dissenting:
The majority’s decision was completely predictable. Over the past several years, this court has become an inhospitable place for organized labor and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1994)). See, e.g., Chief Judge of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 178 Ill. 2d 333 (1997); American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299 (1996); Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 166 Ill. 2d 296 (1995). The government wins, the unions lose, and that is that. There was no reason to think this case would be treated differently.
If the matter were decided on the merits, as it should be, one would have to conclude that the Illinois State Labor Relations Board (the Board) was entirely correct in holding that the City of Belvidere committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to bargain with the union collectively in good faith regarding its decision to contract out paramedic services. The issue was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the standards set forth in Central City Education Ass’n v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496 (1992), as the Board properly held.
In rejecting the Board’s decision, my colleagues rely on the first prong of the Central City test, which asks whether the employer’s actions involve wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Central City, 149 Ill. 2d at 523. Central City makes clear that this question is one that the administrative agency “is uniquely qualified to answer.” Central City, 149 Ill. 2d at 523. Contrary to Central City, however, the majority shows no deference whatever to the Board’s experience and understanding of bargaining. Purporting to employ a “clearly erroneous” standard, what the majority does instead is simply substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.
Rejecting the Board’s factual determinations, my colleagues depict the City’s decision as inconsequential. Although it is true that there has been no reduction in work force or pay, at least so far, those factors are not dispositive. Under Westinghouse Electric Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965), which this court has adopted, the issue is whether the employer’s decision involves a departure from previously established operating practices, effects a change in the conditions of employment, or results in a significant impairment of job tenure, employment security, or reasonably anticipated work opportunities.
In the matter before us, the City entered into a private contract for EMS services where there had been no such contracts before, it took primary responsibility for EMS work away from its firefighters and bestowed it on a private contractor, and it eliminated the opportunity its firefighters previously had to advance by upgrading their levels of EMS certification. In light of these facts, I fail to see how one can seriously deny that the City departed from previously established operating practices, changed the conditions of the firefighters’ employment, and significantly impaired the firefighters’ work opportunities. The City’s decision therefore qualifies as a matter “of wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment” under the first part of the Central City test.
The result reached by the majority reflects a narrow view of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act in which the duty to bargain collectively is seen as the exception rather than the rule. That view is directly contrary to the law. Under the Act, the duty to bargain collectively is broad, and any exceptions should be construed narrowly. See, e.g., City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 364-66 (1988).
I do not understand my colleagues’ reluctance to give the policies and provisions of the Act effect. To say that the City has the duty to bargain collectively here does not mean that the City cannot ultimately subcontract EMS services to private companies or alter the EMS responsibilities presently held by its firefighters. As Justice Miller correctly noted in City of Decatur, 122 Ill. 2d at 367, and as section 7 of the Act (5 ILCS 315/7 (West 1994)) provides, the duty to bargain collectively does not require a party to reach a particular agreement or make a particular concession. For the purposes of the dispute before us today, it means simply that the parties must meet and talk in good faith before final action is taken. There is no possible harm in that. And it is the law. I therefore dissent.