(concurring and dissenting in part). I agree with the result announced by my colleagues but I cannot accept the basis upon which it was reached. The opinion accepts the fact that Dawson had a living lawful wife at the time he entered into the ceremonial marriage with the petitioner. Although the second marriage was therefore void, the majority characterize the relationship of petitioner and Willie Dawson as a de facto relationship of husband and wife, and they regard petitioner’s status as that of a de facto wife. Thus there comes into existence a quasi-marital status which was hitherto unknown to, and in fact contrary to, the law of our State, and which is to be employed in the administration of death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. As I see the legislative intention under that act and under the public policy revealed by our marriage laws, a woman is either a legal wife or she is not a wife. Unless the parties are competent to marry and actually comply with the statutory ceremonial prerequisites, they do not become husband and wife regardless of the good faith attending their assumption of the relationship. To illustrate, no matter how fervently and sincerely a man and a woman agree to become husband and wife and to live together as such, in Dew Jersey they never acquire that status legally regardless of the length of time they live together. The Legislature has condemned common law marriage as “absolutely void.” N. J. S. A. 37:1-10.
But in spite of our strong public policy, the majority hold that a void ceremonial marriage entered into in good faith by a woman, coupled with a period of cohabitation as man and wife and support of the woman by the man, gives her the status of a lawful wife for purposes of workmen’s compensation. I believe that such a doctrine is contrary to the intention of the Legislature and the express language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Furthermore, adoption of such a drastic change in the law is not at all necessary in this case, as the respondent has failed to prove the invalidity of petitioner’s ceremonial marriage to decedent.
*201I
In order to receive benefits in a workmen’s compensation death case, the statute imposes on the petitioner the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that she occupied the status of a dependent wife, as described therein, at the time of the accident or the employee’s death. N. J. 8. A. 34: 15-13 says that “dependents” shall apply to and include a wife and her dependency “shall be conclusively presumed” if she is “actually a part of the decedent’s household at the time of his death.” Ordinarily a woman becomes a wife when she is lawfully married to a man within the requirements of the place where the status was assumed. Undoubtedly that is the type of relationship the Legislature contemplated when using the terms “wife” and “widow.” In my judgment there was no intention to provide benefits for a “de facto wife.” So when a person, claiming to be a wife turned widow on the death of an employee, files a petition for compensation benefits, she must in her case produce at least prima facie evidence of that status. If the employer is possessed of facts demonstrating the contrary, he may deny the relationship in his answer to the petition and introduce the supporting proof at the hearing. Obviously the obligation of the employer under the statute is to pay benefits to the decedent’s wife-widow, not to a woman who happens to be living with him at the time of his death.
In view of the statutory burden on the alleged wife to prove her status, the right of the employer to contest the claim exists, whether he is a self-insurer or whether he carries the otherwise compulsory insurance coverage required by N. J. S. A. 34:15-70 et seq., under which the carrier’s obligation is to satisfy the employer’s compensation act liability. The qualifications for compensation have been fixed by the Legislature and it is not within the province of the judiciary to extend or enlarge them beyond the statute. Jones v. New Jersey Manufacturers Gas. Ins. Co., 77 N. J. Super. 147, 152 (App. Div. 1962), aff’d o. b. 39 N. J. 555 *202(1963); Flynn v. Union City, 32 N. J. Super. 518, 524 (App. Div. 1954), certif. den. 17 N. J. 253 (1955); Fedi v. Ryan, 118 N. J. L. 516, 520 (Sup. Ct. 1937). As this Court has indicated plainly, “dependents” in such cases are to he determined by finding that the person claiming benefits is not only an actual dependent of the deceased worker but also that she bears to him “one of the specified statutory enumerated relationships.” Stellmah v. Hunterdon Coop. G. L. F. Serv. Inc., 47 N. J. 163, 170 (1966); see Gaudreau v. Eclipse Pioneer Div. of Bendix Air Corp., 137 N. J. L. 666, 668 (E. & A. 1948).
Since the inception of the Workmen’s Compensation Act the Workmen’s Compensation Division has recognized the right of the employer to deny and to disprove the alleged status of a petitioner as the lawful wife of a decedent. See e.g. Foster v. Jarka Corp., 21 N. J. Misc. 47, 30 A. 2d 47 (Dept. of Labor 1942); Dunn v. O’Day, 18 N. J. Misc. 679, 16 A. 2d 195 (Dept. of Labor 1940); Monroe v. Kantor, 10 N. J. Misc. 942, 161 A. 833 (Dept. of Labor 1932). So too have the courts: Booker v. James Spence Iron Foundry, 80 N. J. Super. 68 (App. Div. 1963); see Minter v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 24 N. J. 128 (1957) where two petitioners in individual petitions, each claiming to be the widow of the deceased workman, at separate hearings obtained awards of compensation. On appeal this Court vacated both awards, ordered consolidation of the petitions and remanded for a rehearing to determine the true widow; and cf. Weinberg v. Todd Shipyards, 97 N. J. Super. 289 (App. Div.), certif. den. 51 N. J. 9 (1967); Shuler v. Eastern Foundry, 34 N. J. Super. 216 (Cty. Ct. 1955). Administration of the compensation act is accomplished essentially by adversary proceedings between the employee and employer. That appears to be the plan of the Legislatixre and proceedings of that character provide the best means of effectuating the lawmakers’ purpose of providing benefits for those persons who meet the criteria therefor which are specified in the act. Allowing the employer to question or to deny a petitioner’s status *203as the workman’s widow may not be a perfect solution in all cases, but in the great mass of cases it is bound to further the quest for a just result. If an employer proves that decedent had another living and lawful wife, we must rely upon the judge of compensation to require the employer to bring the other person into the proceeding or to have her brought in on the Division’s own motion. In that way the probability is that the true wife will be paid the statutory benefits. Erom a practical standpoint, if an employer has knowledge of another living wife, even if the petitioner — alleged wife — was married in a ceremonial marriage, and if he is faced with the possibility of double liability, it seems likely that he or the hearing judge will see to it that the Division is given the opportunity to decide which person is the lawful wife. If, in the face of a ceremonial marriage between the decedent and the alleged widow-petitioner, the employer simply undertakes to prove that the workman was already married when she married him, and the employer does not produce the alleged first wife, or if the proof indicated that the first alleged wife is dead, petitioner’s right to compensation benefits would be tested and probably resolved by application of the strong presumption (to be discussed hereafter) in favor of validity of the second ceremonial marriage. If on the other hand the employer is not allowed to question the validity of petitioner’s claim that she is the workman’s widow unless it appears that another allegedly true widow is also making a claim, a true widow may never know that she is entitled to compensation benefits.
It does not follow that because an employee might be estopped in a matrimonial proceeding between himself and his wife to question the validity of their marriage, the employer should likewise be estopped from doing so in a statutory workmen’s compensation proceeding. The right of an alleged widow to death benefits was created by and depends entirely upon the conditions precedent to the existence of that right as specified by the Legislature. That body has ordained that if a workman dies in a work-connected acci*204dent, leaving a lawful widow, the employer shall pay certain benefits to her. Thus the measure of the employer’s obligation is the existence of a woman who qualifies under the law as a wife-widow. Therefore subject to the strict proof requirements hereafter outlined, the employer should not be denied the right to show that petitioner did not hold that legal status at the time of his employee’s death.
For the reasons stated, I believe (1) that the Legislature has imposed upon an alleged widow the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that she was the legal wife of the deceased workman at the time of his death, and (2) that the employer may contest her claim to that status, although in the face of a ceremonial marriage between petitioner and decedent, his burden would be a very heavy one.1
II
The above brings me to the uncomplicated and, I think, sound basis on which this case should be decided.
As the majority opinion notes, petitioner and decedent were ceremonially married on February 14, 1949 and lived together in New Jersey until Willie Dawson died 16 years later.
Respondent proved that on September 20, 1942 Dawson had entered into a ceremonial marriage with Nellie Mae Respess in Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia. Less than a year later Dawson entered military service. Upon his discharge he visited Georgia briefly and then went to Newark, New Jersey, allegedly to buy a home. Thereafter he made several short trips to Georgia, returning to Newark after each visit. Then, as the majority opinion records, “he seems to have drifted out of Nellie Mae’s life.” Subsequently she had two children by another man, but she never divorced *205Willie, and to the best of her knowledge he never divorced her.
Respondent offered proof that there is no record showing the grant of a divorce to Nellie Mae or to Dawson in Enlton County, Georgia, between 1940 and 1967; also that there is no record of such a divorce in New Jersey during that period. It shoiüd be noted that there are 159 counties in Georgia and that Nellie Mae lived for some time in Macon County in that state. Moreover the record does not show the state or states to which Dawson was assigned while in military service.
The law has a tender regard for a second ceremonial marriage. A strong presumption of its validity exists; in fact it is regarded as one of the strongest presumptions in the law. It is based upon considerations of social and public policy, principles of morality, and a further presumption against the wilful commission of bigamy. It is regarded as outweighing the presumption of continuance of a prior marriage and as deriving additional support from a presumption that the first marriage was terminated by divorce. Eurther, its probative force increases as the years of cohabitation lengthen. Annotation, “Presumption as to validity of second marriage,” 14 A. L. B. 2d 7 (1950).
In describing the potency of the presumption of validity, courts have said that it can be overcome only by “overwhelming proof to the contrary”; it may be negated only by disproving every reasonable possibility which could vitiate the prior marriage relationship. Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is required; there must be plenary proof that neither party to the previous marriage had obtained a divorce in any of the counties of a jurisdiction where it could have been granted; the evidence to overcome must be clear, strong and satisfactory and so persuasive as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that a divorce was not obtained; the evidence must be sufficient to establish a mental conviction which amounts to a moral certainty; the presumption must prevail until rebutted by evidence which negatives the effective operation of every possible means by which a dis*206solution of the prior marriage could have taken place. Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F. 2d 621, 169 Ct. Cl. 589 (1965); Mims v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 82 Ga. App. 210, 60 S. E. 2d 501 (Ct. App. 1950); Harper v. Dupree, 185 Kan. 483, 345 P. 2d 644 (1959); Browning v. Browning, 224 Md. 399, 168 A. 2d 506 (1961); Esmond v. Thomas Lyons Bar & Grill, 26 A. D. 2d 884, 274 N. Y. S. 2d 225 (1966); Marcum v. Zaring, 406 P. 2d 970 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1965); Texas Employers’ Insurance Assn. v. Elder, 155 Tex. 27, 282 S. W. 2d 371 (1955).
In our own State, the presumption of validity of the second marriage is no less strong, nor is the burden of overcoming it any less burdensome. Booker v. James Spence Iron Foundry, supra, 80 N. J. Super, at 73-74, and cases cited therein; Tyll v. Keller, 94 N. J. Eq. 426, 428 (E. & A. 1922); DiFranco v. DiFranco, 103 N. J. Eq. 529 (Ch. Div. 1928); Rehder v. Rehder, 13 N. J. Misc. 310, 178 A. 361 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1925). In Boolcer, a workmen’s compensation death claim where the respondent contested petitioner’s right to' benefits on the ground that she was already married at the time her ceremonial marriage to decedent was performed, and offered considerable proof in support of its position, the Appellate Division, finding it inadequate to overcome the presumption of validity of the workman’s marriage to petitioner, soundly said:
It is well settled that there is a strong presumption that the latest of two or more marriages involving a common participant is presumed valid when the validity of that marriage is in issue in a legal proceeding and that the presumption is that the prior marriage has been terminated by death or divorce before the contracting of the marriage in issue. Evidence variously described as “clear and conclusive,” [citing cases], and, more recently, as “clear and convincing,” is required to overcome these presumptions as to the termination of the prior marriage. * * * The presumption in favor of the validity of the last marriage is so strong, moreover, that when the opponent thereof submits a prior marriage of one of the parties it is his affirmative obligation to show that the parties to the prior marriage were at that time free from disabilities against a lawful marriage. * * * These presumptions in favor of the latest marriage are entertained in almost all jurisdictions. * * * 80 N. J. Super, at 73-74.
*207When the evidence offered by respondent here is weighed, in my judgment, it is not sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of validity of petitioner’s marriage to Dawson. Although the proof is adequate to show that Dawson never obtained a divorce in New Jersey, it is not so clear and convincing that a dissolution of his first marriage did not occur elsewhere. Eor example, the evidence shows only that no divorce judgment was entered in Eulton County, Georgia, although (as we notice judicially) there are two counties in Atlanta—Eulton and DeKalb Counties. Eurthermore Nellie Mae testified that after Dawson went into service she went to live with her mother in Macon County, Georgia, and apparently was there when he was discharged from service. The Veterans’ Administration record reveals that when Dawson was inducted into service, he said he and his wife were separated. It is entirely possible that he learned of her residence with her mother in Macon County, and sued for and obtained a divorce there. The possibility was not disproved by the record of that County, and it may well be that for some reason she did not receive the suit papers there or she would not admit she received them. It is interesting to note that at one point, apparently long before Dawson’s death, Nellie Mae said that she telephoned him in Newark and that a woman answered who identified herself as Dawson’s wife. She seems to have accepted the fact, because although she was not being supported by Dawson, she made no effort to vindicate her right to support, or to bring a proceeding, either civil or criminal, against him when he visited his relatives in Georgia. No effort was made to prove where Dawson served his military duty or that he did not obtain a divorce in a state where he was stationed. It is a matter of common knowledge that servicemen had the benefit of liberal legal aid during their tour of duty. In view of the social policy supporting the presumption of validity of his later marriage to petitioner, it does not seem unreasonable to regard respondent’s failure to pursue that line of investigation as militating against a conclusion that the presumption *208has been overcome. Moreover, and of extreme significance to me in view of petitioner’s ceremonial marriage, her good faith entry into it and her performance as a wife for 16 years before Dawson died, we cannot overlook the fact that Dawson is dead. His lips are sealed and he seems to have been the one person who could tell us with certainty whether he had divorced his first wife. If Nellie Mae had made the necessary inquiry and investigation after she had been informed, apparently by the present petitioner, that she was his wife, proof positive might have become available. Nellie Mae had two children by Dawson. After he went to New Jersey he obviously provided no support for them. So she had a strong motivation to seek support, if only for her children; yet she did nothing over the years. This can mean that she knew he had divorced her, but even if that is not regarded a strong inference, nevertheless her inaction does not weaken the force of the presumption of divorce, or of the more potent presumption of validity of Dawson’s ceremonial marriage to petitioner.
Under all the circumstances, I feel that petitioner has sustained the burden of establishing that she is the widow of decedent within the contemplation of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and therefore she should receive an award of compensation.
Weintbaub and Ebanois, JJ., concur in result.
Ekancis, J. dissents in part.
For reversal—Chief Justice Weintbaub and Justices Jacobs, Ebanois, Pkoctob, Haul, Schettino and Mountain—7.
For affirmance—None.
This does not mean that the employer should be allowed to make a collateral attack on a divorce decree between decedent and Ms first wife. On that subject the view of the Appellate Division in Weinberg v. Todd Shipyards, supra, 97 N. J. Super, at 293 is eminently sound.