dissenting:
I respectfully disagree that the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress statements was manifestly erroneous. Implicit in the majority’s analysis is the assumption that the trial court erred in its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
If we accept the officers’ version as factual, as the court did, a sound basis for denial of the motion becomes evident. According to the officers, they went to the jail to meet with defendant, unaware that his bond had already been posted. When defendant declined to come out of his cell, they again asked for defendant to appear, not to question him but rather to serve him with a legal notice. Although defendant characterizes this legal notice as “an irrelevant court paper,” the eavesdropping statute requires that the issuing judge shall cause the notice of request for use of an eavesdropping device to be served upon persons named in the application not later than 90 days after the termination of the period of the order. 725 ILCS 5/108A — 8 (West 1994). Here, the period of the order expired on December 24, 1994, and defendant was not apprehended until July 14, 1995. In effectuating the court’s notice, as statutorily mandated, the officers had both a right and duty to serve the notice on defendant. In my view, it is speculation to assume that their doing so was a ploy.
When defendant appeared, the officers did not begin to question him about the crime. Instead, defendant began asking the officers questions about the charges. Before any questioning, defendant signed the authorization form provided by the jailers and was given Miranda warnings. Defendant said that he understood his rights but waived them because he wanted to talk to the officers about the charges.
I fail to see how this sequence of events, which is the version found credible by the trial court, can be viewed as an improper “reinitiation” of questioning in violation of the rule of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975). According to the officers, the discussion of the crime was voluntarily initiated by defendant.
The circumstance that defendant was interviewed in the jail after his father had already posted his bond admittedly presents a closer question in resolving the suppression issue. I agree with our majority that even if the questioning officers were not aware that defendant’s father had arrived with bond money, the jailers should have informed defendant of that fact. On these facts, it is not unreasonable to conclude that defendant was questioned during a period of unlawful detention. However, unlawful detention does not of itself invalidate a confession. It is only one circumstance to be evaluated in the totality of the circumstances in determining voluntariness. People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 378 (1990); People v. Nicholls, 44 Ill. 2d 533, 538 (1970). Statements that are otherwise voluntary may, in some instances, still be admissible. The focal issue remains whether defendant’s will was overborne.
Every delay in admitting a defendant to bail will not constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to bail, even where questioning has occurred during the period of the delay. People v. Tripplett, 12 Ill. App. 3d 834, 835-36 (1973). Defendant cites no authority holding that even a violation of this constitutional right would render per se inadmissible his otherwise voluntary statements, and this court has not adopted such an exclusionary rule. See Tripplett, 12 Ill. App. 3d at 836.
Adopting the officers’ version, as the trial court did, there is no significant indication of involuntariness here. Defendant was cooperative and willing to have a conversation with the officers. I note that defendant admits he knew that his father was going to post bond, which would appear to be consistent with the voluntariness of his participation as opposed to any misapprehension that his custodial situation was hopeless.
Within the parameters of Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975), confessions given during periods of unlawful detention have sometimes been upheld even where interrogation was preceded by the possible trauma of an illegal arrest. Here, any coercive effect of the detention presumably would be less significant where defendant was not subjected to an illegal seizure but was already in lawful custody and was aware that he would soon be released on bond.
In view of the conflicting testimony, I see no basis for overruling the trial court’s determination of the facts, and it is my opinion that those facts support the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress statements. I would affirm the trial court’s order.