ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Kendall, J.Appellee’s petition for rehearing contends that the writer of the opinion misunderstood, and the opinion erred in not stating the evidence most favorable to appellee as to the relation between the bank and the respective parties; error of court in treating the admission of certain exhibits described in the original opinion as hearsay, and that the same constituted reversible error; error in making the general statement, “even though right and justice prevailed”, and, “however highly motivated they may be, do not liberalize the long-established rule of admission of evi*526dence.” No new issue is presented other than what was before the court in the original presentation of this matter.
This court heard the argument of appellee’s learned counsel and considered his briefs. We believe that we understood the- issue presented as announced in the opinion and that the court did not err in failing to state the evidence most favorable to the appellee as outlined in the opinion; that the opinion as it deals with the working arrangement between the bank and the .appellee, the manner of selling the trailers originally, is clear and concise, as well as the communications and letters from the bank (not a party to this law suit) with the appellee, as well as what occurred concerning taking possession of the trailers from the appellee at the request of the bank.
It must, at all times, be borne in mind that the Michigan National Bank who handled securing the possession of the trailers in Texas from appellee the financing thereof was never a party to this law suit and is not the appellant herein, but to the contrary, the trailer sales company originally selling the trailers and about whom there is no evidence, ordered the same repossesed, is the appellant. Had the bank been a proper party, a different situation would have been presented to the trial court in the introduction and admission into evidence of the exhibits described in the original opinion.
The appellee himself chose whom he would sue; therefore, he must be bound by the rules of evidence applicable to a situation he caused to be presented. There is nothing in the petition for rehearing that convinces the court that it was proper to introduce into evidence appellee’s exhibits five, six and seven, which instruments were the handiwork of the agents and employees *527of the bank. We find, no logic or legal reasoning how such instruments can bind a party who is not connected therewith and in view of the objection made by the appellant to the introduction of the same into evidence, this court is bound. It was the bank, pot the appellant, who said that the transaction was handled in a fair and unbiased manner. We are without author-' ity to hold contrary to the general rule that statements, either oral or written, made by third parties in the absence of the principal are admissible, and, on this basis, we think the petition for rehearing should be denied. Accordingly, therefore, rehearing is denied.
Note. — Reported in 132 N. E. 2d 149. Rehearing denied 133 N. E. 2d 66.