(concurring). While I agree with the dissent that the zoning hoard, on the basis of the evidence before it, could initially have determined that the provision of overnight accommodations by the plaintiff was not an “accessory use” under existing zoning regulations on the ground that such activity was not “customary” with the use of the premises as a house of worship, the record reveals that the board expressly found to the contrary, ruling that the provision of overnight accommodations on nights when there are travel restrictions under Judaic law constitutes an “accessory use” and is therefore permitted. As things now stand, the provision of overnight accommodations by Beit Havurah is permitted on all Sabbath and religious holiday nights when travel restrictions are in effect, and for one night subsequent, which means that overnight accommodations are allowed on every Friday and Saturday, as well as on certain key Jewish holidays.1 No appeal from that decision having been taken, that decision is now final.
*452To my mind, the board’s determination that overnight accommodations on certain nights are an accessory use, once final, necessarily precludes the board from subsequently ruling that overnight accommodations on other nights, i.e., on nights on which there are no travel restrictions under Judaic law, are not also accessory uses, because it is apparent from the record that this later determination is premised on religious grounds and involves governmental entanglement in a constitutionally prohibited area.
To permit the zoning board to limit or qualify the use already granted on the basis of religious grounds, i.e., the presence or absence of travel restrictions in Judaic law, is, in effect, to permit inquiry by a secular body into the validity of a par*453ticular religious belief or practice. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S. Ct. 601, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969). Entanglement in religious matters by a governmental body can easily lead to limitations on the free exercise of religion and impermissibly infringes on the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting the establishment or practice of religion.
I must, therefore, join with my colleagues in holding that the appeal of the plaintiffs must be sustained.
In a letter dated September 20, 1976, from Paul Lichterman, a plaintiff in this ease, to the zoning board of appeals, certain “worship periods” were listed as having travel restrictions:
*452“Bosh Hashanna — Jewish New Year and Day of Judgment, 2 days and 2 nights — generally falls in September.
Yom Kjppur — Day of Atonement. 1 night and 1 day, falls 10 days after Bosh Hashanna.
Succot — Festival of Booths — begins 15 days after Bosh Hashanna and lasts 9 days and 9 nights. The first 2 days and nights are considered a major festival with travel restrictions.
Shemini Atzeret and Simhat Torah — The last 2 days and nights of the Succot Festival. A major festival marked by singing, dancing and parading with the Torah Scroll at night.
Pesach — Passover Festival, or Feast of Matzot lasting 8 nights. The first two days and the test two days are major festivals with travel restrictions. The first two nights are marked by special meal celebrations ealled Seders, lasting several hours. There are special dietary restrictions during the entire 8 day period. Pesach falls in April.
Shavuot — Festival of Weeks or Festival of the Giving of the Ten Commandments. It falls seven weeks after Pesach. It lasts 2 days and 2 nights. Traditional celebration consists of overnight study until daybreak, and morning prayers.
Sabbath — The Sabbath, 1 night and 1 day. Every Friday night and Saturday day celebrated by prayers, special meals, study and relaxation. Travel restrictions apply to this worship period.”