dissenting:
This is an appeal from judgments of sentence for escape, possession of implements of escape, possession of an instrument of crime generally, and carrying a prohibited offensive weapon.1 The majority opinion and I are in accord on four of appellant’s.arguments, which I discuss below. We differ on two others; therefore, I dissent.
On May 28, 1975, appellant was convicted of first degree murder. On October 1, 1975, he escaped from the detention room of Philadelphia General Hospital. He was recaptured when police with an arrest warrant forcibly entered a private apartment and discovered him hiding under a child’s crib. In the course of this recapture the police seized a revolver that they saw on top of a dresser a few feet from the crib.
-1-
Appellant first argues that the lower court erred in not granting his motion to suppress the revolver.
At the suppression hearing the Commonwealth offered testimony to this effect: that a woman named Jacqueline Keim told a man named Carmen Sperduto that appellant was at her apartment; that Sperduto saw a newspaper item about appellant’s escape and telephoned the police, telling them that he had seen appellant and might know where appellant was; and that it was on the basis of this tip that the police and Sperduto went to the apartment. Appellant argues that this testimony was insufficient to show that the police had probable cause to believe that he would be in the apartment;2 the revolver was therefore the fruit of an unlawful entry.
*215While it is not necessary for the police to obtain a search warrant to execute an arrest warrant, United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1977);3 see United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925), we agree with appellant that probable cause to believe that the subject of the arrest warrant is on the premises is nonetheless required before the police may enter to execute the arrest warrant. However, before we may consider appellant’s argument that this requirement was not satisfied, we must discuss whether appellant has standing to make the argument.
Constitutional rights under the fourth amendment are personal in nature. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Commonwealth v. Treftz, 465 Pa. 614, 351 A.2d 265 (1976). A defendant who is aggrieved, not by the search itself, but solely by the introduction of damaging evidence, will be denied standing. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); Commonwealth v. Treftz, supra. Four “personal” interests have been identified that a defendant may assert in order to establish standing:
(1) his presence on the premises at the time of the search and seizure; (2) a possessory interest in the evidence improperly seized; (3) that the offense charged include as an essential element of the prosecution’s case, the element *216of possession at the time of the contested search and seizure; or, (4) a proprietory [sic] or possessory interest in the searched premises.
Commonwealth v. Treftz, supra, 465 Pa. at 621-22, 351 A.2d at 268 (footnotes omitted).
Thus is may be seen that if the police had improperly entered the apartment in order to search it, and had found the revolver, appellant would have had standing to move to suppress the revolver as evidence, his standing being based on the fact of “his presence on the premises at the time of the search and seizure.”
This said, we must ask whether the result should be different where, as here, the police do not enter to search the premises but to make an arrest.
We believe the result should be different. The reason a search is forbidden is to protect someone’s right of privacy. When the police set out to make a search, they intend to invade someone’s right of privacy. Here, when the police entered the apartment to look for appellant, they did not intend to invade appellant’s right of privacy but, if they found him, to arrest him. Nor, in fact, did the police invade appellant’s right of privacy. To be sure, they invaded his right of liberty, but they had proper authority to do that, in the form of the arrest warrant. The invasion of appellant’s right of liberty, however, was not an invasion of his right of privacy; a fugitive does not have a right of privacy if by “privacy” is meant a right to hide from, or to resist, proper arrest.4
*217Since appellant may not attack the lawfulness of the entry to arrest him,5 the revolver which was the proper subject of a search incident to arrest, and was in plain view, was properly held admissible.6
-2-
Appellant next argues that his motion for a demurrer as to the firearms charges should have been granted because the Commonwealth failed to prove possession of the revolver seized at the time of his arrest.
In deciding the sufficiency of evidence, we must first accept as true all the evidence upon which the trier of fact could properly have based the verdict, and then ask whether that evidence, with all reasonable inferences from *218it, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Fortune, 456 Pa. 365, 367, 318 A.2d 327, 328 (1974); Commonwealth v. Petrisko, 442 Pa. 575, 579-89, 275 A.2d 46, 49 (1971). Guilt must be proved and not conjectured. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 225 Pa.Super. 513, 312 A.2d 430 (1973). However, guilt may be established by circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Cimaszewski, 447 Pa. 141, 144, 288 A.2d 805, 806 (1972).
Here, appellant correctly argues that evidence of his mere proximity to the revolver would be insufficient to prove possession. Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971). Furthermore, the evidence that the apartment was not appellant’s might suggest that others had access to the revolver, which would argue against appellant’s possession of it. Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A.2d 119 (1971). However, Sperduto testified that two days before the arrest, that is, on the day appellant escaped, he saw a gun drop to the floor from inside appellant’s trousers. He further testified that it was a black, .22 caliber gun with a white handle — as was the revolver — and that he thought it and the revolver were the same. Given this testimony, the jury was justified in finding that appellant possessed the revolver.
-3-
Appellant next argues that his conviction for possession of the revolver should be reversed because he was convicted under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a) instead of § 907(b); in appellant’s view, although § 907(b) includes possession of firearms, § 907(a) does not. However, this court decided otherwise in Commonwealth v. McNear, 238 Pa.Super. 177, 353 A.2d 39 (1976).7
*219-4-
Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove one of the elements of the crime of escape. Appellant was originally tried on the escape charge in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, the jurisdiction of which is limited to misdemeanors. When appellant appealed for a trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas, he again was tried for escape as a misdemeanor. The Crimes Code, supra, 18 C.P.S.A. § 5121, provides as follows:
(d) Grading.—
(1) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree where:
(i) the actor was under arrest for or detained on a charge of felony or following conviction of crime;
(2) Otherwise an offense under this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove the crime of escape as a misdemeanor because it failed to prove that he was detained for something other than “a charge of felony or following conviction of a crime,” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121(d)(l)(i).
The difficulty with this argument is that the elements of the crime of escape are set out, not in § 5121(d), but in § 5121(a):
(a) Escape. — A person commits an offense if he unlawfully removes himself from official detention or fails to *220return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.
The Commonwealth was required to prove, and did prove, that appellant unlawfully removed himself from official detention. The grading section, on which appellant relies, does not add or subtract to this definition of the crime but only defines its severity, as a felony or misdemeanor. Compare Commonwealth v. McKennion, 235 Pa.Super. 160, 340 A.2d 889 (1975) (for theft offenses, under the Crimes Code, supra, § 3903, valuation of stolen goods is not element of crime, but controls grading of offense only (HOFFMAN and SPAETH, JJ., dissented)). Furthermore, it would be absurd to say that the Legislature, by requiring proof of conviction of a crime before an escape could be graded as a felony, intended by that to forbid proof of conviction of a crime before an escape could be graded as a misdemeanor. So long as appellant was not deprived of adequate notice to prepare his defense — and appellant does not argue that he was so deprived — he was fortunate to have been charged with and convicted of a less serious offense than he might have been. Cf. Commonwealth v. Farmer, 244 Pa.Super. 334, 344, 368 A.2d 748, 753 (1976) (indictment charging attempted theft of automobile fairly put defendant on notice of charges against him; proper to convict him of attempted theft of automobile’s contents, since any defense to first charge would have been identical to any defense to second charge).
-5-
Appellant next argues that the lower court erred in not permitting him to introduce evidence of the conditions of his confinement in prison as a defense to the charge of escape. Here, the majority and I differ.
As the majority notes, the law is clear that even if a prisoner’s conviction would be reversed or set aside on appeal or writ of habeas corpus, he has no right to escape. It does not necessarily follow from this law that duress is not available as a defense to a charge of escape. In People *221v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 118 Cal.Rptr. 110 (1974), the court set out five factors to be considered in deciding whether duress had been shown: (1) a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack, or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) lack of time for complaint or circumstances indicating that a complaint would be futile; (3) no time or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) absence of force or violence toward prison personnel in making the escape; and (5) an immediate report to the proper authorities once the prisoner has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat. This decision has been widely followed, see, e. g., United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129 (Del.Supr., 1977); State v. Worley, 18 Cr.L. 2310 (S.C.Sup.Ct., filed Dec. 4, 1975), although some courts have held that the factors enumerated are not prerequisites but rather go to the weight of the testimony about duress, see Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 576 P.2d 1129, 23 Cr.L. 2137 (1978); People v. Unger, 66 Ill.2d 333, 5 Ill.Dec. 848, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977).
Recently in United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (1978), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has had the occasion to consider the defense of duress. After examining such cases as Lovercamp and Michelson at length, a majority of the court concluded that proof of prison conditions should be permitted if relevant to the “intent to avoid confinement.” The majority drew a distinction between, on the one hand, a prisoner who escaped “to see his mother who is ill”, and, on the other, a prisoner who escaped “to avoid conditions that are not normal aspects of ‘confinement’— such as beatings in reprisal for testimony in a trial, failure to provide essential medical care, or homosexual attacks . .” 585 F.2d at 1128. In the latter case, said the majority, “the intent element of the crime of escape may not be satisfied,” id.
I should not decide which of these several analyses is the most persuasive, for here appellant did not offer enough evidence to make out a prima facie case under any of them. *222Counsel’s only offer was general, to show that living conditions in the prison were “unbearable”, N.T. at 292; and although counsel said he had subpoenaed appellant’s medical records, he did not say what the records would show. On this offer, it was not error to refuse to receive the evidence.
The majority recognizes that the extent of the duress defense is “not directly presented in the instant case,” Majority slip opinion at 1171, yet goes on to say, “we hold that . . . .” I submit that the majority’s discussion is not a holding but mere dictum.
-6-
Appellant finally argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of evidence that the crime he had been convicted of was first degree murder. Here, too, the majority and I differ.
The Commonwealth introduced the evidence that appellant had been convicted of murder in order to prove escape, which, as just discussed, requires proof that the defendant was under official detention, and also in order to prove possession of a firearm by a former felon, in violation of the Crimes Code, supra. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 (appellant was acquitted of this charge).
At trial, objecting to this evidence, appellant’s counsel argued that the Commonwealth had to prove only that appellant had committed a crime (for escape) and a crime of violence (for possession of a firearm by a felon). It was unnecessary, counsel argued, to prove exactly what the crime of violence was; further, counsel offered to stipulate that the crime appellant had been convicted of was a crime of violence.
I acknowledge that elsewhere the law is as the majority says — that the Commonwealth could insist upon proving that the crime of violence in question was first degree murder. Perhaps we should adopt — the majority does adopt — this view. It seems to me, however, that we should remember the principle that otherwise admissible evidence may be inadmissible if it is not essential but cumulative, and *223so prejudicial as to be likely to make it difficult for the jury to decide the case in an unimpassioned manner. Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 472 Pa. 53, 371 A.2d 186 (1976); Fed.R. Evid. 403; McCormick, Evidence, § 185 at 438-40 (Cleary Ed., 1972). This principle was recognized and applied in Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 466 Pa. 355, 353 A.2d 392 (1976). There the defendant had been charged with assault by a life prisoner. He argued that while proof of that crime necessarily involved exposing the jury to the fact that he was serving a life sentence — and therefore obviously had been convicted of a crime — -it was unnecessary for the jury to be told that the crime was first degree murder. The Supreme Court agreed with this argument, holding that the admission of the evidence that the crime was first degree murder had been error. However, reasoning that the jury presumably knew that a life sentence involved a “crime of the most egregious sort,” 466 Pa. at 361, 353 A.2d at 395, the Court held the evidence was merely cumulative and its admission harmless error.
The same cannot be said here. To be sure, as appellant and counsel recognized, the jury necessarily had to be exposed to the fact that appellant had committed a crime of violence.8 However, the phrase “crimes of violence” comprises crimes of a wide range of gravity, e. g., in addition to murder, robbery, or burglary, or “entering a building with intent to commit a crime therein.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102. It is clear that the jury here might well have thought worse of appellant, knowing that he had committed first degree murder, than if it had simply, but accurately, been informed that he had committed a “crime of violence.” Thus the evidence that appellant had committed murder was not cumulative, as it was in Commonwealth v. Scoggins, supra. The majority says that Scoggins is distinguishable because “the crime charged in the instant case required the introduc*224tion of the exact nature of the prior crime,” Slip opinion at 1173; but that begs the question, which is whether evidence “of the exact nature of the prior crime” was “required” here. The majority also says that there was a greater danger of prejudice in Scoggins than here, Slip opinion at 1174, but putting myself in the position of a juror, I come to the opposite conclusion.
There remains, however, the question whether the evidence was harmless, i. e., whether it prejudiced appellant by exposing him to the danger of “the tendency of a normal juror to accept testimony of prior convictions as a basis for finding a predisposition to commit the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Scoggins, supra, 466 Pa. at 360, 353 A.2d at 395. As to the conviction of escape, I find that appellant was not prejudiced. As indicated by the foregoing discussion, appellant had no defense to the charge (except the claim of “duress”); his attorney admitted as much. N.T. at 292-93. I should therefore affirm this conviction. However, as to the convictions of possession of implements of escape, possession of an instrument of crime generally, and carrying a prohibited offensive weapon, I find that appellant was prejudiced, and that these convictions should be vacated. Appellant denied that he was the one who removed the bars from the window at Philadelphia General Hospital (although he admitted leaving through that window); he denied possessing the hacksaw blade that a witness said he had; he denied ever having a revolver, although Sperduto testified he saw one in appellant’s possession. Thus appellant’s credibility was involved, and critically involved, for while there was no question that appellant was guilty of escape, still, if the jury believed his testimony regarding the bars, hacksaw blade, and revolver, it could otherwise acquit him. In these circumstances I cannot say that the evidence that appellant was a first degree murderer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978). For this reason, I should remand for a new trial.
. The Crimes Code, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5121, 5122, 907(a), and 908, respectively.
. Sperduto pointed out the correct apartment, but was not present during the recapture of appellant. Instead he went with some officers to police headquarters where he gave a long statement telling where he had seen appellant and how he had learned where appellant was staying. This statement, however, may not be considered in *215deciding whether the police had probable cause to enter the apartment. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wilds, 240 Pa.Super. 278, 362 A.2d 273 (1976); Pa.R.Crim.P. 2003 (magistrate in issuing search warrant may not consider evidence outside of the affidavits).
. In United States v. Cravero, supra, the court suggested that one reason a search warrant was not required was that
there is no need to particularize the search — the arrest warrant has already done that. There is not the same danger of the “general writ” which is the reason for requiring that a search warrant described what specific items police are allowed to search for. 545 F.2d at 421 n. 1.
. This is not to say that the subject of an arrest has no right of privacy. While the police may search him incident to his arrest, that search is of limited scope. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Here, however, the seizure of the revolver did not exceed those limits, which were held in Chimel to include “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon . . .” 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040. Alternatively it might be said that although the police made a seizure, they made no search, for the revolver was in plain view. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
. In United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100, 97 S.Ct. 1123, 51 L.Ed.2d 549 (1977), the Court of Appeals reached the same result as we have here although without explicitly relying on the doctrine of standing. It initially held that to execute an arrest warrant in the home of a third party the police need a search warrant (in United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1977), the court rescinded this holding), but went on to say that, although the entry was unlawful, the arrests of the appellants were valid:
The arrest warrants represent judicial sanction of the deprivations of the suspects’ liberties. Possession of the warrants was a completely self-validating justification for the arrests regardless of the circumstances under which the police reached the location where they served the warrants. To hold otherwise would mean that a suspected felon could claim what amounts to temporary sanctuary in the home of another and would require us to contemplate with equanimity the prospect of a section 1983 suit by him against the officers who arrested him on a valid warrant, which seems self-evidently absurd. Thus, the arrests are valid, though the method of effecting them be not.
545 F.2d at 417 (footnote omitted).
. Appellant has argued that the entry by the police was unlawful because the police failed to announce their purpose. However, standing to make this argument also depends upon proof of an invasion of one’s right of privacy.
Although appellee was, in the most literal sense, a “fugitive,” our discussion is not limited to escapees but applies to anyone for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued. As for the tenants of the apartment, their right of privacy stands untouched; if the police had found evidence and attempted to use it against the apartment tenants, they would certainly have had standing to argue that the police had no probable cause to believe that appellant was there.
. Furthermore, if one were to accept the analysis of the author of this opinion (who dissented in McNear, supra ), still the loaded revolver in possession of appellant, an escaped convict, would come under § 907(a) as something “commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have,” and therefore an “instrument of *219crime” under § 907(c)(2). See Commonwealth v. Goosby, 251 Pa.Super. 326, 333, 380 A.2d 802, 806 (SPAETH, J., concurring).
It may also be mentioned at this point that appellant makes two other arguments regarding his convictions incident to possession of the revolver. First, he argues that the Commonwealth did not prove that he had the intent to employ the revolver criminally, as required by § 907(a). Second, he argues that we should vacate his conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908, which bars possession of prohibited offensive weapons, for in Commonwealth v. McHarris, 246 Pa.Super. 488, 371 A.2d 941 (1977), this court held that revolvers were not prohibited offensive weapons. We may not consider these arguments because appellant failed to include them in his post-verdict motions. Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975).
. Appellant argues that this necessity should not have arisen because the charge of a felon possessing a firearm was improperly before the jury in the first instance as the result of an impermissible amendment to the information. However, I need not consider this argument.