dissenting:
The majority’s respondeat superior analysis is wrong. (See Holda v. County of Kane (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 522.) It is also irrelevant. The county’s liability here is defined by statute. Section 4 — 105 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 4 — 105) provides that neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody. The statute also provides, however, that this immunity is inapplicable where, as alleged in this case,
"the employee, acting within the scope of his employment, from his observation of conditions that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and, through willful and wanton conduct, fails to take reasonable action to summon medical care.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 4 — 105.
There is no question that Cook County constitutes a local public entity within the meaning of this statute (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 1 — 206), nor can there be any doubt that the sheriff, who runs the jail, is an employee of that entity. Under article VII, section 4, of the 1970 Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 4) sheriffs are explicitly listed among county officers, and such officers are expressly defined as constituting employees for the purposes of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 1 — 202). By statute, Cook County is therefore responsible for any injury proximately caused by members of the sheriffs department where the conditions set forth in section 4 — 105 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 4 — 105) are proven at trial.
Counts I and II of plaintiffs complaint set forth claims which fall squarely within the terms of section 4 — 105. He specifically alleges, inter alla, that county employees at the jail knew that the decedent was in immediate need of medical attention, yet "wil[l]fully and wantonly failed to take reasonable action to summon medical care.” Under these circumstances, counts I and II properly stated a cause of action. The judgment dismissing those counts with prejudice should therefore be reversed, and the cause should be remanded for further proceedings.