(dissenting).
The majority assumes that the admission of the photographs of the victim was erroneous but concludes that the error was harmless. Because I conclude that admission was erroneous and not harmless, I dissent.
Exhibits 32 and 33 are photographs of the naked body of Milford Thompson. They present a gruesome view of Thompson’s horribly battered and bloody head and neck. *302Without a doubt they possess a great potential for inflaming the minds and passions of the jury.
Ever since the seminal case of Commonwealth v. Powell, 428 Pa. 275, 241 A.2d 119 (1968), it has been established that photographs with inflammatory potential should not be admitted into evidence unless “ ‘ “the photographs are of such essential evidentiary value that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.” ’ ” Commonwealth v. Garrison, 459 Pa. 664, -, 331 A.2d 186, 187 (1975).
I am unable to conclude that the inflammatory potential of these photographs is outweighed by their essential evidentiary value. The Commonwealth’s medical witness testified unequivocally that death was caused by asphyxiation by blood in the upper respiratory passage resulting from blows about the head and neck. The injuries caused by these blows were described in great detail. The witness could and did “adequately and effectively [testify] without the use of these photographs.” Commonwealth v. Powell, supra, at 279, 241 A.2d at 121.
I can discern no other evidentiary purpose served by the photographs. Therefore, I must conclude that their inflammatory potential exceeded any evidentiary value they might have had. Accordingly their admission into evidence was error.
Furthermore, I cannot agree that the error was harmless. The Commonwealth has failed to “demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the [photographs] might have contributed to the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa. 45, 49, 233 A.2d 552, 554 (1967). The majority may be correct in concluding that the evidence of appellant’s participation in the slaying was overwhelming. However, there is clearly a reasonable possibility, particularly in light of the fact that the trial court permitted the photographs to be taken to the jury room, that they contrib*303uted to the jury’s decision to find murder in the first degree rather than some lower degree of homicide.
1 would reverse the judgment of sentence and grant appellant a new trial.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissent.