We granted leave to appeal to determine the effect of the doctrine of res judicata upon these workers’ compensation claims.
*159Justice Williams has stated the facts in both cases.
I
The parties do not question that the doctrine of res judicata applies to workers’ compensation proceedings; they differ only as to its scope. Plaintiffs assert that only those claims actually litigated in a prior proceeding are barred from relitigation. Defendants argue that res judicata bars those claims actually litigated and also those arising out of the same transaction which plaintiff could have brought in the first action, but did not.
The concerns behind the res judicata principle— economy of judicial resources and finality of litigation — apply equally to workers’ compensation proceedings and other actions. 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 79.71, p 15-307. While this Court has always maintained that the scope of the doctrine should be the same in each area,1 we have not been consistent in defining that scope.
*160Our opinions have endorsed both a narrow and a broad application of the rule. Narrow application bars a second action only if the same question was actually litigated in the first proceeding.2 Broad application bars as well those claims arising out of the same transaction which plaintiff could have brought, but did not.3 In recent opinions, we have acknowledged the conflicting language and opted for the broad rule. Gursten v Kenney, 375 Mich 330, 334-335; 134 NW2d 764 (1965) (order of dismissal); Curry v Detroit, 394 Mich 327, 332; 231 NW2d 57 (1975) (order of summary dismissal).
Our workers’ compensation cases also contain conflicting language.4 Once again, we endorsed the broad rule in our most recent pronouncement:
"This Court has cited with approval the rule set forth in 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation, § 508. See White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201; 89 NW2d 439 (1958). This section states:
" 'The general rule with respect to the effect upon the application of the principles of res judicata to decisions under workmen’s compensation acts, of a provision authorizing the modification of an award upon a showing of a change in the employee’s condition, is that a compensation award is an adjudication as to the condition of the injured workman at the time it is entered, and conclusive of all matters adjudicable at that time, but it is not an adjudication as to the claimant’s future *161condition and does not preclude subsequent awards or subsequent modifications of the original award upon a showing that the employee’s physical condition has changed. * * Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368, 375-376; 224 NW2d 856 (1975) (emphasis supplied in Hlady).
I do not share the view expressed in Justice Williams’ opinion that we applied a "narrow rule” in Hlady.
There was no disagreement there that res judicata barred all facts adjudicated or adjudicable at the time of the first hearing. There was also no disagreement that the law applied to those facts at such hearing if unchanged would also preclude subsequent redetermination.
We disagreed only over whether a change in the law — as would a change in facts — permits a subsequent redetermination of an issue.
Thus while we disagreed over whether the rule of res judicata should be applied, there was no dispute over the scope of its coverage if applicable.
The expression in Hlady:
"the doctrine of res judicata applies not only to facts previously litigated, but also to points of law which were necessarily adjudicated in determining and deciding the subject matter of the litigation”, Hlady, supra, 376,
is no expression of a "narrow” rule but a simple affirmation that the rule of res judicata, whatever its breadth, applies equally to facts and law. Barring a change, under the doctrine we all agree neither can be relitigated.
I am not persuaded that the scope of the rule should be narrowed, as plaintiffs urge. A compensation award represents " 'an adjudication as to *162the condition of the injured workman at the time it is entered.’ ” Theodore v Packing Materials, Inc, 396 Mich 152, 158; 240 NW2d 255 (1976), citing 58 Am Jur, supra. Disability benefits "are a form of income maintenance for persons whose wage-earning capacity has been suspended or terminated. A claimant’s entitlement to such benefits depends on the circumstances at the time of application and payment”. Hlady, supra, 391 (Levin, J., concurring).
The requirement that he present all of his available claims in a single proceeding is consistent with this purpose of adjudicating the worker’s needs. The remedial character of the legislation, if affected at all by this rubric, would scarcely be enhanced by a construction which would authorize piecemeal compensation for an injury.
II
Central to any application of the res judicata rule — narrow or broad — is the principle that one may not relitigate the identical question once determined. The adjudicative process would fail to serve its social function if it did not have this effect. James & Hazard, Civil Procedure (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1977), ch 11, p 530.
I agree with Justice Williams that plaintiff Sanders’ second petition is barred because she is asserting the same claim.5
*163I disagree with his conclusion that plaintiff Gose’s claim should not be barred for the same reason.
There can be but one claim for total and permanent disability. Although the statute recognizes seven alternative bases for it,6 evidence establishing more than one basis would occasion only one award.
Gose’s second petition, although upon a different basis (insanity instead of industrial loss of use of both legs), nonetheless seeks compensation for the same claim of total and permanent disability arising from injury to his left ankle. He was obligated to advance in a single proceeding every alternative basis which could support this claim. Failure to do so bars relitigation of the claim previously resolved against him. Restatement Judgments, 2d (Tentative Draft No 5, 1978), § 61, comment c, p 144.
We reverse and remand in both cases for entry of an order denying benefits based on res judicata.
Coleman, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J. *164Williams, J.We are asked in these two cases to revisit and more explicitly define the application of the doctrine of res judicata to workers’ compensation law. This Court most recently faced this task in Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368; 224 NW2d 856 (1975), in which res judicata was found to control, and Morgan v Freedman Artcraft, 401 Mich 54; 257 NW2d 85 (1977), in which it was not.
In Gose, the issue is whether a claim based on insanity which was withdrawn before adjudication can be re-petitioned in a subsequent case without being barred by res judicata. In Sanders the issues are of fact as to whether determinations had been made in the prior case. Based on the facts of each case and the rule set forth by this Court in Hlady, supra, we find the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the claim of plaintiff Gose but does bar the claim of plaintiff Sanders.
I. Facts
A. Gose
Plaintiff, Tipton G. Gose, commenced employment with defendant Monroe Auto Equipment in 1945. In 1946, plaintiff cut his left ankle; on August 3, 1953, he reinjured the same area. Both incidents occurred while at work.
The 1953 incident developed into an ulcerated skin condition which caused intermittent absences from work while plaintiff received treatment. Workers’ compensation benefits were voluntarily paid during these absences.
By 1960, plaintiff was apparently totally unable to continue employment and on February 19, 1962, plaintiff underwent a below-the-knee amputation of his left leg.
*165Compensation benefits were paid voluntarily through the expiration of a 500-week period. Ten days subsequent to the expiration of that benefit period, March 14, 1963, plaintiff filed a petition for hearing with the Workers’ Compensation Bureau indicating personal injury dates of August 3, 1953, and the summer of 1960 (presumably the last day of work). The disability was described as "ankle, leg amputation thereof, permanent and total disability, and related injuries”. The petition was withdrawn August 12, 1963, however, when the defendant-employer agreed to pay compensation on a voluntary basis. This payment continued for 250 more weeks and terminated December 4, 1967.
Plaintiff testified that after his amputation he was depressed and felt like killing himself. As a result, in August, 1963, plaintiff was admitted to the Ypsilanti State Hospital and was an intermittent patient at that facility until 1968. Since his release, plaintiff has been on medication and in the care of his brother.
On March 14, 1968, plaintiff again filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. This claim was brought against both his employer and the Second Injury Fund. Plaintiff listed the same disability dates (1953 and 1960) and claimed "industrial loss of use of both legs, insanity, total and permanent disability and related injuries”.
Hearing commenced on November 3, 1969, during which Raymond F. Lipton, M.D., who testified that he was a specialist in the treatment of injury cases, was deposed with regard to plaintiff’s physical and mental status. As to his physical status, Dr. Lipton found plaintiff suffered from arterial circulatory disease of the right leg. He diagnosed plaintiff’s mental problem as "chronic psychosis”. This diagnosis was partially based on the fact that *166the social worker who accompanied plaintiff from Ypsilanti State Hospital to Dr. Lipton’s office had told the doctor that plaintiff had been diagnosed as psychotic. No other medical testimony was presented, and the testimony of Dr. Lipton at no time related the claimant’s psychosis to his employment, although, as stated above, the claimant’s own testimony related his mental problems to his amputation.
On December 1, 1969, the matter came before the hearing referee for a closing of the record. At that time, plaintiff’s attorney officially withdrew from consideration plaintiff’s claim of insanity:
"Well, if your Honor please, I would like to complete it from my standpoint by withdrawing that part of the claim which relates to the claim of insanity. We did not offer proofs in that regard, and we do not want a decision made in that regard. We would like instead for the case to proceed on the allegation of loss of both legs * * * »
No objection to the withdrawal was lodged by defendant.
On April 29, 1970, the hearing referee found that plaintiff had suffered industrial loss of the use of both legs and ordered the defendant-employer to pay benefits for 750 weeks; the referee further ordered the Second Injury Fund to pay benefits beyond the 750-week period. The Second Injury Fund appealed this decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (hereinafter WCAB).
The WCAB modified the referee’s order by denying plaintiff the benefits ordered due from the Second Injury Fund. Apparently no appeal was taken from this modification.
In April, 1972, plaintiff again applied for benefits from his former employer and the Second *167Injury Fund. Plaintiff recited the same injury dates and the same disabilities as previously claimed in the 1968 petition, including insanity. No change in condition was alleged, but testimony pursuant to this claim included that of a psychiatrist. Defendants, employer and Second Injury Fund, filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that plaintiff’s present claim was barred by res judicata. A hearing was held on January 26, 1973, which resulted in a finding that plaintiff was "incurably insane as determined by court decisions and is permanently and totally disabled”. Further compensation, however, was found to be barred by application of res judicata. The WCAB affirmed, finding that plaintiff’s contention of insanity was a triable issue at the earlier 1969 hearing, and was therefore barred by res judicata.
Plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal with the Court of Appeals. That Court, in a peremptory order issued November 21, 1977, ruled:
"It is ordered, pursuant to GCR 1963, 806.7, that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board for consideration, on the merits of the evidence and without invoking res judicata, of the question whether plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled as a result of incurable insanity under the act. Morgan v Freedman Artcraft, 401 Mich 54 (1977).
"This Court retains no further jurisdiction.”
Both defendants sought leave to appeal to this Court. Leave was granted June 1, 1978.
B. Sanders
Plaintiff, Louise Sanders, commenced employment with defendant Genera] Motors Corporation in October, 1952. From that date until November, 1960, plaintiff worked in various capacities includ*168ing packing bumpers, working on a press, working on the production line and inspecting.
At the end of plaintiffs shift on November 10, 1960, while working as an inspector, plaintiff tripped and fell over several pieces of wire which had been discarded in an aisle. The fall resulted in injuries to plaintiffs back.
Plaintiff first consulted with her own physician, Dr. John Benson, who recommended that she cease work for a 30-day period. The plant physician, Dr. Clark, however, did not agree that the injuries to plaintiffs back necessitated total cessation of work. Rather, Dr. Clark had plaintiff transferred to sedentary work for a 30-day period. Plaintiff returned to her prior duties at the conclusion of the 30-day period and subsequently transferred to several other positions. For approximately a three-year period between plaintiffs November, 1960 fall and April, 1963, plaintiff continued to work while she received treatment for back and leg problems occasioned by her fall. In April, 1963, however, plaintiffs medical problems necessitated cessation of work.1
From termination of employment through 1966, plaintiff underwent several surgeries and periods of hospitalization and was able to perform only limited activities. Plaintiff testified that in 1966, following her third laminectomy, she was unable to do almost all household chores, be mobile for more than a short time, prepare meals or drive or ride in an automobile.
Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits during much of the period between April, 1963 and October, 1965.
*169On September 27, 1967, plaintiff filed a petition for hearing with the Workers’ Compensation Bureau alleging total and permanent disability to her back, legs and nervous system. A hearing was held December 5, 1968, which resulted in a finding that, as of April 15, 1963, plaintiff had sustained an occupational disease disability and was therefore entitled to receive compensation for total disability from her employer for the maximum statutory period of 500 weeks2 (i.e., until November 11, 1972). The hearing referee simultaneously determined, however, that defendant Second Injury Fund, unlike defendant employer, was not liable because plaintiff had "failed to sustain the burden of proof to establish total and permanent disability as defined by the statute” (emphasis added). No appeal was taken from this determination.
On December 6, 1972, plaintiff again filed a petition for hearing with the Workers’ Compensation Bureau alleging total and permanent disability due to loss of industrial use of both legs. Pursuant to this second hearing, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that plaintiff was "totally and permanently disabled through the industrial loss of use of both legs”.
Appeal was taken to the WCAB. The WCAB determined that, because there had been no *170change in plaintiff’s condition since the first hearing, the doctrine of res judicata as set forth by this Court in Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368; 224 NW2d 856 (1975), precluded a redetermination of the issue of plaintiff’s total and permanent disability.
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which found that, despite the doctrine of res judicata, there were two possible approaches under which total and permanent disability could now be found.
The first possible approach was explained as follows:
"[I]t is possible that the referee who entered the first award in 1968 found that the plaintiff was then suffering a total loss of industrial use of her legs but that it was impossible at that time to determine whether or not the loss was permanent.” Sanders v General Motors Corp, 80 Mich App 190, 194; 263 NW2d 329 (1977).
The second possible approach centered on a change in the legal standard:
"Whether or not the referee believed that the plaintiffs condition was permanent, he may have found no 'total and permanent disability’ because he found no 'loss of industrial use of both legs’. While the statutory phrase has remained the same, the case law interpretation of that phrase has undergone a considerable evolution beginning shortly after the plaintiffs 1960 injury date. Paulson v Muskegon Heights Tile Co, 371 Mich 312; 123 NW2d 715 (1963), Lockwood v Continental Motors Corp, 27 Mich App 597; 183 NW2d 807 (1970), Burke v Ontonagon County Road Comm, 391 Mich 103; 214 NW2d 797 (1974).” Sanders, supra, 195.
Based on these alternative possibilities, the Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the *171WCAB and remanded to that board for further proceedings.
Appeal was taken from this decision. On June 1, 1978, this Court granted the applications for leave to appeal of the employer and the Second Injury Fund and the cross-application for leave to appeal of plaintiff.
II. Issue
Because of the differing factual aspects of Gose and Sanders, this Court phrased in different language the issues on which leave to appeal was granted.
The issue on which this Court granted leave to appeal in Gose is as follows: "[D]oes the doctrine of res judicata bar plaintiff’s second total and permanent disability claim based on insanity” when, in the prior case, the claim based on insanity was withdrawn before adjudication? 402 Mich 950p.
In Sanders the issue is: "[D]oes the doctrine of res judicata apply to bar plaintiff’s total and permanent disability claim when the issue of total and permanent disability was litigated and decided against the plaintiff at a previous hearing before a referee?”3 402 Mich 950i.
The order in each case indicated the two cases were to be argued and submitted together.
III. Workers’ Compensation Res Judicata
A. Hlady
Our point of departure in deciding these two *172cases is the longstanding rule in this jurisdiction that, absent a change in the claimant’s physical condition, the doctrine of res judicata applies to workers’ compensation law. Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368; 224 NW2d 856 (1975); Besonen v Campbell, 243 Mich 209; 220 NW 301 (1928); 24 Michigan Law & Practice, Workmen’s Compensation, § 234. There is a distinction, however, between the scope of the doctrine’s application to workers’ compensation and the scope of its application to other areas of the law. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Stokes v Lakey Foundry Corp, 20 Mich App 217, 219; 173 NW2d 832 (1969):
"Except for workmen’s compensation cases, Michigan has held that the doctrine of res judicata applies not only to issues which were determined on the merits, but also to matters which the parties had the opportunity to present for adjudication on the merits. Strech v Blissfield Community Schools District, 357 Mich 620 [99 NW2d 545 (1959)]; Gursten v Kenney, 375 Mich 330 [134 NW2d 764 (1965)].”4 (Emphasis added.)
That case then went on to correctly set forth the scope of res judicata’s application to the law of workers’ compensation as of its 1969 decisional date, as follows:
"While the doctrine of res judicata does apply to workmen’s compensation cases (Willis v Michigan Stan*173dard Alloy Casting, 367 Mich 140 [116 NW2d 222 (1962)]), in Michigan it has been limited to issues that were actually litigated as a matter of fact. Hebert v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 607 [281 NW 374 (1938)]; White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201 [89 NW2d 439 (1958)].” Stokes, supra, 219.
Subsequent to Stokes, in Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368, 376; 224 NW2d 856 (1975), a case which was twice before this Court for resolution of differing issues, this Court slightly broadened the scope of application of res judicata in workers’ compensation cases.
In Hlady the plaintiff lost four fingers in 1945 when her hand got caught in a punch press. In 1947, upon expiration of benefits under the statutory 100-week specific loss schedule, plaintiff filed an application for further benefits alleging industrial loss of use of her right hand and/or general disability. The employer appealed a WCAB award of compensation alleging there was no entitlement to benefits under the test existing at the time. We agreed with the appellant and reversed the award of compensation stating;
"The record is devoid of testimony tending to prove that plaintiff has suffered any different or greater loss than normally results from the amputation of 4 Angers of a hand. Notwithstanding plaintiff claimed that the amputation of her fingers resulted in disabling 'sequelae’ and 'general disability,’ the commission found none except disability which normally follows such amputations.” (Emphasis added.) Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 325 Mich 23, 25; 37 NW2d 576 (1949).
Approximately eight years later, this Court in another case reconsidered the test under which Ms. Hlady had been denied benefits. In an evenly divided vote, four Justices would have adopted a *174more liberal test under which Ms. Hlady could have recovered, Van Dorpel v Haven-Busch Co, 350 Mich 135; 85 NW2d 97 (1957).
In light of Van Dorpel, in 1967 plaintiff Hlady repetitioned for benefits. Plaintiff therein subsequently appealed to this Court from a Court of Appeals decision affirming the WCAB’s denial of benefits based on res judicata. On appeal, this Court adopted the more liberal test set forth in Van Dorpel, but affirmed the application of res judicata to deny plaintiff benefits. The rule utilized to resolve the res judicata dispute in Hlady, however, added another dimension to the doctrine not articulated in the more recent case law,5 e.g., White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201, 211; 89 NW2d 439 (1958), and Hebert v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 607, 613; 281 NW 374 (1938). Instead of merely limiting res judicata to questions which were litigated in fact, this Court went further, stating
"that the doctrine of res judicata applies not only to facts previously litigated, but also to points of law which were necessarily adjudicated in determining and deciding the subject matter of the litigation. ” (Emphasis added.) Hlady, supra, 376.6 *175This expanded rule, enunciated in Hlady, constitutes this Court’s most recent application of the doctrine to workers’ compensation law in Michigan, and is the rule which necessarily controls the cases at bar.7
This limited scope is consistent with the nature of workers’ compensation. Although the general policy rationale for the doctrine of res judicata is *176to ensure finality in litigation, 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, § 395, p 559, workers’ compensation is remedial legislation which is to be liberally construed. Given the remedial nature of the legislation, the policy favoring finality is not always consistent with the purpose behind workers’ compensation, which is to maintain the fiscal integrity of persons whose wage-earning capacity has been suspended or terminated. See Hlady, supra, 390-391 (opinion of Levin, J.); see, generally, Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich 578, 589; 99 NW2d 490 (1959). It is for this reason that res judicata is narrowly applied in workers’ compensation cases. It is for this same reason we today reaffirm the Hlady limited application of res judicata vis-a-vis workers’ compensation.
B. Morgan
Prior to analyzing the cases at bar under the Hlady rule, however, it is beneficial to discuss Morgan v Freedman Artcraft, 401 Mich 54; 257 NW2d 85 (1977), the case cited by the Court of Appeals panel in reversing the WCAB’s denial of benefits in Gose.
In Morgan, the claimant was injured in a June 16, 1970 accident involving a forklift truck. He filed a claim for benefits, but at the hearing held May 26, 1971, the claimant expressed the intention to return to favored work offered by the employer to commence on June 7, 1971. Under this circumstance, it was unnecessary for any fact finding to be made as to whether the claimant was totally or permanently disabled or whether the favored work was within the claimant’s capacity to perform. The first hearing was resolved with an award of benefits to terminate as of the June 7, 1971 date when the claimant was scheduled to begin favored work. Subsequently, however, fa*177vored work was not commenced for reasons in dispute. Plaintiff Morgan, on September 28, 1972, brought a second claim pursuant to which further benefits were ordered. The second claim was brought for disability benefits from the period beginning June 7, 1971, the termination date of the prior benefits, until September 19, 1972, at which time the claimant commenced other employment at wages greater than his pre-injury wages. The award of benefits was reversed by the WCAB based on res judicata. Appeal was taken to this Court and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, a per curiam opinion was issued which reversed the WCAB. Our reversal was based on this Court’s unanimous view that res judicata did not bar plaintiffs second claim. We stated the following:
"We disagree with the WCAB’s application of res judicata in this case. We perceive the issue at the second hearing before the referee to have been twofold: whether claimant was disabled, and the significance and effect of plaintiffs declining of an apparent offer of favored work. The evidence available to the referee prior to his first decision was incomplete on these issues. Evidence at the second hearing, considered on its merits, led the referee to conclude that claimant should receive a second award.” Morgan, supra, 55-56.
The facts of Morgan demonstrate that the scope of the first hearing was of a limited nature due to an assumption, later proved erroneous, that favored work would be commenced by the claimant as of a specified date. The issue of claimant’s post-June 7, 1971 disability and refusing to perform favored work had clearly never been considered at the original hearing and was not to be accorded res judicata significance under the dictates of Hlady.
Given the rule espoused in Hlady, and the basis *178for the nonapplicability of res judicata in Morgan, we now turn to an analysis of the cases at bar.
IV. Gose
As discussed in Part I A, supra, plaintiff Gose filed a claim for benefits in 1968 against defendant employer and defendant Second Injury Fund based on the claim that plaintiff had suffered "industrial loss of use of both legs, insanity, total and permanent disability, and related injuries”. As earlier indicated, some testimony was presented in the deposition of plaintiff’s witness, Dr. Lipton, as to the existence of plaintiff’s psychosis. At the December 1, 1969 hearing for closing of the record, however, plaintiff’s attorney withdrew the insanity claim prior to any determination thereof by the hearing referee. Given this background, we must decide whether these circumstances are sufficient, under the doctrine of res judicata, to bar reassertion of the insanity claim. We find, within the context of a worker’s compensation claim, they are not.
In Laichalk v Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co, 308 Mich 298; 13 NW2d 826 (1944), this Court discussed the impact of a worker’s compensation claim that had been filed and withdrawn prior to determination. This Court stated: "[bjecause plaintiff’s petition * * * was withdrawn, nothing was adjudicated in that proceeding, and it has no effect on plaintiff’s present petition”, Laichalk, supra, 301. It is irrelevant that in Gose only the insanity portion of the claim was withdrawn unlike Laichalk in which the whole claim was withdrawn. The two claims in Gose, one for insanity and one for disability due to industrial loss of use of both legs, were totally separate and no point of law involving the insanity claim was "necessarily adju*179dicated” in determining the leg disability claim. Therefore, under the rule announced in Hlady, plaintiff’s insanity claim is not barred by res judicata. It is not the raising of a matter, but the adjudication or decision of the matter which requires application of the bar. See Tucker v Rohrback, 13 Mich 73, 75 (1864); Morgan, supra. As was stated in Machen v Budd Wheel Co, 265 Mich 530, 535-536; 251 NW 580 (1933):
"The doctrine of 'res judicata’ rests upon the principle that a question once determined by a court of competent jurisdiction by a judgment on the merits is forever settled so far as litigants * * * are concerned.” (Emphasis added.)
We do not question the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that plaintiff’s insanity claim was a "triable issue” at the prior hearing. However, the fact that a claim could have been adjudicated at an earlier hearing is not a basis for invocation of res judicata within the context of workers’ compensation, see Stokes, supra, 219.
V. Sanders
As discussed in Part I B, supra, on September 27, 1967, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim against her employer and the Second Injury Fund alleging total and permanent disability to her back, legs and nervous system. Benefits were awarded for the 500-week maximum statutory period from the employer but the Second Injury Fund was not held liable based on the finding that plaintiff had "failed to sustain the burden of proof to establish total and permanent disability as defined by the statute”. Plaintiff did not appeal this finding.
*180Plaintiff filed a second petition on December 6, 1972. This petition alleged total and permanent disability due to loss of industrial use of both legs. On appeal from an award of compensation, the WCAB determined that there was no change in the claimant’s physical condition, and that plaintiff was therefore barred from recovery by res judicata as set forth in Hlady.
This finding was reversed by the Court of Appeals, Sanders v General Motors Corp, 80 Mich App 190; 263 NW2d 329 (1977). The panel found two possibilities for excepting this case from the bar of res judicata. The first theory postulated by the Court of Appeals was that the first hearing took place at a time when the referee could not yet determine the permanency of the claimant’s disability, Sanders, supra, 194. The second concerned the fact that, since the legal standard affecting the claimant’s rights had evolved by judicial pronouncements between the first and second hearing, claimant might now be entitled to benefits if the finding in the first hearing could be read as merely postponing or deferring final determination. Sanders, supra, 195-196.
We do not agree that the first "possibility” can be reasonably gleaned from the original determination. Complete evidence as to plaintiffs leg disability was presented and the hearing referee made specific findings thereon.8 Absent a change in *181claimant’s physical condition, these findings are res judicata.
Similarly, we do not find the second "possibility” can be reasonably gleaned from the original determination. There is nothing in the record of the first hearing to indicate an intention to postpone or defer final determination. And, as the majority of this Court stated in Hlady in regard to a subsequent change in the law:
"Plaintiff may not concede an issue, necessarily determinative of and included in the judgment * * * and then, after another has successfully raised the issue she did not wish to contest, ask * * * for relief. The doctrine of res judicata bars this from happening.” Hlady, supra, 380.
Although plaintiff asserts to this Court that her physical condition had, in fact, changed between the time of the first and second hearings, the WCAB specifically found as a matter of fact that no such change occurred. Because there exists a basis in the record for this finding of fact of the WCAB,9 it is conclusive and not reviewable by this Court, Dressler v Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp, 402 Mich 243, 250; 262 NW2d 629 (1978).
Plaintiff finally asserts that the first hearing solely determined her disability as of the November, 1960 injury date, and, therefore, there is no bar to a second hearing to establish an occupational disease disability date as of the last day of work, April, 1963. The record belies this contention. The decision of the referee at the first hearing designates April 15, 1963, the last day of work, as the date of disability.
*182In light of the fact that there was a prior determination of all issues now asserted, plaintiff’s present claim is barred by application of res judicata.
VI. Conclusion
The rule of res judicata within the context of workers’ compensation in Michigan is as follows:
"[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies not only to facts previously litigated, but also to points of law which were necessarily adjudicated in determining and deciding the subject matter of the litigation.” Hlady, supra, 376.
In light of this rule, we affirm the Court of Appeals reversal in Gose as we conclude that plaintiff’s insanity claim was withdrawn and was not previously adjudicated and points of law pertaining thereto were not necessarily adjudicated in determining and deciding the subject matter (leg disability) of the prior hearing. Laichalk, supra.
As to Sanders, we reverse the Court of Appeals because we find that plaintiff Sanders’ claim involves facts previously litigated and necessarily determined in the first hearing. Because plaintiff has not established a change in physical condition, she is now barred by the doctrine of res judicata as interpreted in Hlady.
Affirmed and remanded to the WCAB in Gose for consideration without regard to the doctrine of res judicata; reversed and remanded in Sanders for entry of an order denying benefits based on res judicata.
Blair Moody, Jr., J., concurred with Williams, J.The Court of Appeals held otherwise in Stokes v Lakey Foundry Corp, 20 Mich App 217, 219; 173 NW2d 832 (1969):
"Except for workmen’s compensation cases, Michigan has held that the doctrine of res judicata applies not only to issues which were determined on the merits, but also to matters which the parties had the opportunity to present for adjudication on the merits. [Citations omitted.]
"While the doctrine of res judicata does apply to workmen’s compensation cases (Willis v Michigan Standard Alloy Casting, 367 Mich 140 [116 NW2d 222 (1962)]), in Michigan it has been limited to issues that were actually litigated as a matter of fact. Hebert v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 607 [281 NW 374 (1938)]; White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201 [89 NW2d 439 (1958)].”
A close reading of both Hebert and White shows that neither opinion delineated a rule unique to workers’ compensation proceedings; they merely recited a narrow application of the rule, as opposed to a broad version, discussed infra. Moreover, in each case, res judicata was inapplicable: two separate injuries involving two separate transactions were at issue in Hebert, and in White a final determination on the merits had not been made in the first proceeding.
MacKenzie v Union Guardian Trust Co, 262 Mich 563; 247 NW 914 (1933); Meister v Dillon, 324 Mich 389; 37 NW2d 146 (1949), and Detroit Trust Co v Furbeck, 324 Mich 401; 37 NW2d 151 (1949).
Harrington v Huff & Mitchell Co, 155 Mich 139; 118 NW 924 (1908); McDannel v Black, 270 Mich 305; 259 NW 40 (1935); Strech v Blissfield Community Schools Dist, 357 Mich 620; 99 NW2d 545 (1959).
Compare Hebert v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 607, 613; 281 NW 374 (1938), and White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201, 211; 89 NW2d 439 (1958), with Kubiak v Briggs Manufacturing Co, 286 Mich 329, 333-334; 282 NW 427 (1938), Boyich v J A Utley Co, 306 Mich 625, 629; 11 NW2d 267 (1943), and Theodore v Packing Materials, Inc, 396 Mich 152, 158; 240 NW2d 255 (1976).
Plaintiffs original claim was for total and permanent disablement. The referee allowed the claim for total but not permanent disablement. The proofs of permanency were inadequate. Plaintiff seeks to avoid this adjudication by claiming it was premature and therefore ineffective on the theory that a determination of permanency could only be sought after 496 weeks had elapsed from the date of injury. This is a misreading and misinterpretation of the statutory language: "such permanency shall be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury”. MCL 418.361(2)(g); MSA 17.237(361)(2)(g). This provision is not a statute of *163limitation determining when a claim can be asserted, but rather a requirement that the permanency of the disability must be determined at a date within about 496 weeks of the date of injury.
"(2) Total and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 351 means:
"(a) Total and permanent loss of sight of both eyes.
"(b) Loss of both legs or both feet at or above the ankle.
"(c) Loss of both arms or both hands at or above the wrist.
“(d) Loss of any 2 of the members or faculties enumerated in (a), (b) or (c).
"(e) Permanent and complete paralysis of both legs or both arms or of 1 leg and 1 arm.
"(f) Incurable insanity or imbecility.
"(g) Permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm; for the purpose of this subdivision such permanency shall be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury.” MCL 418.361(2); MSA 17.237(361X2).
In 1965 plaintiff returned to work for a four-day period but was unable to continue. This incident of employment was apparently found to be insignificant because there was a subsequent determination that plaintiff’s last day of work occurred in 1963.
The 500-week limit was subsequently legislatively changed. As discussed by the Court of Appeals in the instant case:
"The statute in effect at the time of the plaintiff’s injury limited benefits for total disability to 500 weeks. 1948 CL 412.9(a) [since repealed and replaced by MCL 418.351(1); MSA 17.237(351X1)]. This limit did not apply to persons found to have a 'total and permanent disability’. The 500-week limitation was removed by 1965 PA 44, but it nevertheless applied to the plaintiff’s case because — absent a clear legislative expression of contrary intent — compensation rights are determined under the law in effect on the date of injury. Briggs v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 379 Mich 160; 150 NW2d 752 (1967). But cf. Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich 578; 99 NW2d 490 (1959).” 80 Mich App 190, 192; 263 NW2d 329 (1977).
As to plaintiff-cross-appellant in Sanders, the grant was limited to the question:
"Has the Court of Appeals correctly, in this case, enunciated the doctrine of res judicata as it is to be applied in workers’ compensation cases?”
As demonstrated in the quoted portion, Stokes notes the distinction between res judicata vis-á-vis workers’ compensation law and res judicata vis-á-vis other areas of law. However, solely in regard to the general civil law, there has existed some further conflict as to the proper scope of application of res judicata. See Rogers v Colonial Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Grosse Pointe Woods, 405 Mich 607, 615-617; 275 NW2d 499 (1979).
In Rogers, GCR 1963, 203.1 was discussed as a limitation on res judicata in Michigan. The GCR now limits merger and bar under res judicata, but as a general court rule it has no specific applicability to workers’ compensation proceedings.
The authority cited for the broader statement of the rule was Justice Cooley’s opinion in the early case, Jacobson v Miller, 41 Mich 90; 1 NW 1013 (1879).
Defendants in both Gose and Sanders assert that Michigan adheres to the broad rule of res judicata in workers’ compensation cases. The broad rule includes not only all claims adjudicated but also all claims adjudicable at the time of the first hearing.
While citation to this broad rule does exist in certain cases, we have not found a workers’ compensation case in which res judicata was actually applied to an injury adjudicable but not adjudicated at the time of the first hearing.
Boyich v J A Utley Co, 306 Mich 625; 11 NW2d 267 (1943), is cited by defendants but it is inapposite. As correctly noted by this Court in a subsequent case discussing Boyich, the later asserted neurosis disability had actually been adjudicated as not work-related at a prior hearing, Laichalk v Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co, 308 Mich 298, 303; 13 NW2d 826 (1944), and, therefore, was barred by res judicata.
*175Similarly, although the broad rule is mentioned in Theodore v Packing Materials, Inc, 396 Mich 152, 158; 240 NW2d 255 (1976), res judicata was found totally inapplicable.
In White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201, 211; 89 NW2d 439 (1958), citation is made to 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation, § 508, now found at 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation, § 584, which iterates the broad rule, but the rule actually set forth in the opinion and utilized by this Court was as follows:
"[F]or the doctrine of res judicata to bar a subsequent proceeding, the precise issue of fact or law must have been at issue and decided in the preceding adjudication.” White, supra, 211.
In Hlady, both White, supra, and prior § 508 of American Jurisprudence were cited for the broad rule. Hlady, supra, 375-376. However, subsequently the narrower rule was articulated:
"[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies not only to facts previously litigated, but also to points of law which were necessarily adjudicated in determining and deciding the subject matter of the litigation.” Hlady, supra, 376.
It was this narrower rule that was then applied by this Court in resolving the issue in Hlady, supra, 380.
Finally, in Kubiak v Briggs Manufacturing Co, 286 Mich 329; 282 NW 427 (1938), the broad rule and the narrow rule are both quoted, Kubiak, supra, 333-334. However, it was again the narrow rule which was applied to preclude the bar of res judicata and thereby affirm an award of compensation for an injury which existed prior to the first compensation award but was not therein adjudicated.
What has occurred is citing a broad and a narrow rule, each alongside the other, but actually applying only the narrow rule.
In Hlady, the decision of the Court, authored by Justice Thomas Matthew Kavanagh, was signed by four Justices. A concurring opinion authored by Justice Levin and signed by then Chief Justice Thomas Giles Kavanagh agreed that Ms. Hlady was not entitled to benefits but would not have based the denial on res judicata, pp 386-387. As to res judicata, Justice Levin expressed the rule common to the law in general as opposed to workers’ compensation, "that all issues which were or could have been raised in an action are barred under the doctrine” (Emphasis added), pp 385-386. However, he stated his view that "a change in the law, like a change of fact, eliminates the bar of res judicata where the claimant seeks continuing benefits under a statute providing 'income maintenance’ ”, p 387.
As to plaintiffs total and permanent disability claim for injuries to her back, legs and nervous system, the referee at the first hearing stated as follows:
"It is further ordered that defendant State of Michigan Second Injury Fund has no liability hereunder, plaintiff having failed to sustain the burden of proof to establish total permanent disability as defined by the statute.” (Emphasis added.)
As a finding of fact supported by the record, it cannot be disturbed by this Court. Dressler v Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp, 402 Mich 243, 250; 262 NW2d 629 (1978).
This finding was based upon the testimony of plaintiffs medical expert, Thomas C. Baker, M.D., who had begun treating plaintiff in 1966 prior to the first hearing and had last examined her in 1974.