(dissenting) — I dissent from the majority opinion in Cause No. 48862. I note no errors therein respecting the statement of facts or of the matters of procedure, but I wish to elaborate on them somewhat. The parties were engaged in farming near Eagle Grove in Wright County, Iowa. The family consisted of themselves and two sons, Jerry F. and Richard R. The marriage apparently was not a successful venture, and Mrs. Lynch, by counsel, filed petition for divorce alleging cruel and inhuman treatment by her husband such as to endanger her life and health. Mr. Lynch, though represented by counsel, did not personally *84appear .at the trial, filed no pleading, and offered no evidence. On the testimony of Mrs. Lynch and her corroborating witness, the court, by its judgment and decree, found that the allegations of the petition were true, that the parties had an accounting between themselves and “reached an agreement as to property rights, alimony, child support and costs of this action, and that plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded in her petition.” The care, custody and control of the elder boy, Jerry, was awarded to the father, Francis L. Lynch, with the right of reasonable visitation by Gladys M. Lynch, the mother. As set out, verbatim, in the majority opinion, the care, custody, and control of the younger child, Richard, was awarded to the plaintiff-mother, Gladys M. Lynch, with the proviso “that the said child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion.” The decree provided for the right of the father to visit Richard at reasonable times, and required him to pay for the support and maintenance of Richard at the rate of $40 per month from April 9, 1953, the date of the decree. All clothing and personal effects of Mrs. Lynch and specified household goods and furnishings which she owned prior to the marriage were also, awarded to. her. As a complete settlement of all property rights of the parties, and in full of all alimony, support money or money claims, Mrs. Lynch was awarded $3500, payable $1500 on the date of the decree, $1000 on January 1, 1954, and the balance of $1000 on January 1, 1955. All other personal property of every kind was awarded to. Mr. Lynch. It appears from the record that Mr. Lynch met all money and property obligations required of him by the decree. The final provision of the judgment and decree is: “The court retains jurisdiction to compel performance of' the provisions of the decree and to see that the same are carried into' effect by the parties hereto.”
On the decree is the following notation:
“Approved:
/S/ J. J. H. Attorney for the Defendant
Filed April 9,1953 /S/ R. V. Goslin, Clerk Dist. Court Wright County, Iowa.”
The initials “J.J.H.” are those of J.J. Henneberry, attorney for defendant.
*85Either prior to' the commencement of the divorce proceedings or thereafter, each of the parties had consulted with legal counsel, and they had agreed upon all matters incident to the divorce proceedings, and evidenced the same by a written stipulation which they executed on April 8, 1953. This stipulation w.as prepared by Mrs. Lynch’s attorney. The first paragraph was: “It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties hereto that their property rights and the custody of minor children be settled subject to the approval of the court, and to the court granting a decree of divorce to the plaintiff.” The provisions which followed respecting the determination of alimony, support money, property division, and custody of the children were identical with those in the judgment and decree. When the stipulation was presented to Mrs. Lynch by her attorney she read it over and because of the provision therein, “that the care, custody and control of Richard R. Lynch shall be awarded to the plaintiff provided however (italics mine) that the said child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion * * she refused to sign the stipulation, as she said: “Because I wouldn’t raise him as a Catholic if I was going to have him in my custody because it would be too inconvenient to> do so, so they changed it.” The stipulation was then changed to read: “That the care, custody and control of Richard R. Lynch shall be awarded to the plaintiff and it is provided (italics mine) that the said child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion * * As so changed, the stipulation was then executed by Mrs. and Mr. Lynch on April 8, 1953. The attorney for Mrs. Lynch then prepared the decree in accord with the stipulation and presented it to her and she read and approved it and upon her direction he submitted it to Judge Nichol at the divorce hearing and it was signed by him and filed on April 9, 1953, as above noted.
After the divorce Mr. Lynch assumed the care, custody and control of the boy, Jerry, then about eight years old. Richard was between five and six years old. Their father was of the Roman Catholic faith and the two boys had been baptized according to its rites, and such religious teaching and training as they had received was in the Roman Catholic religion. Mr. Lynch continued this with Jerry after he became his sole custodian.
*86The following appears from interrogation of Mrs. Lynch by the Respondent Court.
“The Court: Are you a Protestant ? A. Yes.
“The Court: And your husband took the other little boy and is raising him a Catholic? A. Yes.
“The Court: And you, so far, are raising this child (Richard) as a Protestant? A. Yes.”-
This interrogation was in August 1955, and Mrs. Lynch testified that Richard would be eight years old in November 1955.
It does not appear of which Protestant sect or denomination Mrs. Lynch was a member, and it is a fair assumption that she attended no church, since she testified: “I haven’t personally taken him (Richard) to the Congregational Sunday school. But he has gone with my former sister-in-law. I see that he gets there.” She began sending the boy to a Protestant Sunday school immediately after the divorce decree in 1953. And she sent him to a Congregational Church summer Bible school in 1953 and 1955.
Mrs. Lynch never made the slightest attempt to comply with the stipulation or the decree which she presented to the divorce court. All of her efforts were affirmatively to the contrary. She testified that she had never taken Richard to- any Roman Catholic services and did not intend to take him to any in the future, and never attempted to make any arrangements to have him go to the Roman Catholic Church. She said it was too inconvenient to do so, but she readily arranged to- have him taken to Protestant sei’vices.
Mr. Lynch discussed the matter with her several times and complained of her failure to comply with the decree. He took Richard to Catholic services a few times. He finally told her that he was going to take action to enforce the decree, and -did so by filing the contempt information, which brought about her citation and the hearing before the Respondent of August 23, 1955. The able Respondent in his oqrder mentioned the serious and troublesome nature of the- issues involved and stated:
“The court began deliberations oxi the premise that the provision regarding religion cannot be impugned in this proceeding, and that so long as it stands it must be respected. The court has *87gone the entire round of the arguments and has come back to the original premise. * * *
“The only questions are (1) whether there was jurisdiction to decree this provision and (2) whether plaintiff violated it. ^ ^
“There is no doubt but what plaintiff, an educated woman understood the agreement and the decree. Neither is there any doubt but what she is intentionally raising the child a Protestant. It is the plainest kind of a violation of a promise that plaintiff knowingly entered into in order to secure what she wanted. Defendant has faithfully abided by the decree on his part.
“The violation being proved, the only question left is whether the court had jurisdiction so to decree. This is for the reason that although a court ought perhaps not incorporate a provision such as this, if it does so and has jurisdiction it must be respected. We do not have the case of a simple contract covering religion, which some courts say may be disregarded. See Annotation 12 A. L. R. 1146. Here we have a formal decree of a court of general jurisdiction, sought and secured by the contemnor. (Italics mine.) It will not do for parties to gamble on the parts of a decree the courts will honor and what will be disregarded. As stated in 17 C. J. S. 21: 'Since an order, judgment, or decree of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter cannot be collaterally attacked in the contempt proceedings, but must be modified or vacated if erroneous, by a direct proceeding, disobedience of an order made by a court within its jurisdiction and power is a contempt, although the order may be clearly erroneous.’ See also Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 188-190, 42 S. Ct. 277, 66 L. Ed. 550, 559 (even true where decree founded on unconstitutional statute).
“There is no question at all but what the court had jurisdiction of the parties to the divorce proceeding, and had jurisdiction of them to make provision respecting the children. Indeed, the parties by their stipulation laid the matter before the divorce court. Neither is there any real question but that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter. Our broad statute gives the divorce court general jurisdiction respecting the children and their custody, education, training, welfare, and support. Iowa Code (1954) Section 598.14. * * * At least where the parties *88have stipulated the point, a decretal provision on the subject of religion does not cut across Federal or Iowa constitutional provisions respecting freedom of conscience because no one is imposing a particular faith on the parties; they have chosen to impose it on themselves. In such circumstances neither the language of the First Amendment to the Federal, nor of Article I, Section 3 of the State Constitution reaches the case. And no one doubts the right of the parents to direct the course of their children’s religion.”
The court found the plaintiff in contempt, and continued the proceeding until September 14, 1955, for the purpose of passing sentence, “providing that if plaintiff files her affidavit in this cause by that date that she is rearing the child in the Catholic faith, then she shall stand purged of contempt to this time; otherwise appropriate punishment to be inflicted.” A further continuance of fifteen days, to permit certiorari proceedings by plaintiff, was granted. Plaintiff refused the proffer to purge herself by affidavit.
The petition for the writ of certiorari alleges several grounds of illegality and excess of jurisdiction, the substance of them being that: the facts established that petitioner had not willfully disobeyed the decree of divorce by clear, satisfactory and convincing proof, and the findings and .judgment of the respondent were contrary to and unsupported by the evidence; the Order of the Court was excessive and unreasonable, illegal, beyond its lawful jurisdiction, and violated the rights of the petitioner guaranteed her by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and section 3 of Article I of the Constitution of Iowa; the respondent did not rule on petitioner’s motion for directed verdict until approximately fourteen days after it was made; and this petitioner has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for the injustice done her in finding her guilty of contempt except by certiorari.
I. These are the only propositions stated or argued, either orally or in the printed brief and argument in this court, and none other was urged in the court below. However, the majority opinion hardly touches upon any of these propositions. The chief proposition stated and argued in the majority opinion for sustaining the writ is that the decretal order that Richard R. Lynch *89be reared in the Roman Catholic religion by the petitioner, who has care, custody and control, is void because of uncertainty and indefiniteness. Such contention was not urged in the court below and was never presented to this court. Its first appearance is in the majority opinion. Furthermore, there is no factually sound or reasonable foundation for the proposition contended for.
I have no particular quarrel with the statement that contempt proceedings are somewhat quasi-criminal, nor with the authorities cited that the decretal or judicial order which the contemnor is charged with violating must be certain and definite. I contend that they have little application under the facts, and for these reasons: the fact of being reared in the Roman Catholic religion—and I will use the term Catholic hereinafter—is not so unknown or abstruse as to be ununderstandable. There are in excess of 30,000,000 members of that faith in the United States, and in all parts of the country there are many thousands of churches, schools, hospitals, and other institutions supported by its members; the petitioner and her Catholic husband were married in 1939, and they lived together for approximately fourteen years; the children were baptized in accord with the rites of the Catholic Church and it may fairly be assumed that such religious instruction as they were capable of receiving during those early years conformed to rearing of children of that faith; the peti-. tioner was not a stranger to rearing of children in the Catholic religion; and she readily told the respondent that Mr. Lynch “was raising Jerry a Catholic.” She had been a schoolteacher. She had no difficulty in getting another person to take Richard to a Protestant Sunday school. She, no doubt, could as readily have had someone take him where he would receive instruction in the Church of his baptism. The communicants of any religious faith or denomination are eager to add another to their number. Under the record the conclusion is incontrovertible that the petitioner never intended to rear the boy in the Catholic religion. She knew the desire and intention of Richard’s father that the boy’s religious training should continue as it had been. She had the stipulation and decree prepared to plainly so provide. There is no mistaking the clear import of these writings. She was given the care, custody and control of Richard on condition that he “be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion.”
*90There is no question, nor controversy that contempt of court must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. This court has uniformly so held. Stein v. Municipal Court of Sioux City, 242 Iowa 465, 469, 470, 46 N.W.2d 721; Burtch v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 52, 202 N.W. 542, 39 A.L.R. 1349; Battani v. Grund, 244 Iowa 623, 631, 56 N.W.2d 166; Critelli v. Tidrick, 244 Iowa 462, 471, 472, 56 N.W.2d 159; Watson v. Charlton, 243 Iowa 80, 92, 50 N.W.2d 605; Jones v. Levis, 240 Iowa 602, 606, 35 N.W.2d 891, 36 N.W.2d 756. It is clear, beyond any reasonable question, that the evidence of petitioner’s guilt is of the character and probative value required by our decisions. It is contended in her behalf that what she did was not willful. The record does not support this claim. What she did was not inadvertent, thoughtless, or unintentional. It was affirmative and determined action or her part with the fixed purpose of continuing it. She did not accompany Richard to the Congregational Sunday school, but engaged another to do so, and saw that he got there. It is a fair assumption that she never intended to comply with the decree which she presented to the court.
The majority opinion states that the divorce decree was rendered through error and inadvertence. After reference to “long, involved and alternative definitions”of the word “religion” in the dictionaries, it states: “But the word ‘religion’ is often confused in terms with cultus or form of worship of the different denominations [citing cases]. So we think the parties and the court here confounded the terms. They referred to the ‘Roman Catholic Religion’ when they, meant the cultus or forms of worship of that church; perhaps what was really intended was that the child should he reared in the. Christian religion in conformity to the. forms, disciplme, organization and dogma of the Roman Catholic Church. If nothing more than the Christian religion was intended, rearing in. any. Christian, church would satisfy the requirements of the decree; * * (Italics mine.) The majority opinion goes far afield in the foregoing tenuous reasons it urges. There is no sound or reasonable support for them in the record. I am sure that the word “cultus” never entered the minds of the parties. The word does not appear where words are defined in *91Webster’s New International Dictionary. In tbe footnote among obsolete words it is defined as “cultivation, culture, cult.” In the Latin language it had various meanings.
The majority opinion also states: “The decree itself does not specify who shall rear the child in the stated religion. * * * The decree itself is silent as to whose duty it was to do these things.” The clear and definite language of Item I of the decree is: “That the care, custody and control of Richard R. Lynch shall be awarded to the Plaintiff and it is provided that such child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion and that the Defendant shall have the right of visitation at all reasonable hours * * (Italics mine.) No more complete refutation of the statement in the majority opinion is required than the words of the decree. Plaintiff had full control of the child and defendant had only the right of visitation.
II. The problem of the religious faith in which minor children shall be reared is one with which courts are frequently confronted in matters involving their custody or adoption. These situations must be met and cannot be .avoided. This court has recognized the problem. In Winter v. Winter, 184 Iowa 85, 87, 166 N.W. 274, 275, a habeas corpus case, the court said: “Much evidence was introduced on both sides, pro and con, as to this father’s fitness * * * for his parental privilege, having due regard to the best interests of the child. It is pathetic enough that differences of religious faith is a strong stimulus to the zeal of contending affections; the plaintiff and the deceased mother being Protestant, and the defendant and his sisters being Catholic. The issue of the contest, therefore, will determine the faith in which the child will be reared. We cannot, of course, be guided or influenced by this difference of religious views, further than to recognize that it emphasizes somewhat the right of the parent to have the child reared in his own religious faith, notwithstanding that the deceased mother desired it otherwise.”
Another case is In re Guardianship of Waite, 190 Iowa 182, 187, 180 N.W. 159, 161, in which the parents had died and there was a controversy as to the guardianship of the minor children between the mother of the father and a brother of the mother. The court said: “Undoubtedly the religious faith of the parents is a matter for consideration, though not controlling. See Winter *92v. Winter, 184 Iowa 85. The courts will not arrogate to themselves. the right to determine what religion, if Christian, will prove most beneficial to a child of tender years, but will take into consideration church affiliations of relatives with whom the child is likely to associate, only as bearing on his probable welfare in the future. The parents of these children Avere of the Catholic faith, as is Helmer [brother of the mother]. Mrs. Waite [mother of the father] has a preference for that denomination, though not a communicant. Mrs. Stoltenburg is a Congregationalist, and Mrs. Spiers is a member of the Presbyterian Church. We are not inclined to discuss critically nor to- compare the tenets of faith approved by any denomination. It is thought sufficient if the children be taught the fundamental principles of Christianity, and reared according to its teachings. This is assured, whatever our conclusion.”
The statutes of the State recognize in the chapter which deals with Child Welfare that the official agencies of the State in the placement of children for adoption “shall take into consideration the religious faith or affiliations of the child or its parents.” Code section 235.3, paragraph 3. This is a declaration of policy. We find no decisions that such statutes violate any Constitutional provisions.
There is no difference of opinion among the courts that-parents have the exclusive right to determine and rear their children in any religion or religious faith which they choose without interference by the courts, if the teaching is not contrary to public policy. Certainly this is true of any Christian faith or religion. Such right is “protected”, and not “prohibited” by the Constitutional provisions. This is conceded in the brief of the Amicus Curiae, which states: “It is hardly open to question that the right of parents to rear their children in the faith of their choice is protected by the- First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.”
The provision in the Iowa Constitution is in substantially the same language as that of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Mr. and Mrs. Lynch were husband and wife, with equal rights as to. the custody and rearing of the children, when they executed the stipulation and approved the decree. They had a *93right, in the settlement of their marital difficulties to agree upon the religious upbringing of their children. The stipulation and decree presented no controversy to the court other than the determination of the alleged grounds of divorce. If religious affiliations may be considered in relation to the custody of the children, without offending Constitutional provisions, there should be no legal objection to incorporating in a divorce decree which awards custody, a provision which both parents have agreed upon and asked the court to include in the decree awarding custody.
It is my conclusion that the decretal order awarding custody of Richard to his mother, with the condition that he be reared in the Roman Catholic religion, violates none of the Constitutional provisions specified. Courts avoid the determination of controversies involving religious doctrines, tenets or principles. But no such controversy was before the divorce court nor the respondent. In fact, there was no controversy, factual or otherwise. It was an admitted and conceded fact in the court of the respondent that the petitioner was not rearing Richard in the Catholic faith, in violation of the decree. She thereby subjected herself to punishment for the contempt.
The divorce decree was entered in accord with a stipulation of the parties and they are estopped from predicating error as to any of its provisions. It is obvious that no party can appeal from a consent decree or judgment, not void for lack of jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter, nor accept the benefits of such decree, and challenge such parts thereof as may he unsatisfactory. Hughes v. Feeter, 23 Iowa 547, 548; Stever v. Heald, 61 Iowa 709, 710, 17 N.W. 145; Root v. Heil, 78 Iowa 436, 43 N.W. 278; Van Gorden v. Schuller, 192 Iowa 853, 185 N.W. 604; Truitt v. Mackaman, 162 Iowa 253, 144 N.W. 22; Lytle Investment Co. v. McMorris, 189 Iowa 1355, 1362, 179 N.W. 871.
The defense which petitioner makes against the contempt proceedings is a collateral attack against them. She has instituted no proceeding to modify the divorce decree. It is a familiar rule that in contempt proceedings, the contemnor cannot collaterally attack the validity of the proceedings out of which the contempt arises. Geneva v. Thompson, Judge, 200 Iowa 1173, 1175, 1176, 206 N.W. 132.
*94In Pure Milk Assn. v. Wagner, 363 Ill. 316, 320, 2 N.E.2d 288, 289, defendants were found guilty of violating an injunction. Though not raising the question below, they argued that the order was unconstitutional. The court held: “No constitutional issues can now be raised as a defense to the proceeding in contempt. The court was a court of general jurisdiction and had the authority to enter a decree for a permanent injunction. The question as to whether the decree was correct or incorrect did not control the jurisdiction of the court to pronounce a particular decree, regardless of whether the decree was proper 'or improper. If it was the claim then that the decree was based on an unconstitutional law, that point should have been raised by a proceeding to review the original decree. The defendants were not justified in ignoring the decree, inasmuch as the court had jurisdiction of the parties to the proceeding and the subject matter of the proceeding in which the original decree making the injunction permanent was entered.”
Other decisions, that when an order or decree becomes res judicata it is not subject to attack in the contempt proceedings, are Howat v. Kansas, supra, 258 U. S. 181, 42 S. Ct. 277, 66 L. Ed. 550; Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 48 S. Ct. 311, 72 L. Ed. 587; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884; Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S. 56, 69, 68 S. Ct. 401, 408, 92 L. Ed. 476, 487, in which the court said: “* * * It would be a disservice to the law if we were to depart from the long-standing rule that a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and thus become a retrial of the original controversy.”
Petitioner made no claim in her petition for the writ of certiorari that the divorce decree conflicted with any constitutional provision. Parents have a constitutional right to rear their minor children in accord with the tenets of any religion they choose. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 1078, 39 A. L. R. 468. Courts may decide the property or contract rights of religious societies to the same extent as those of other like organizations or charitable associations. Watson v. Jones, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L. Ed. 666.
*95In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 312, 72 S. Ct. 679, 683, 96 L. Ed. 954, 961, the court said: “The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise, the state and religion would be aliens to each other — hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; ‘so help me God’ in our courtroom oaths — these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, o-ur public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court’.”
As said by this court in Burtch v. Zeuch, supra, 200 Iowa 49, 56, 202 N. W. 542, 544, 39 A. L. R. 1349, 1354: “It is elementary that disobedience of an order or process made by a court within its jurisdiction and power is a contempt, although the order or process may be irregular or irregularly issued.”
III. If any relief was available to the petitioner, without a change in circumstances, for a modification of the divorce decree, she should have made application therefor, but as it is the stipulation and decree stand as she had them phrased. In State v. Baldwin, 57 Iowa 266, 270, 271, 10 N.W. 645, 647, a certiorari proceeding against the trustees of one church organization for violating a court order, their defense was that they could not comply with the order because the articles of their church’s discipline required the consent of two thirds of the church membership. In affirming the action of the court in punishing the trustees for contempt, this court said:
“If these articles of discipline in any way qualify the right *96of the trustees to control the use of the house [church] they should have been presented to the court in the injunction proceeding, and insisted upon as a reason why the order entered in that proceeding should not have been made.
“If they were called to the attention of the court in that proceeding, and notwithstanding the court erroneously ordered the trustees to do what is beyond their power, the order may, upon proper proceedings be reversed. But the order of the court, even if erroneous, was not void. The court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, and its adjudication cannot ' be disregarded with impunity. So long as it remains unreversed it must be obeyed. There would be an end of all subordination and social order, if parties could disregard judicial orders, and when proceeded against for contempt, call in question the correctness of the order itself. In such a proceeding the only legitimate inquiry is, did the court have jurisdiction, and did it make an order which has been violated?”
Courts are charged with the duty of guarding their proceedings against everything that interferes or tends to interfere with the administration of justice. Murphy v. Wright, Judge, 167 Iowa 75, 80, 148 N.W. 985, Critelli v. Tidrick, Judge, supra, 244 Iowa 462, 472.
As stated in United Packing House Workers v. Boynton, Judge, 240 Iowa 212, 223, 35 N.W.2d 881, 888: “The object [of contempt-of-court proceedings] is not to punish an offense but to compel obedience and respect for the order of the court. State v. Baker, 222 Iowa 903, 270 N.W. 359. The keystone of this government has been, is, and must be, respect for and obedience to orders of the courts.”
While review in this contempt-of-court proceedings is not a trial de novo, we are not bound by the findings of fact of the respondent, though they are entitled to much weight. Watson v. Charlton, 243 Iowa 80, 92; Critelli v. Tidrick, 244 Iowa 462, 472, Battani v. Grund, 244 Iowa 623, 631, and Jones v. Levis, 240 Iowa 602, 607, 608, all supra. I am satisfied that the findings of the respondent have full support in the record.
It is also my conclusion that none of the Constitutional provisions, referred to in the majority opinion, is violated by the *97challenged decree, and that tbe authorities relied on therein are not applicable because of the differences in their facts, and the factual situation in the case at bar. In none of them was the decree violated prepared and presented to the respective courts by the contemnor.
One of the reasons for the conclusion of the majority is thus stated: “* * * keeping in mind that we have before us a contempt proceeding in which the punishment will in all probability be a fine or imprisonment of unknown but real severity, we can only conclude that that part of the decree involved should be held void for uncertainty and indefiniteness.” I am not in agreement with the propriety or soundness of such assumption respecting what penalty the respondent might have ordered, when there is no basis for it in the record.
It is my conclusion that neither the decree nor the portion of it attacked is void for uncertainty or indefiniteness.
I would annul the writ and dismiss the petition.
Garfield, Oliver and Smith, JJ., join in this dissent.