¶ 48. dissenting. Plaintiffs in this case seek redress for their landlord’s failure to notify them of chemical contamination, that the landlord knew about, in the water serving their residences. Although plaintiffs alleged a number of claims arising from the landlord’s inaction, they decided to pursue only their warranty-of-habitability claim in the superior court. Obviously sympathetic to plaintiffs’ situation, the majority holds that the Legislature did not intend the Vermont Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), 9 V.S.A., chapter 137, to cover latent defects known to the landlord. Thus, under the majority’s holding, a tenant may sue for breach of the common-law warranty without prior notice to the landlord if the defect is latent, but the tenant must follow the statutory prerequisites to suit for all patent defects. I cannot join in the Court’s decision because the statutory warranty of habitability supplants the common-law warranty and does not distinguish between latent and patent defects, and defendants’ alleged conduct is fully actionable under a common-law tort. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 44. What distinguishes this case from any precedent on the interrelationship of a statutory remedy and its common-law antecedent is *319that the statute applicable in this case entirely and explicitly covers the situation that is before the court. The RRAA sets out a warranty of habitability requiring that the landlord provide “premises that are safe, clean and fit for human habitation and which comply with the requirements of applicable building, housing and health regulations.” 9 V.S.A. § 4457(a). The language of § 4457(a) reflects the parameters of the common-law warranty that this Court adopted in Hilder v. St Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 159, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (1984) (holding that landlord warrants to deliver over and maintain rental premises that are safe and fit for human living); see also Vt Tenants, Inc. v. Vt. Hous. Fin. Agency, 170 Vt. 77, 86, 742 A.2d 745,751 (1999) (“Although RRAA has tenant-protection and landlord-protection provisions, its primary purpose appears to be to codify the common law relationship for residential rental agreements.”); State v. Bisson, 161 Vt. 8, 12, 632 A.2d 34, 37 (1993) (RRAA “contains the general law of landlord and tenant relations that is customarily applicable in any context”). Hilder made no distinction between latent and patent defects, 144 Vt. at 160, 478 A.2d at 208 (“[T]he implied warranty of habitability covers all latent and patent defects in the essential facilities of the residential unit.”), and neither does the statute. By its plain meaning, the statute covers both. Just as explicitly, it requires the tenant to give “actual notice of the noncompliance,” 9 V.S.A. § 4458(a), which the statute defines as “written notice hand-delivered or mailed to the last known address.” Id. § 4451(1). Again, by its plain meaning, the statutory warranty covers the situation before this Court.
¶ 45. Our precedents are clear that where the statutory scheme covers the exact situation before the court, it preempts the common law. Swett v. Haig’s, Inc., 164 Vt. 1, 5, 663 A.2d 930, 932 (1995); Winney v. Ransom & Hastings, Inc., 149 Vt. 213, 217-18, 542 A.2d 269, 271-72 (1988); see also Klittner v. Steiner, 158 Vt. 654, 655, 610 A.2d 149, 150 (1992) (mem.) (holding that when a claim falls squarely within the statute’s language, the common-law claim does not survive). The situation here is quite close to Swett, where we followed the plain meaning of the statute to preempt the law with respect to contribution between joint tortfeasors over a dissent that the holding was inconsistent with legislative intent and would gut the statute’s protection. 164 Vt. at 5, 12-13, 663 A.2d at 932, 936-37. In doing so, we noted that the legislative history was “sparse and ambiguous.” Id. at 6, 663 A.2d at 932. The majority opinion pays lip service to our case law on statutory preemption of common-law claims, but does not reconcile its action with that precedent.
*320¶ 46. Notwithstanding the Legislature’s adoption of the common-law warranty of habitability in toto, the majority carves out a narrow and unspoken exception for latent defects because it believes the Legislature overlooked the issue. See ante, ¶ 23 (“This oversight is understandable ____”). It draws that conclusion from committee discussion on patent, but not latent, defects. See ante, ¶22. Ultimately, the majority concludes that requiring notice for latent defects “serves no similarly important or logical purpose.” Id. ¶20. In my view, the majority’s rationale involves imperfections that often inhere in legislation. The Legislature rarely predicts every eventuality and covers it in the resulting legislation. See Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 VT 5, ¶¶ 10-15, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727 (construing a statute according to its express terms even though legislative history suggested that the Legislature overlooked the statute’s application in one particular context). In responding to concerns of landlords, the drafting committee may well have gone further than necessary to protect their legitimate interest. These imperfections are not grounds for refusing to apply a clear legislative requirement, however much we may disagree with it. In my view, .the Legislature’s inattention to the question of latent defects, and the RRAA’s consequent imperfection as it relates to those defects, cannot justify the majority’s interpretation of the statutory scheme.
¶ 47. There is a much more obvious reason why the Legislature would construct a warranty-of-habitability scheme without distinguishing between latent and patent defects, and that reason involves an appropriate interaction between the statute and the common law. In this case, plaintiffs seek damages for the anguish they have suffered since discovering that, without any prior warning, they exposed themselves and their children to a dangerous chemical whose Mure health effects are unknown. Plaintiffs did not need either a common-law or statutory warranty of habitability to bring this claim. Defendants’ failure to disclose the water contamination is actionable under a long-recognized exception to the caveat lessee doctrine. Thus, plaMiffs’ inability to recover is created not by the notice provisions of the RRAA, but instead by their choice of liability theory.
¶ 48. Before the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability in residential rental agreements, the common law recognized the harshness of the caveat lessee doctrine with respect to latent defects known to the landlord. R. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 3:12 (1980). An exception to the doctrine emerged that made a landlord liable for latent defects that the landlord knew about at the time of *321the tenant’s entry, but failed to disclose to the tenant. Id:, 1 H. Tiffany, The Law of Landlord and Tenant § 86, at 562 (1910); 1 J. Taylor, The American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 382, at 482 (9th ed. 1904). The landlord’s liability arose from his silence about the latent defect because the landlord owed no duty to repair the premise under the common law. Maywood v. Logan, 43 N.W. 1052, 1053 (Mich. 1889); Steefel v. Rothschild, 72 N.E. 112, 114 (N.Y. 1904); Tucker v. Hayford, 75 P.3d 980, 984 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); see also Schoshinski, supra, § 3:12, at 111 (discussing various remedies for landlord’s nondisclosure of dangerous and known latent defect the tenant is not likely to discover). For example, a landlord’s failure to disclose water contamination to his tenants stated a common-law cause of action under this theory in a Washington case. Tucker, 75 P.3d at 984. In that case, the landlord was aware of the water contamination and the need to test the water system periodically. The tenants were unaware of the contamination, and they later became ill from it after consuming the Water. The Tucker court explained that, although the common law did not require the landlord to discover or repair obscure defects existing when the tenant takes possession, the landlord is liable for not disclosing “‘known dangers which are not likely to be discovered by the tenant.’” Id. (quoting Aspon v. Loomis, 816 P.2d 751, 756 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)). The court sent the case back for trial on the common-law failure-to-disclose claim, as well as other claims, including a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
¶ 49. The result in this case is that plaintiffs are, in effect, getting double liability from the same theory. Plaintiffs were fully aware that negligent failure to disclose a latent defect known to the landlord was actionable, and in each of the three complaints they filed, they pled this cause of action. By the third amended complaint, they had reached the point, however, that the proliferation of defendants and causes of actions, leading in turn to cross-claims and third-party claims, was seriously slowing the progress of the case. As a result, they settled with all defendants except Parsons Hill Partnership and the Rooney family defendants. Part of the terms of the settlement required them to amend the complaint to delete claims of negligent failure to disclose against the remaining defendants and to go forward with only claims based on “active fault” in the breach of the implied covenant of habitability. The transcripts of the hearings and the relevant documents show that this decision was made because the settling defendants wanted to eliminate the risk that the remaining defendants could transfer liability to them on a theory of indemnity or contribution. *322Indeed, because the final version of the complaint raised only a claim of breach of warranty of habitability and required proof of “active fault,” proof that would not otherwise be required on a theory of breach of warranty of habitability, the trial judge granted summary judgment to all the settling defendants on the claims of the remaining defendants for indemnity.
¶ 50. While the terms of the settlement are not disclosed, plaintiffs received value for dropping their tort claim that remaining defendants negligently failed to disclose a latent defect known to them. Now they want to assert the same theory under the rubric of implied warranty of habitability. No unfairness is caused by denying plaintiffs this additional liability route. They could have gone to trial against defendants under the common-law theory with no elements to prove beyond those in their current complaint.
¶ 51. The majority’s illogical approach is most apparent from its conclusion about the 2000 amendment to 9 Y.S.A. § 4458(a), which allows notice to come from “a governmental entity or a qualified independent inspector.” 1999, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 6. The majority concludes that: “[w]ith this amendment, the Legislature has now brought cases like plaintiffs’ within the ambit of the statute, thus supporting our view that the former § 4458(a) did not cover the entire range of habitability claims.” Ante, ¶ 24. Our law is that an amendment is intended to change the meaning of a statute unless a clarification of preexisting law is clearly indicated. See State v. Thompson, 174 Vt. 172, 178, 807 A.2d 454, 460 (2002); Tarrant v. Dep’t of Taxes, 169 Vt. 189, 198, 733 A.2d 733, 740 (1999); Jones v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 140 Vt. 552, 555, 442 A.2d 463, 464 (1982). In this case, the amendment adding a new class of persons who can provide notice is not clearly indicated as a clarification, and thus, it is intended to change the law. According to the majority’s theory, however, this change was unnecessary because the original law didn’t require notice for latent defects. The amendment is inconsistent with the majority’s holding that the RRAA does not apply to latent defects.
¶ 52.1 have further concerns about the majority’s treatment of the amendment. Despite the fact that the amendment is intended to respond to the injustice the majority seeks to prevent, the Legislature did not choose to make a general distinction between latent and patent defects. Thus, the Legislature rejected the majority approach, and the majority is implementing it anyway. The Legislature will be surprised to find that despite its carefully constructed solution to the notice *323problem, notice will be irrelevant for the tenants the Legislature sought to protect.
¶ 53. In summary, we are distorting our law on the relationship between statutory and common-law rights by enforcing a right directly denied by the plain meaning of the statute, all to give plaintiffs a theory of liability alternative to the theory they tactically chose to bargain away. In doing so, we are undermining a statutory amendment the Legislature enacted to respond to this kind of case. I respectfully dissent.