with whom CLIFFORD, J. and CALKINS, J„ join, dissenting.
[¶ 25] I must respectfully dissent. The Court finds that because Alexander’s relationship with the labor market consisted of a “series of discrete, short-term employments which can best be described as ‘consistently intermittent,’ ” subsection B of 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4) may result in an inflated average weekly wage and thus the hearing officer should have applied subsection D. To apply subsection D, however, due regard must be given both to Alexander’s own previous earnings and to “the earnings of other employees of the same or most similar class working in the same or most similar employment in the same or a neighboring locality.” 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(D); St. Pierre v. St. Regis Paper Co., 386 A.2d 714, 719 (Me.1978). As the party asserting application of subsection D, PNG bore the burden to provide evidence of the earnings of comparable employees. See Bossie v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 24, 1997 ME 233, ¶ 6, 706 A.2d 578. Even if subsection D is the best approach for calculating average weekly wage under these circumstances, I do not agree that PNG carried that burden in this case. Although the parties stipulated to the amount comparable employees earned per week, PNG provided no evidence of the number of weeks per year comparable employees worked. Without that information, the basis for comparison is incomplete and the hearing officer was justified in relying on subsection B.
I would affirm.