OPINION
HOFFMAN, Senior Judge.Appellant-defendant Annetta Schweitzer appeals from her conviction for criminal deviate conduct, as a Class A felony. The facts relevant to this appeal are presented below.
On September 25, 1986, Schweitzer was convicted of criminal deviate conduct, as a Class A felony, and neglect of a dependent, as a Class B felony. The supreme court *490affirmed Schweitzer’s criminal deviate conduct conviction but vacated her conviction for neglect of a dependent. Schweitzer v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1386, 1389 (Ind.1989). On November 26, 1986, the trial court sentenced Schweitzer to 50 years’ imprisonment for the criminal deviate conduct conviction. On July 26, 1989, the trial court granted Schweitzer’s petition to reduce her sentence to 20 years. This sentencing order was later vacated because Schweitzer had failed to file her petition within 180 days after she began serving her sentence; IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 provided that any sentence modification sought after this 180-day deadline was subject to prosecutorial consent, which was not granted in Schweitzer’s case.1 On July 1, 1997, Schweitzer filed another petition to modify her sentence, which was again opposed by the State; the trial court consequently denied Schweitzer’s motion on January 30,1998. Schweitzer now appeals.
Schweitzer presents three issues for review, which we have consolidated and restated as follows:
(1) whether IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 conflicts with Sections 16 and 18 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution; and
(2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction on Schweitzer’s motion for sentence modification.
Schweitzer argues that Article 1 §§ 16 and 18 of the Indiana Constitution, when read together, require the criminal justice system to provide a defendant with “an opportunity for rehabilitation where reasonably possible.” Fointno v. State, 487 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind.1986). Schweitzer further contends that a defendant’s right to rehabilitation cannot be subject to any time restrictions, and that IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 unconstitutionally limits this right by requiring prosecutorial consent for a sentence modification after a defendant has served 365. days of her sentence. Schweitzer characterizes this 365-day deadline as arbitrary and contrary to law.
When evaluating a statute that allegedly violates the Indiana Constitution, this Court’s standard of review is well-established: every statute is presumed to comport with the Constitution until clearly overcome by a contrary showing. Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996). “The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of proof, and all doubts are resolved against that party.” Id. The constitutionality of IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 was previously challenged in Beanblossom v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1345 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. In Beanblossom, this Court held that IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 does not violate Article 3 § 22 and Article 7 § 1 with respect to separation of powers and judicial powers, nor does it violate a defendant’s rights to due process, equal protection of the laws, and equal access to the courts. Id. at 1347-1349. Schweitzer strenuously disagrees with Beanblossom’s holding and instead advances arguments based upon her reading of Fointno.
IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 reads in relevant part as follows:
35-38-1-17 Reduction or suspension of sentence
Sec. 17(a) Within three hundred sixty-five (365) days after:
(1) the defendant begins serving his sentence;
(2) a hearing at which the defendant is present and of which the prosecuting attorney has been notified; and
(3) obtaining a report from the department of correction concerning the defendant’s conduct while imprisoned;
the court may reduce or suspend the sentence. The court must incorporate its reasons in the record.
(b) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the defendant began serving the sentence and *491after a hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney. The court must give notice of the order to reduce or suspend the sentence under this section to the victim (as defined in IND. CODE § 35-35-3-1) of the crime for which the defendant is serving the sentence.
Article 1 § 16 of the Indiana Constitution reads as follows: “Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Article 1 § 18 provides: “The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.”
As previously noted, Schweitzer’s arguments hinge upon the constitutional requirement that Indiana’s criminal justice system must provide defendants with an opportunity for rehabilitation “where reasonably possible.” Fointno, 487 N.E.2d at 144. Schweitzer’s reliance on Fointno is misplaced: the supreme court addressed the issue of a manifestly unreasonable sentence in that case, not the reduction or suspension of a sentence already imposed as in the case at bar. The State argues, and we agree, that Schweitzer “erroneously equates opportunities for rehabilitation with opportunities for sentence modification.” The record furnishes ample evidence that Schweitzer has been offered and has taken full advantage of numerous opportunities for rehabilitation while incarcerated.
Schweitzer repeatedly asserts that Article 1 §§ 16 and 18 mandate an opportunity for a defendant’s rehabilitation “with no time limits” and attempts to link this assertion to the sentence modification provisions under IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 without citing any relevant authority. The statute’s 365-day time limit applies strictly to a trial court’s unfettered authority to modify a defendant’s sentence, not to the extinguishing of a defendant’s rehabilitation rights. Nowhere in her brief does Schweitzer explain or support her implied assertion that a defendant’s release from incarceration is equivalent to rehabilitation, particularly with respect to Fointno and IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17. Furthermore, Schweitzer baldly accuses the prosecutor in this case of engaging in “vindictive justice” and fails to cite any convincing authority for her claim that the prosecutor’s denial of her sentence modification unconstitutionally infringes upon her right to rehabilitation.
As fervently as Schweitzer argues that this Court’s holding in Beanblossom does not apply to the facts of her case, a careful reading of the issues raised in her brief would indicate otherwise. The trial court reached the same conclusion after considering Schweitzer’s motion to modify sentence. Schweitzer’s arguments focus most heavily upon a prosecuting attorney’s prerogative to approve or deny a defendant’s sentence modification after the 365-day time limit expires under IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17; these arguments strongly echo the separation of powers issue addressed in Beanblossom. A trial court has no inherent authority over a defendant after pronouncing sentence. Beanblossom, 637 N.E.2d at 1348. Furthermore,
[t]he legislature was free, through the statute, to give the trial court authority to render a modification of the sentence with whatever conditions and within whatever time it deemed appropriate. The legislature chose to subject the authority to reduce or suspend a sentence to the approval of the prosecuting attorney if 365 days had passed. Even though the authority to modify is subject to such a condition, the statute does not take judicial power away from the trial court and give it to the prosecuting attorney. The statute gives the sentencing court authority, subject to certain conditions, to change the sentence of the defendant after the court has pronounced sentence and after the defendant has begun to serve that sentence. In other words, the statute gives the court authority it does not otherwise have and does not transfer power between branches of government. The scheme therefore does not violate the separation of powers.
Id.
The legislature’s determination of the 365-day time limit is neither arbitrary or unreasoned, nor does it violate equal protection of *492the laws. Id. “The statute treats equally those prisoners who are similarly situated.” Id. Schweitzer argues that defendants who are unable to rehabilitate themselves within the 365-day period will be adversely affected because their motions for sentencing modification will be denied by the prosecuting attorney. We note that no “fundamental right to liberty is at stake here, and the rational basis test is therefore applicable.” Id. The State must balance the considerations of encouraging prisoner rehabilitation against the dangers of prematurely releasing them upon society, in addition to promoting the finality of judgments and an “ordered procedure for the modification of sentences.” Id. at 1348-1349. The distinctions IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 draws between time periods are legitimate and have a rational basis and therefore do not offend equal protection. Id. at 1348. If Schweitzer believes that the current 365-day time limit is too restrictive or that sentences should be reviewed without being subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney, she should address her concerns to the legislature. Id.
Because Schweitzer’s claim of unconstitutionality is without merit, we need not address her severability arguments with respect to IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17. We need only determine whether the trial court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to grant Schweitzer’s motion for sentence modification. After issuing a final judgment, a court retains only such continuing jurisdiction permitted by the judgment or granted to the court by statute or rule. Id. at 1347. Upon expiration of the 365-day limit outlined in IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17, “notwithstanding any petitions filed by the defendant, the court loses further jurisdiction over the defendant insofar as the alteration of his sentence is concerned.” Id. If the prosecuting attorney should acquiesce in the motion for sentence modification under subsection (b) of the statute, the decision to grant or deny the motion is within the trial court’s discretion; if the prosecuting attorney should oppose the motion for sentence modification, the trial court lacks authority to modify the sentence. Sanders v. State, 638 N.E.2d 840, 841 (Ind. Ct.App.1994). Therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling that it had no jurisdiction on Schweitzer’s motion for sentence modification.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
SHARPNACK, C.J., concurs. SULLIVAN, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.. The 180-day time limit mandated in IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 was changed to 365 days by P.L. 240-1991 (ss2) § 92. Because both of Schweitzer's petitions for sentence modification were filed more than 365 days after she began serving her sentence, we need not determine which version of the statute should apply in this case and merely refer to the current version for purposes of discussion.