concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority as to Issues 1 and 2; however, I must respectfully dissent as to Issue 3.
An injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy. Schlehuser v. City of Seymour, 674 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). In *368other words, the trial court exercises its equitable power in granting (or refusing) an injunction. The granting of an injunction requires great caution on the part of the trial court. Id. The injunction is primarily designed to maintain the status quo. See Elder v. City of Jeffersonville, 164 Ind.App. 422, 329 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1975) (injunctive relief is essentially for protection from future or threatened injury). Whether to grant an injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Schlehuser, 674 N.E.2d at 1009.
Under Indiana Trial Rule 65(C), a party may recover damages, including attorney’s fees, for a wrongful injunction. However, I do not believe the injunction in this case should be characterized as “wrongful” so as to warrant an award of attorney fees. The facts of this case date back ten years, with litigation in multiple courts. The instant question of Kapitan’s ability to proceed with her cause of action against Grand Trunk in Lake Superior Court involved the interpretation of a legal agreement between the parties. The trial court was called upon to interpret the intent of the parties and the application of the law as applied to their intent, a task with which it had some difficulty. The matter was a pure question of law, and regardless of whether venue lay in Lake or Jasper County, the same questions or issues were likely to arise until resolved by an appellate court. Consequently, I perceive no harm flowing from Kapitan’s course of action in seeking clarification or the answer to a legal question through the court system, inasmuch as Grand Trunk’s civil and property rights were not impinged upon in any manner.
I find the award of attorney fees in this case to be an elevation of form over substance. The action of the Lake Superior Court we now find to be erroneous had no different, nor more harmful, effect than the action of the Jasper Circuit Court in granting partial summary judgment to Grand Trunk, an action also found to be erroneous. The latter required Kapitan to appeal to this court for relief, without benefit of attorney fees, in order to rectify an error on the part of the court. Yet by reference to T.R. 65(C), the majority would allow Grand Trunk to recover attorney fees for what I find to be the same kind of challenge, albeit wearing another label.
Based upon the facts before us, I find the award of attorney fees to be unwarranted. I further believe such an award sets a bad precedent by punishing litigants for an error on the part of the court and, as such, augurs a chilling effect upon litigants. I would deny the request for attorney fees, leave the parties where we found them, and let the matter proceed to a just resolution in the trial court.