argued by the claimant that such an outburst should not amount to misconduct. We will not base our decision upon a question of whether an individual has a temper or not, such that those individuals who have a temper could be excused and those who do not, could not be. We fail to see how an employer could operate a business and allow employees to swear at their supervisors. This employment was not in a factory setting and there is no evidence to demonstrate that such language was in any way commonplace. While an individual may well become angry and frustrated, it is incumbent upon an employee to remain civil and conduct of the type demonstrated by the claimant is certainly in disregard of the standards of the behavior which an employer has a right to expect. We therefore concur with the Appeal Tribunal when it held that the claimant was discharged for reasons amounting to misconduct under the Minnesota Employment Services Law.
(emphasis supplied).
If we are to give persuasive effect to decisions of other jurisdictions, we should consider those decisions holding that the use of vulgarity or profanity toward supervisors is statutory misconduct. One, inferentially, is Avery v. B & B Rental Toilets, 97 Idaho 611, 549 P.2d 270 (1976), cited by the majority in its opinion in Windsperger. Although the Avery court concluded that there was no misconduct when an unhappy toilet cleaner “blew his stack” upon discovering a number of particularly dirty units, the court noted that “[tjhere was no evidence that [the employee] used vulgar or abusive language during the conversation.” 97 Idaho at 615, 549 P.2d at 274.
Brostven v. Beatrice Foods, Inc. and DILHR, No. 80-CVD-867 (Wis.Cir.Ct, Rock Cty., Nov. 26, 1980), involved the discharge of an employee who objected to and argued about a work assignment in the course of receiving the directive of his supervisor. The employee used abusive language, made an obscene gesture, and signed out 2 minutes early. The court stated that no employer should be required to tolerate such abuse or insolence and noted the need for complete cooperation and respect for authority for an organization to function properly. For other cases finding insubordinate misconduct for use of vulgarity or abusive language, see Olsgard v. Industrial Commission, 190 Colo. 472, 548 P.2d 910 (1976); Acord v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, 607 S.W.2d 174 (Mo.App.1980); Choute v. Ross, 60 A.D.2d 738, 400 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1977); Henry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 57 Pa.Cmwlth. 192, 425 A.2d 1210 (1981) (“[the] choice of terminology, in itself, supports the finding that [the employee] was insubordinate. Insubordinate vulgarity constitutes wilful misconduct.”).
The conduct of this employee involved patently unacceptable language and an attitude totally out of place at any level of employment, not excluding high levels of management. Whether the language was heard by others or whether it was a single episode makes it no less unacceptable. Reversal of the commissioner undermines the state policy of using unemployment compensation reserves for the benefit of employees unemployed through no fault of their own. I would affirm.