concurring and dissenting:
Victor Perry Wright, seventeen years of age, was adjudicated delinquent following a hearing in which it was found that he had assaulted and raped his stepmother’s sister. The majority reverses the adjudication and remands for another hearing because the hearing judge excluded lay opinion testimony that the victim had been intoxicated. Although I concur in the majority’s determination that the lower court’s evidentiary ruling was in error, I believe the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The juvenile and Marlene Lynch met at a family picnic held on August 7, 1977 at 3625 Churchview Avenue, Pittsburgh, the home of the juvenile’s father and stepmother. After several hours, the juvenile and Marlene left the picnic with Joseph Sipior to feed a watchdog at Sipior’s place of employment. Thereafter they twice stopped at bars to purchase six-packs of beer, visited the home of Sipior’s friend, James Davis, and drove to a wooded area on East Agnew Extension, Baldwin Boro, Allegheny County. There, in darkness, they experienced difficulty with Sipior’s vehicle, which stalled after colliding with a tree and after having been" driven through an accumulation of surface water. After the juvenile had walked away from the car, Sipior grabbed Marlene, pushed her against the car, and tore a button from the vest she was wearing. Marlene struck Sipior in the face and screamed for the juvenile, who thereupon returned to the car. The young men managed to start the car, only to have Sipior declare a need for a screwdriver because the car was not functioning properly. Marlene volunteered to go in search of one and left, to be followed by the juvenile. When they were a short distance from the vehicle, the juvenile knocked Marlene to the ground, held her down and pulled off her clothes. He then engaged in sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, they returned separately to Sipior’s car and left the wooded area. When an accident occurred, Marlene jumped out of the car and began running and screaming. An unidentified motorist picked her up and took her to the police station. There she said *293that she had been raped and asked to use the lavatory. Instead of remaining there, however, she ran to her cousin’s home where she attempted to clean herself of blood and dirt. She was thereafter taken to a hospital.
The juvenile admitted an act of sexual intercourse but testified that it had been consensual. He was corroborated by Joseph Sipior. The hearing judge rejected this explanation. He did so because of inconsistencies which he found in the young men’s testimony and also because he found that the condition of Marlene’s clothing and the injuries apparent to her person corroborated her version of the manner in which intercourse had occurred.
Appellant attempted to attack the victim’s credibility by showing that she had been intoxicated. Intoxication is a matter where the line between a witness’s opinion and his affirmation of fact is indistinct. Word descriptions are sometimes inadequate to convey the full import of visible manifestations. Thus, it is proper for a witness who has observed another’s conduct and physical condition to supplement his or her description by an opinion. Because intoxication is a matter of common knowledge and observation, opinions of non-expert witnesses are admissible. Commonwealth v. Eyler, 217 Pa. 512, 66 A. 746 (1907); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 202 Pa.Super. 520, 198 A.2d 419 (1964); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 186 Pa.Super. 632, 142 A.2d 469 (1958). Before a witness can testify to an opinion, however, he or she must first lay a foundation therefor by articulating the facts which support such an opinion. This requires more than opportunity for observation. It requires, rather, that the witness identify those facts upon which his or her opinion of another’s intoxication is founded. Unless the witness can identify and articulate facts forming a reasonable basis for such an opinion, the witness’s opinion should not be received. Laubach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 A. 88 (1925); Commonwealth v. Eyler, supra; Turner v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 161 Pa.Super. 16, 53 A.2d 849 (1947); Commonwealth v. Rouchie, 135 Pa.Super. 594, 7 A.2d 102 (1939). See also: Gensemer v. Williams, 419 F.2d 1361 (3rd Cir. 1970).
*294The record in the instant case is filled with references to the fact that Marlene had been drinking alcoholic beverages. James Davis, who had been visited by Sipior, Marlene, and the juvenile, observed that Marlene had been sipping beer intermittently from a plastic glass. Although he had had ample opportunity to observe Marlene, he was able to identify neither physical condition nor conduct on her part that would support an opinion that she had been intoxicated. The observed fact that she had been sipping beer was inadequate, without more, to permit the expression of an opinion that she was intoxicated. The hearing judge’s exclusion of Davis’ opinion, therefore, was correct. It was only his reason for the ruling, i. e., that the witness was not an expert, that was erroneous.
Robin Wright, the juvenile’s sister-in-law, who had been present at the picnic, said that Marlene had been “staggering a bit” and had spilled a drink. When asked if she thought Marlene had been intoxicated, she replied: “I guess she was, but I am no expert.” Neil Wright, Jr., the juvenile’s brother, saw Marlene stagger during the afternoon and heard his brother say, “She’s drunk.” He was not asked to give his own opinion. Victor Perry Wright, the juvenile, testified that Marlene had been drinking beer and liquor. He was not asked and did not express an opinion about her state of, sobriety.
The only witness who was improperly denied the right to express an opinion was Joseph Sipior. However, his testimony left no doubt that he thought Marlene had been intoxicated. Thus, he told the hearing judge that Marlene had been drinking beer and “didn’t walk a straight line.” He also described her speech as “crazy — like when you start getting high.” Consequently, it is difficult to perceive how an expression of opinion concerning Marlene’s lack of sobriety would have added to or strengthened the testimony of this witness.
In summary, one witness testified the victim had been staggering, another said she was intoxicated, a third quoted the juvenile as saying “she’s drunk,” and a fourth witness *295opined that she couldn’t walk a straight line and talked as though she were getting “high.” I cannot agree with the majority that this evidence was insufficient to enable the factfinder to make an accurate assessment of Ms. Lynch’s state of sobriety for purposes of determining the credibility of her testimony.
The trier of the facts, it must be remembered, was an experienced juvenile court judge and not a jury of lay persons. Indeed, it is unlikely that even lay persons could have failed to grasp the import of the juvenile’s evidence. The victim’s consumption of alcohol and the manifestations of intoxication apparent in her conduct were certainly sufficient to alert the judge, who understood exactly what appellant was trying to prove, that the victim’s ability to perceive and remember accurately may have been impaired. Moreover, the hearing judge’s remarks at the time of entering his adjudication make it clear that he did give due consideration to this aspect of the case and made an assessment of the victim’s state of sobriety.
Nevertheless, he decided the credibility issue in favor of the victim. In doing so, he found that the evidence of Marlene’s intoxication had been outweighed by other, more significant indicia of truthfulness. Her prompt outcry at the police station and again at the home of her cousin, her charge of rape repeated to the juvenile’s step-mother, who was also her sister, and the condition of the victim’s clothing and physical appearance were found by the hearing judge to be controlling. The hearing judge also found inconsistencies in the facts narrated by Sipior and the juvenile. The majority has recited various reasons for disregarding the hearing judge’s finding and determines the credibility issue adversely to the victim and favorably to appellant. It was the hearing judge, however, who heard and saw the witnesses and who was in a better position to make such a determination. His findings have the same effect as the verdict of a jury. Commonwealth v. Truss, 230 Pa.Super. 262, 326 A.2d 630 (1974). It is enough for our purpose of review that the lower court’s determination of the victim’s credibility *296was unaffected by the erroneous evidentiary ruling. As such, the error was harmless. See: Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978).
The hearing in the instant case, if not perfect, was thorough and fair. The juvenile was not in any way deprived of the fundamentals of a fair hearing. The issues in dispute received the careful and impartial consideration of the jurist who heard the case. A remand for rehearing, therefore, is unnecessary. See: Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 162, 318 A.2d 680, 694-695 (1974).
Appellant also complains that the Juvenile Court judge refused to receive and consider the results of a polygraph test. I concur with the majority’s rejection of this contention. The law is clear that the results of polygraph tests are not admissible in a court of law. The scientific reliability of such tests has never been established. Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d 732 (1973); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth, 179 Pa.Super. 64, 115 A.2d 865 (1955). There is no good reason for creating an exception, as appellant would have us do, to permit the results of polygraph tests to be used in juvenile hearings.
Appellant contends finally that the Juvenile Court abused its discretion when it denied appellant’s request to transfer the case to criminal court for trial by jury.1 Appellant’s motion for transfer, however, was not timely made. It was made for the first time at the start of the second day of hearings. By that time, the evidence in support of the delinquency petition had been introduced, and a part of the juvenile’s case had also been presented. By failing to make his request before the court began hearing the petition on its merits, appellant waived his right to request a transfer. Certainly it was too late to request a transfer after the evidence in support of the petition had been fully presented.
*297I would affirm the adjudication of delinquency; and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No. 333, § 28(c), 11 P.S. § 50-325.