The question presented in this case is whether the defendants were entitled to accelerated judgment on any of the following grounds: the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; the treasurer plaintiffs lacked standing; or the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs’ claim. We hold, first, that this is, at least in part, an equitable action, not within the Tax Tri*733bunal’s exclusive jurisdiction, and thus properly brought in the circuit court. Secondly, we hold that the treasurer plaintiffs’ standing may not yet be determined to be lacking because this case may present the extraordinary circumstances necessary for a township or city treasurer to have standing to challenge a county drain commissioner’s actions. Thirdly, we hold that the 30-day period of limitation asserted by the defendants to bar this action is not applicable.
I
The plaintiffs are township and city treasurers, acting in their official capacities, and landowners. They instituted the present proceedings on July 2, 1976, challenging their 1975 drain taxes.1 Plaintiffs allege that defendants have committed a constructive fraud by collecting money for administrative expenses through special assessment procedures. The monies collected through special assessments, plaintiffs contend, are to be placed in the Revolving Drain Fund, and the enumerated purposes of the fund do not include the payment of such expenses of the drain commissioner’s office as the yearly services of clerks, stenographers, engineers and the assessing department. The complaint states that 78% of the money received through the special assessments provided for in § 196 of the Drain Code of 19562 has been used for such administrative purposes. The complaint further states that several hundred thousand dollars, which are *734presently in escrow, were additionally earmarked for these administrative expenses. Plaintiffs contend that these expenses should only be paid out of funds received through general taxation, and that the collection of such money under the guise of the special assessment laws constitutes a constructive fraud. Plaintiff treasurers argue that to release to the county the funds collected and now in escrow would violate the public trusts and the duties of their offices.3
Plaintiffs seek various forms of relief. They seek a declaration of the rights of the treasurer plaintiffs to bring this action and an accounting of the drain commissioner’s records as they relate to the assessments in dispute and to the funds used for administrative expenses. They also seek a declaration that the disputed assessments are illegal and that the drain commissioner’s administrative expenses must be paid from the county’s general fund. Additionally, they request a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the special assessments and from using the Revolving Drain Fund for administrative expenses, and an order that the monies held in escrow be returned to the landowner plaintiffs._
*735Defendants filed a motion for accelerated judgment in which they claimed that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, that the claim was barred by a 30-day period of limitation, and that the treasurer plaintiffs lacked the legal capacity to sue. The circuit court granted accelerated judgment relative to the landowner plaintiffs’ claims for tax refunds. The circuit court considered these claims to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal and also to be barred because they were not timely brought. The court denied the motion relative to the treasurer plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Both parties appealed, the defendants by leave granted, to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the partial accelerated judgment and otherwise affirmed the circuit court’s order. Romulus City Treasurer v Wayne County Drain Comm’r, 86 Mich App 663; 273 NW2d 514 (1978). The Court of Appeals held that because of plaintiffs’ allegations of fraudulent conduct, the plaintiff treasurers’ standing to sue could not be denied-without a full evidentiary hearing. The Court also concluded that if fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendants could be proved, the claim would not be barred by the statute of limitations. It further held that since the Tax Tribunal lacked equitable jurisdiction, this case was properly brought in circuit court.
This Court granted leave to appeal and asked the parties to include within the issues to be briefed the question "whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal is the only forum in which relief can be sought for allegedly illegal drain tax assessments”. 406 Mich 976 (1979).
*736II
A
This case was heard and is being decided with Wikman v Novi, ante, p 617. Both cases raise questions concerning the scope of the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction, and both involve special assessments. The plaintiffs in this case, however, make allegations that were not made in Wikman. They contend, inter alia, that the defendants have been collecting most of the money needed for the defendant drain commissioner’s administrative expenses through special assessment procedures, and that the money presently being held in escrow has been similarly earmarked for such expenses. This, they contend, constitutes constructive fraud. We need not pass on the merits of this contention; we need only consider whether this is a claim that may properly be considered by a circuit court acting within its equitable jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs’ claim of constructive fraud in this case differs from the claim in Wikman that the assessments were not levied according to the benefits received. The focus of the present claim concerns not the factual underpinnings of the pertinent assessments, but rather how funds collected pursuant to the special assessment laws may be spent. Any conclusion as to whether the funding of administrative costs through the special assessment procedures constitutes constructive fraud would involve both statutory construction and a consideration of the equitable doctrine of constructive fraud. Thus, Wikman is not directly on point and reconsideration of the provisions of the Tax Tribunal Act is necessary.
*737MCL 205.731; MSA 7.650(31) provides:
"The tribunal’s exclusive and original jurisdiction shall be:
"(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under property tax laws.
"(b) A proceeding for refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws.”
The tribunal that, was created to exercise such jurisdiction was labeled a "quasi-judicial agency”, MCL 205.721; MSA 7.650(21), whose membership is to be comprised of persons with various specified qualifications. Of the seven members, two must be attorneys with experience either in property tax matters or in judicial or quasi-judicial office. MCL 205.722; MSA 7.650(22). One member must be a certified assessor; one, an experienced professional real estate appraiser; and one, a certified public accountant with experience in state-local tax matters. Not more than three of the seven members are to be members of any one professional discipline and persons who are not members of any of the enumerated disciplines are required to have experience in state or local tax matters.
The expertise of the tribunal members can be seen to relate primarily to questions concerning the factual underpinnings of taxes. In cases not involving special assessments, the tribunal’s membership is well-qualified to resolve the disputes concerning those matters that the Legislature has placed within its jurisdiction: assessments, valuations, rates, allocation and equalization. In special assessment cases, the tribunal is competent to ascertain whether the assessments are levied ac*738cording to the benefits received. Although the tribunal, in making its determinations, will make conclusions of law, MCL 205.751; MSA 7.650(51), the matters within its jurisdiction under MCL 205.731; MSA 7.650(31) most clearly relate to the basis for a tax, and much less clearly to the proper uses which may be made of the funds once collected. Questions concerning how the funds collected may be expended do not appear to be implicated in disputes related to assessments, valuations, rates, allocation and equalization. The question presented here is whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal extends to such questions when the funds are collected pursuant to special assessment laws.
As to the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs, we conclude that the question whether the defendants may pay administrative expenses with funds that have been collected pursuant to the special assessment procedures for drains is not "a proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to * * * special assessments * * * under the property tax laws”. Divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be accomplished except under clear mandate of law. Leo v Atlas Industries, Inc, 370 Mich 400, 402; 121 NW2d 926 (1963), Crane v Reeder, 28 Mich 527, 532-533 (1874). Because questions as to the lawful expenditure of funds do not arise within the other matters within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and because the tribunal’s expertise relates much more directly to other questions concerning the lawfulness of challenged special assessments, we cannot assume that the Legislature intended to divest the circuit court of its equitable jurisdiction to grant declaratory and *739injunctive relief in matters involving the appropriate use of funds collected under the guise of special assessment laws.
While we are unable to conclude that subsection (a) of MCL 205.731; MSA 7.650(31) prohibits the declaratory and injunctive relief that the plaintiffs seek in this case, the question remains whether subsection (b) would preclude the circuit court from ordering that the funds in escrow be returned to the landowner-plaintiffs. Subsection (b) provides that the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal includes "[a] proceeding for refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws”. Similarly, MCL 205.774; MSA 7.650(74) provides: "The right to sue any agency for refund of any taxes other than by proceedings before the tribunal is abolished as of September 30, 1974.” However, the scope of these provisions and the questions plaintiffs have raised concerning the Legislature’s power so to proscribe the jurisdiction of a court of equity need not be addressed at this stage in these proceedings. As will be discussed below,4 if the treasurer plaintiffs are found to have standing, and if they are found to have justifiably withheld from the county the monies presently in escrow, a consideration of the requests of landowner plaintiffs for repayment of the monies in escrow would be within the circuit court’s jurisdiction.
Ill
Defendants contend that the treasurer plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. The treasurers, having no financial stake in the outcome of this *740litigation,5 base their claim of standing on the public trusts and duties of their offices. Defendants argue that their offices cannot be bases for standing because the duties of their offices were ministerial: to pay the county treasurer the taxes collected from the drain assessments. There is no statutory authority, defendants argue, by which city and township treasurers can review the actions of the county drain commissioner. Plaintiffs do not challenge defendants’ assertion that the duties of their offices in this case were ministerial.6
Plaintiffs cite three cases for the proposition that a public official can maintain a suit commensurate with his or her public trusts and duties. See Mayor of Dearborn v Dearborn Retirement Board of Trustees, 315 Mich 18; 23 NW2d 186 (1946); Auditor General v Lake George & M R R Co, 82 Mich 426; 46 NW 730 (1890); Berrien County Treasurer v Bunbury, 45 Mich 79; 7 NW 704 (1881). Defendants are correct in saying that these cases are all quite different from the instant situation.
*741In Mayor of Dearborn, the mayor’s duties, as specified in the city charter, included preparing and administering the annual budget. He considered one provision that had been included in the budget by the city council to be illegal, and he vetoed it. When the city overrode his veto, he sought a declaratory judgment on its legality. This Court found that he had the capacity to bring such a suit by virtue of the public trusts and duties of his office.
This Court also recognized the capacity of public officials to sue commensurate with their public trusts and duties in Auditor General v Lake George & M R R Co. The suit was based on certain statutes which provided that the Auditor General was to assess and collect taxes from the railroads and that if any refused to pay the State Treasurer was to give the names of such companies to the Attorney General, who was to file suit to collect them. This Court held that a suit brought by the "Auditor General * * *, by direction of * * * [the] Attorney General” adequately satisfied the statutory provisions. Similarly, in Bunbury, the Court concluded that a county treasurer, within his public trusts and duties, could sue on a bond that, pursuant to statute, named him as the obligee.
In these cases, while standing was not expressly granted by statute, or by city charter in Mayor of Dearborn, standing was implied by the duties and obligations that were expressly stated. The treasurer plaintiffs in the instant case assert no statutory duties or obligations which imply their standing. Thus, these cases do not establish their capacity to challenge the actions of the county drain commissioner.
*742There is, however, authority from which one may conclude that standing will be present in extraordinary circumstances. In two instances, this Court has refused to issue a writ of mandamus to compel performance by township officers of their ministerial duty of assessing a tax. In Huron County Drain Comm’r v Chandler Twp Supervisor, 90 Mich 278, 279; 51 NW 282 (1892), the Court, in refusing to grant mandamus, stated: "The proceedings being so defective that no legal drain could be laid out, the supervisor was not in the wrong in refusing to assess the tax.” The writ was also refused in Cheboygan County Board of Supervisors v Mentor Twp Supervisor, 94 Mich 386; 54 NW 169 (1892), in which the county board passed a resolution that $2000 would be collected through assessments for the purpose of obtaining a poorhouse. Their intent was actually to use the money for the illegal purpose of securing a location for a tannery. The Court, in denying the county’s petition for mandamus to compel the townships to spread the assessments on their rolls, noted that the writ was discretionary, and further stated:
"The action of the petitioner in the present case was not only intentionally and willfully fraudulent, but it was criminal, and a gross outrage upon the rights of tax-paying citizens.
"It would, in my judgment, be a reproach upon the law if courts were, under the circumstances of this case, compelled to issue the writ of mandamus, and thereby compel the imposition of a fraudulent tax. The circumstances must be exceptionally extraordinary which will justify a supervisor in refusing to comply with his statutory duty, but we think the respondents in this case were justified in so doing.” 94 Mich 388.
In Scholtz v Smith, 119 Mich 634, 635-636; 78 NW 668 (1899), a mandamus action brought by a *743county drain commissioner against a township supervisor, this Court reiterated that the circumstances must be extraordinary to justify a township official’s refusal to perform ministerial duties:
"We have held that the supervisor is not vested with the authority to sit in judgment upon the action of the board of supervisors. When, in the exercise of their lawful authority, they order a tax to be spread, it is his duty to spread it, and not block the regular course of the public business by refusal because he may think that the board should have decided differently. Nor is it a part of the official duty of the supervisor to sit in judgment upon drain proceedings, which are within the jurisdiction of another officer. If his ideas of the sufficiency of petitions and other papers in drain proceedings, and the rumors that come to his ears about irregularities, and his notion of the time that taxes should be laid with reference to the completion of the drain, are to be held sufficient to justify a refusal to spread a tax which the duly-constituted authorities have ordered spread, the public business in connection with drains will be seriously embarrassed as soon as the fact becomes generally known. * * * As a rule, it is safe for a public officer to obey the commands of the law, and perform the duties imposed upon him, without attempting to find an excuse for refusing in irregularities in the proceedings of others, with which he has nothing to do.
"* * * The prevailing opinion in [Cheboygan County Board of Supervisors, supra] admits that circumstances must be extraordinary which will justify a refusal by an officer to perform a statutory duty, and the refusal to grant the writ in that case may be ascribed to the exercise of a lawful discretion.”
See also Laubach v O’Meara, 107 Mich 29; 64 NW 865 (1895).
It is not altogether clear, perhaps, whether the decisions in Cheboygan County Board of Supervisors and Huron County Drain Comm’r, should be *744classified simply as instances in which this Court in its discretion refused to enforce the clear duties of public officials, or whether they are instances in which extraordinary circumstances actually relieved the public officials of their statutory duties. The uncertainty arises because of cases in which this Court has held that where the duty of the public official is certain, the Court cannot in its discretion deny the writ. Municipal Finance Comm v Marquette Twp School Dist Board of Education, 337 Mich 639, 644; 60 NW2d 495 (1953); Hamilton v Secretary of State, 212 Mich 31, 42; 179 NW 553 (1920). Regardless of the classification given, however, extraordinary circumstances have allowed ministerial duties to go unfulfilled that otherwise would have been fulfilled. See Cheboygan County Board of Supervisors, supra.
If the defendant drain commissioner’s actions in the instant situation could be deemed to present extraordinary circumstances, a petition for mandamus to compel the township treasurers to pay the county the funds collected pursuant to these special assessments could have properly been denied. And if mandamus could properly have been denied, we see no good reason to refuse the treasurers the opportunity to challenge in a court of equity the actions that would have excused the performance of their duties. In other words, if the circumstances are such that the treasurers would not have been compelled to perform their duties of paying the county the taxes which they have collected, there is no good reason for precluding them from seeking instructions from a court of equity as to what properly ought to be done with the funds that they hold. The question whether extraordinary circumstances exist seemingly can be determined as well by a court of equity as by this Court in a mandamus action. Thus, we con-*745elude that if extraordinary circumstances exist, a township treasurer has standing to challenge the actions of a county drain commissioner.
Contrary to defendants’ assertions, we do not, in reaching this conclusion, give license to city and township treasurers to withhold city, school, county, sewer, and highway taxes whenever they feel that the actions of the local governing body are illegal. The circumstances must be truly extraordinary for a township or city treasurer to have standing to challenge the actions of county officials, and sufficient facts need to be pleaded to show such circumstances. Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
In the instant case, the allegations in the plaintiff treasurers’ complaint are sufficient to overcome defendants’ motion for accelerated judgment. If plaintiffs prove their allegations, they will show that most of the expenses of the defendant drain commissioner’s office, which amount to several hundred thousand dollars for the years 1975 and 1976, have been collected under the guise of being special assessments for drains. This appears to be an egregious misuse of the special assessment procedures contained in § 196 of the Drain Code of 1956; it misleads landowners as to what use is being made of the assessments they pay, and removes from the county a responsibility that it needs to meet through general taxation. The treasurer plaintiffs are entitled to an opportunity to prove the extraordinary circumstances that they have alleged.
IV
We may now properly consider the previously . deferred question whether the landowner plain*746tiffs’ request for a return of the money presently held in escrow is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal by virtue of MCL 205.731(b); MSA 7.650(31)(b) and MCL 205.774; MSA 7.650(74). From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that under extraordinary circumstances a city or township treasurer may not be required to fulfill his or her ministerial duties. If the instant case presents such circumstances, so as to justify the withholding from the county of the funds now in escrow, the circuit court will need to determine what should be done with the funds. We conclude that, if the funds in escrow have been justifiably withheld from the county, the landowner plaintiffs’ claim that the funds should be repaid to them because of defendants’ constructive fraud is not a claim for a tax refund within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.
We do not reach this conclusion by holding that equity jurisdiction supersedes the Legislature’s intended jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. Rather, we believe that the Legislature has not shown a clear intent to abolish the circuit court’s equity jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ claim to the funds in escrow. In accordance with the settled principle that the divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be accomplished except under clear mandate of law, Leo v Atlas Industries, Inc, supra, Crane v Reeder, supra, we will not presume an intent not clearly expressed. Although it is arguable that MCL 205.731(b); MSA 7.650(31)(b) and MCL 205.774; MSA 7.650(74) could apply because the funds in escrow were collected as purported special assessments, a return of the funds from this escrow account would not be a typical tax refund and to treat it as such would likely lead to an anomalous result. If the circuit court determines *747that the funds in escrow were properly withheld from the county, then principles of equity may dictate that the funds should be returned to those who paid them. If so, the court would be in an intractable position if such relief were deemed to be a tax refund over which the circuit court had no jurisdiction. Rather, the rule that equity will grant complete relief is applicable here. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v National Memorial Gardens, Inc, 366 Mich 492; 115 NW2d 312 (1962). The Tax Tribunal Act does not prevent a court of equity from determining what should be done with funds that in extraordinary circumstances have been properly withheld from the county.
Therefore, because in the present posture of this case it is not possible to determine that the funds in escrow were improperly withheld from the county, we cannot conclude that the landowner plaintiffs’ request for a return of the escrow monies is a proceeding for a tax refund within the meaning of either MCL 205.731(b); MSA 7.650(31)(b). or MCL 205.774; MSA 7.650(74).
V
The defendant also asserts that the action is barred by a 30-day statute of limitations. The statute, in pertinent part, provides:
"No suit shall be instituted to recover any drain tax * * * unless brought within 30 days from the time of' payment * * * and the same procedure observed as is or may be required by the general tax law.” MCL 280.265; MSA 11.1265.-
This action was not commenced within 30 days from the time of payriieiit.
*748We do not agree with defendant that, at this stage of these proceedings, the statute can be held to bar plaintiffs’ claims. As stated previously, the fund from which the landowner plaintiffs seek reimbursement may be found to have been justifiably withheld from the county due to the extraordinary circumstances of this case. If so, the jurisdiction of a court of equity to grant complete relief will allow it to determine what, according to principles of equity, should be done with the escrow account.
Laches is the controlling doctrine when determining the timeliness of the landowner plaintiffs’ claim that they are entitled to the funds in escrow because of defendant’s constructive fraud. Although courts will look to analogous statutes of limitations when determining the timeliness of equitable proceedings, it is laches and not the statute of limitations which bars stale claims.7 *749Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 332 Mich 65; 50 NW2d 851 (1952); Tilley v Brady, 323 Mich 547; 36 NW2d 140 (1949).
The statutory period which defendants assert to bar this claim is not applicable as an analogous statute of limitations. The apparent purpose of that period of limitation is to allow counties the use of the drain taxes that they have collected without the necessity of waiting a prolonged period of time to ascertain the extent to which the assessments will be challenged. In the instant case, if plaintiffs prove their allegations, the funds in escrow which the county has never received will be shown to have been justifiably withheld from the county and, furthermore, will be shown never to have been intended for the drain construction or repair that the limitation was designed to protect. Thus, we cannot now determine that the statute of limitations which defendants assert to bar this claim is pertinent to the question of laches in this case.
VI
Although defendants also challenge the landowner plaintiffs’ ability to bring a class action, the trial court has not yet addressed this question. Because this case will be remanded, we see no need to address it prior to a decision by that court.
We affirm.
No costs, this being a public question._
*750Williams, Fitzgerald, Ryan, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Coleman, C.J.Plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint raising the same allegations with respect to their 1976 drain taxes.
1956 PA 40; MCL 280.196; MSA 11.1196. Although the 1976 amendments to the Drain Code of 1956, 1976 PA 344, may have rendered certain aspects of this case moot, the existence of an escrow account and the necessity of determining its disposition keeps the controversy alive.
Plaintiffs also allege that funds in excess of $800 per mile were spent on drain repair and maintenance and that approval of the expenditures by, 50% of the legislative bodies of public corporations in the drainage district was thus required by § 196 of the Drain Code of 1956. They allege that such approval was never obtained, and that the assessments were not levied according to the benefits received or within two years from the completion of inspection work as required by § 196 of the Drain Code of 1956. Additionally, they contend that the notice required by § 196 was not given.
The parties have not sought to distinguish the various allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint to show how they may differ in relation to this motion for accelerated judgment. Thus, since consideration of plaintiffs’ allegation of constructive fraud and the factual basis for that allegation is sufficient to dispose of the issues presented, we will not seek to ascertain whether these allegations, either individually or in conjunction with the constructive fraud claim, merit a different disposition.
See part IV, infra.
The treasurers do assert that their bonds would have been jeopardized had they failed to bring this action. However, the bond required for a township treasurer is to assure that he or she will faithfully discharge the duties of the office and "faithfully and truly account for and pay over according to law, all moneys which come into the treasurer’s hands as treasurer”. MCL 41.77; MSA 5.69. While we conclude, below, that in extraordinary circumstances a treasurer may be excused from the performance of statutory duties and may have standing to challenge the actions of a county drain commissioner, we do not imply that a treasurer has a duty to take such action. Certainly, the treasurers’ responsibilities as provided in the Drain Code do not establish any such duty. See MCL 280.264-280.265; MSA 11.1264-11.1265. Because we can see no basis from which such a duty would arise, we do not agree that treasurers’ bonds give them a financial stake in this litigation.
Defendants cite the following provisions as defining the pertinent duties of township supervisors and treasurers: §§ 263, 265, and 303 of the Drain Code of 1956, MCL 280.263; MSA 11.1263, MCL 280.265; MSA 11.1265, and MCL 280.303; MSA 11.1303, MCL 41.76-41.78; MSA 5.68-5.70, MCL 211.54; MSA 7.98.
Since the defendants, as well as plaintiffs, address the question of the timeliness of this action in terms of the statute of limitations and not laches, neither address whether MCL 600.5815; MSA 27A.5815 applies to the limitation that defendants assert to bar this claim. That statute, as pertinent, provides: "The prescribed period of limitations shall apply equally to all actions whether equitable or legal relief is sought.” MCL 600.5815; MSA 27A.5815. We do not necessarily decide whether the "prescribed period of limitations”, to which MCL 600.5815; MSA 27A.5815 refers, includes only those limitations contained in the Revised Judicature Act of 1961, 1961 PA 236. Even if the above statute were to apply to the limitation contained in MCL 280.265; MSA 11.1265, it is not at all clear that the present action should be considered a "suit to recover [a] drain tax”. Although drain assessments are the source of the presently disputed escrow account, that fact alone does not necessarily mean that this case is within MCL 280.265; MSA 11.1265. A statement by Justice Smith in his now vindicated dissent in Consumers Power Co v Muskegon County, 346 Mich 243, 253; 78 NW2d 223 (1956), is apropos:
"What we have before us is simply an overpayment, to the taxing authorities, arising out of a mutual mistake of fact, an arithmetical, clerical, error. Were we to categorize, we would say that the law of mistake is primarily involved, not the law of taxation.”
See Spoon-Shacket Co, Inc v Oakland County, 356 Mich 151; 97 NW2d 25 (1959). Similarly, the landowner plaintiffs’ claim in this case is not so much a suit for a tax refund as it is a claim that they have an *749interest in the escrow account because of the alleged constructive fraud on the part of the defendants. Therefore, even if MCL 600.5815; MSA 27A.5815 applies to the Drain Code limitation (so that the question would not be one of analogy, as in a consideration of laches, but rather a question of whether the Drain Code limitation applies directly to this case) we would conclude that the 30-day limitation of the Drain Code is not applicable.