Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion “that the trial court erred by rejecting the Zoning Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to where the Platt Bridge begins.”
The majority states:
PennDOT assigned ‘sectors’ when it divided up the construction contract for the Platt Bridge and Penrose Avenue, but it did not make any attempt to determine the exact boundaries of the Platt Bridge. Therefore, the Zoning Board was required to use its discretion to determine the point at which the Platt Bridge begins. In order to accomplish this task, the Zoning Board looked to the definition of the term ‘bridge’ and found that a bridge is ‘a structure carrying a pathway or roadway over a depression or obstacle.’ Accordingly, the Zoning Board determined that the elevation of the roadway indicates the point at which the Platt Bridge begins, because this is the point where Penrose Avenue begins to be carried over the Schuylkill River. Although one could reach a different conclusion as to where the Platt Bridge begins, the Zoning Board’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, as this determination does correspond with the plain, ordinary meaning of the term ‘bridge.’
Majority Opinion at 6-7 (emphasis added).
The trial court reversed the Zoning Board’s decision and concluded:
A Court is not privileged to expand a deprivation of property by including the approach to the bridge as part of the bridge.
This position is consistent with the general Hornbook law that any ambiguous or vague terms in an ordinance which restrict a permitted use shall be construed so as to give the landowner the benefit of the least restrictive use. This Court finds that the evidence in this record establishes that the elevated section is in reality the Penrose Avenue section and that was not restricted by this ordinance.
Trial Court Memorandum, June 2, 2000, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
As accurately noted by the trial court, the rule of law controls when confronted with ambiguous or undefined terms that restrict a permitted use. Any ambiguity is to be interpreted broadly to enable the landowner to enjoy the least restrictive use. See Appeal of Shirk, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 493, 539 A.2d 48 (1988). In sum, the trial court properly construed the term *216“bridge” within the context of the Zoning Code to grant Appellees’ request for a zoning permit.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the trial court.1
. There is no need to address the variance issue in light of this outcome.