dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority focuses on whether an express agreement existed between the State and its chief witness, Helen Williams, who was charged with the same offense as Sigler. It is true that, under Indiana law, the duty of a prosecutor to disclose such express agreements with State’s witnesses exists only when there is a confirmed promise of leniency in exchange for that testimony. Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1113 (Ind.1997). Thus, preliminary discussions and offers made to a felon-witness are not subject to mandatory disclosure by the prosecutor.
In this instance, Sigler’s counsel requested during discovery “[a]ny and all consideration or promises of consideration given or offered to prospective State witnesses including ... Helen L. Williams....” P.C.R. 150. Even though the prosecution had previously disclosed to Loretta Stonebraker that an offer of a fixed term of twenty-five (25) years had been made, the prosecution did not divulge this information to Sigler.3 In essence, the prosecution withheld from Sigler virtually all evidence of its discussions with and offers to Williams, even though that information was specifically requested and the prosecutor was aware an offer had been made to Williams.
Just because disclosure of offers made to felon-witnesses is not mandatory under Indiana law does not mean a prosecutor should not be required to disclose such information when it is requested. The prosecution has the duty under the due process clause to insure that criminal trials are fair by disclosing evidence favorable to the defendant on request. United States v. Bouye, *814688 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir.1982). Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process rights where evidence has been requested by the accused and is material either to guilt or punishment — irrespective of the prosecutor’s good faith or bad faith. Boyd v. State, 650 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied.
The information which Sigler sought was clearly material to the jury’s determination of his guilt, as information about Williams’ possible motives in testifying related directly to her credibility. The jury’s estimation of the truthfulness and reliability of a witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence; it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of a witness in testifying that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend. Ferguson v. State, 670 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. In this case, I believe the prosecutor violated-Sigler’s due process rights by suppressing evidence which could have caused a jury to find Williams less credible than it did without that evidence.
I am also troubled by the requirement of an “express agreement” before disclosure of information pertaining to State’s witnesses is mandatory. This seems to require that there be both an offer of a fixed term sentence and an acceptance before disclosure becomes mandatory. Unfortunately, this gives prosecutors an opportunity to circumvent the due process rights of the criminally accused by discussing possible leniency with State’s witnesses but delaying the final arrangements for plea bargains or refusing to make final express agreements with felon-witnesses until after those witnesses testify. This court has previously noted the problems inherent in requiring an express agreement before prosecutors must disclose evidence pertaining to felon-witnesses. See Lewis v. State, 629 N.E.2d 934, 938 n. 6 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).
A jury should have before it all the relevant circumstances that cause or induce a felon-witness to testify, including the rewards for such testimony. Newman v. State, 263 Ind. 569, 573-74, 334 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1975). When the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a co-conspirator to obtain the conviction of the accused, the co-conspirator’s credibility is an important issue in the case and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to future prosecution of the co-conspirator must be disclosed to the jury. Birkla v. State, 263 Ind. 37, 42, 323 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1975). Prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the State’s failure to disclose any understanding or agreement it has entered into to procure testimony of a witness constitutes violation of a defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed under the federal constitution. Ferguson, 670 N.E.2d at 374. I believe these cases strongly suggest that, in order to fully protect the due process rights of the criminally accused, evidence of any understanding should be disclosed, not just express agreements.
Finally, it is clear to me that the prosecutor did err in this ease. Williams testified that the prosecutors had not made her any offers at all. This simply was not, and is not, true. The prosecutor testified during the hearing on Sigler’s petition for post-rconviction relief that an offer had been made to Williams. This fact alone gave the prosecutor the duty to correct Williams’ testimony. Instead, he sat mute and allowed testimony which could have given the jury the incorrect impression that Williams had no motive to testify.
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we must determine whether there was misconduct by the prosecutor and whether that misconduct had a probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision; the degree of impropriety of the conduct is irrelevant. See Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Ind. 1998) (noting “grave peril” is not required to sustain a finding of prosecutorial misconduct). Williams was the chief witness for the State. Her credibility was of the utmost importance in the case against Sigler. By failing to correct Williams’ false testimony that the State had not made her any offers, the prosecutor’s misconduct had a probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision, violating Sigler’s right to due process.
It is important to note that requiring the State to fully disclose all information relevant to felon-witnesses should not prejudice the State in any way. Full disclosure merely protects the due process rights of the crimi*815nally accused by ensuring that juries have all available information about State’s witnesses and by allowing them to make decisions on the credibility of State’s witnesses based on that information. I would reverse Sigler’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
. The prosecution’s response to Sigler was only that Williams had agreed to testify against Sigler; that Williams intended to plead guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Murder, a Class A felony, after Sigler’s trial; and that Williams had no agreement with the State regarding her sentence and thus was at some risk of receiving the maximum penalty for the crime. P.C.I?.. 137-38.