also dissenting:
I agree with Justice Heiple that Mitchell had a duty to use reasonable care to insure the accuracy of the information it provided Brogan during the parties’ hiring negotiations. I would further hold, however, that a cause of action exists for negligent misrepresentations that cause emotional harm. Because juries are capable of determining whether claims of emotional distress are genuine, as this court has already recognized (Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 312 (1991)), there is no justification for differentiating emotional injuries from physical ones.
The majority is concerned that the recognition of tort liability here “could unduly impede the flow of communication in society,” but I fail to see the social utility in protecting the sort of misconduct committed by the employer in this case. Implicit in the majority’s position is the belief that our system must make allowances for dishonesty in order to function and that business cannot thrive without the freedom to trick employees. I hope this is not true, but if it is, it is time for the system to change.