dissenting.
Should a jury be permitted to weigh the value of human life such that the death penalty might be imposed where the victim is an upstanding citizen but not be imposed where the victim lived on the margins of society? Having the jury consider such profound issues without adequate direction from the court disrupts the careful weighing process constitutionally required to be employed by juries in determining whether a sentence of death is warranted. Moreover, it improperly *338channels the jury’s deliberation towards examining the life of the victim, rather than the criminal act and character of the defendant.
At a minimum, the introduction of such evidence is incompatible with precedent of our Court providing that “victim impact evidence,” unaccompanied by restrictions as to its presentation or guidelines as to its evaluation, unconstitutionally interjects arbitrariness into the capital sentencing scheme. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 545 Pa. 233, 681 A.2d 130 (1996). Because the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court has flagrantly disregarded this rule of law and upheld the victim impact provisions of the capital sentencing statute, I vigorously dissent. While the adoption of stringent guidelines regarding the presentation and use of victim impact evidence may minimize the effect of the statute’s constitutional infirmities, it is not, and never has been, the role of our Court to amend what the General Assembly has enacted.
Initially, I note that I join that portion of Mr. Justice Nigro’s Dissenting Opinion wherein he concludes that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2) and (c)(2) violate the fundamental fairness required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Likewise, I agree with his conclusion that the amended statute “injects the very kind of arbitrary and impermissible factor into the jury’s sentencing decision that this Court prohibited in Fisher.” Dissenting Opinion 565 Pa. at 341, 773 A.2d at 163. Unlike Mr. Justice Nigro, however, I would not admit victim impact evidence as rebuttal to defense evidence introduced as a catchall mitigating circumstance under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8). As noted by the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, such a construct “forces the defendant to make the Hobson’s choice of forgoing such mitigation evidence in order to block presentation of victim impact testimony.” Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court at 565 Pa. at 312, 773 A.2d 159. The answer to the dilemma, however, is not to admit the evidence without restriction. Rather, victim impact testimony should be precluded.
*339The evils likely to arise from the admission of victim impact evidence are numerous and of constitutional significance. Because there is no statutory provision describing the standard of proof by which such evidence is to be assessed or whether unanimity is required in how the evidence is to be weighed, victim impact evidence can not be constitutionally considered as a “super” aggravating circumstance. The evidence should also not be considered as an arbitrary “tiebreaker” in the weighing of competing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Moreover, the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court has failed to even contemplate the possibility of victim impact evidence being offered by the defense.1 The fact that these scenarios are likely to occur drastically increases the risk of capricious imposition of the death penalty.
As drafted, the statute is constitutionally inadequate to regulate the presentation and consideration of victim impact evidence in the myriad of situations that are likely to arise. When the life of a human being hangs in the balance, the Court should be wary of sanctioning practices that may result in an execution based heavily on the attributes of the victim rather than the culpability of the defendant. Although the guidelines referenced in Mr. Justice Nigro’s Dissenting Opinion may work to prevent some constitutional violations from occurring, the adoption of such substantive limitations lies within the prerogative of the legislature. As they tinker and adjust such guidelines, some may die. I do not choose to adopt that course.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the trial court ruling section 9711(a)(2) and (c)(2) unconstitutional.
Chief Justice FLAHERTY joins this dissenting opinion.. In fact, this scenario has already arisen. In Commonwealth v. Givens, 26 WM 2001, the Commonwealth filed an application for extraordinary relief in which it challenged the common pleas court’s ruling that the defense could presenl testimony as to tire victim’s family's opposition to the death penalty in that particular case. The defense sought to introduce testimony that the victim’s mother did not believe that the defendant was the perpetrator and that the defendant's execution would only intensify the pain she suffered as a result of the loss of her son. Our Court denied the Commonwealth's application for extraordinary relief on April 3, 2001.