concurring and dissenting.
The majority holds that the confidentiality provision of the Peer Review Protection Act (“Section 4”), 63 P.S. § 425.4, does not prevent disclosure of records of peer review proceedings in all civil actions, and it concludes by reversing the Order of the Commonwealth Court that quashed the Hospital’s appeal as moot, and by affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court). I write separately because, although I agree with the majority that the Hospital must provide Dr. Hayes with a copy of the audiotape of his own peer review proceeding for use in his challenge of that proceeding, I disagree with the restrictions that the majority places on the Order of the trial court for production.
Although the majority thoughtfully explains in its discussion that Section 4 provides only limited protection to records of peer review proceedings, I can not agree with the conclusion of the majority that we must condition the production of the audiotape with burdensome restrictions. The Order of the trial court did not limit the purposes for which Dr. Hayes could obtain the peer review information; it simply ordered that “[the Hospital] shall produce a copy to [Dr. Hayes] immediately.”1 Order of the Trial Court, September 24,1997.
*31The Peer Review Act promotes a legislative goal of encouraging self-policing by the medical profession to improve the quality of health care. Cooper v. Delaware Valley Medical Center, 539 Pa. 620, 628, 654 A.2d 547, 551 (1995). The legislature incorporated confidentiality and liability immunity provisions to “foster free and frank discussions by review organizations.” Steel v. Weisberg, 368 Pa.Super. 590, 597-98, 534 A.2d 814, 818 (1987), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 525 Pa. 503, 582 A.2d 648 (1990). However, as the majority notes, the legislature did not intend to create an absolute privilege. Op., at 117 (citing Sanderson v. Frank S. Bryan, M.D., Ltd., 361 Pa.Super. 491, 498, 522 A.2d 1138, 1141 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 624, 538 A.2d 877 (1988)); accord Steel, 368 Pa.Super. at 598-600, 534 A.2d at 818-19. Section 4 evidences the legislature’s struggle to protect peer review participants from negligence actions, while not condoning misuse of their review power.
Once a tribunal has determined the exact nature of the matters that were subject to evaluation and review by a peer review committee, the court must preclude production of peer review records, but only in civil actions arising out of the specific subject matters. Thus, barring other restrictions, such as those established by rules of evidence or civil procedure, Dr. Hayes may obtain the information for use in any civil action that does not arise out of matters that have been or are before the peer review committee for its evaluation. The subject matter of the peer review committee’s evaluation and review of Dr. Hayes is his provision of medical care to a particular patient. The majority concludes that the Hospital could assert its confidentiality privilege in any civil action that relates to Dr. Hayes’ provision of medical services. I agree that Section 4 prevents the discovery and use of peer review information by all parties involved in medical malpractice *32actions where the peer review concerned the quality of a physician’s medical services. See Sanderson, 361 Pa.Super. at 501, 522 A.2d at 1143. However, the confidentiality provision would not automatically proscribe Dr. Hayes’ discovery and use of the audiotape in other civil actions.2
Though Dr. Hayes’ challenge of his suspension of clinical privileges does not directly implicate the liability immunity provision of the Peer Review Act (“Section 3”), 63 P.S. § 425.3, Section 3 is related to his desire to discover what transpired during his peer review. The immunity from liability is limited; Section 3 permits lawsuits against individuals who knowingly or recklessly make false statements or act maliciously in peer review proceedings. See Cooper, 539 Pa. at 631-32, 654 A.2d at 552-53. The Peer Review Act offers no shelter to peer review participants who make false or malicious statements about a physician. Whenever a doctor challenges the veracity of or motivation behind statements made during his own peer review proceeding in a civil action, he or she must have an opportunity to discover all of the information that affected the peer review committee’s decision. If Section 4 were to prevent doctors from discovering records of their own peer reviews to recover damages for tortious conduct perpetrated against them, the exception to Section 3 liability immunity would serve little function. See Steel, 368 Pa.Super. at 598-600, 534 A.2d at 818-19.
Dr. Hayes is seeking the production of the audiotape for use in his challenge of his peer review proceedings and in another civil action. Because the latter discovery request is part of a pre-complaint motion, the exact nature of his action is not yet apparent. However, if Dr. Hayes wishes to obtain the peer review information for a defamation or contract claim, his ability to obtain the material must not be fettered by Section 4 *33of the Peer Review Act. Cooper v. Delaware Valley Medical Center, 428 Pa.Super. 1, 23-24, 630 A.2d 1, 12 (1993), aff'd, 539 Pa. 620, 654 A.2d 547 (1995) (noting that doctor was not “precluded from asking any questions or discovering any material concerning his own peer review”). Dr. Hayes has a right to protect his reputation, and we should not hamper his efforts, should he choose to hold participants accountable for any fraudulent or malicious acts.
The majority has erred by narrowing the Order of the trial court. If the majority were truly interested in advancing judicial economy, it would not have intimated that Dr Hayes’ discovery of the audiotape is limited solely to his challenge of the Medical Board’s recommendation to the Board of Directors. Such a limitation will certainly encourage additional, unnecessary litigation. Because the restriction suggested by the majority is inconsistent with the Peer Review Act, absent from the Order of the trial court, and pointlessly burdensome to Dr. Hayes, I join the majority in its decision to affirm the Order of the trial court but dissent concerning any restrictions it attaches to the Order.
. As discussed by the majority, in a separate civil action filed by Dr. Hayes, his wife, and his professional corporation, Hayes v. Mercy Health System, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, October Term 1997, No. 366, the trial court ordered the Hospital’s Custodian of Records to "produce any and all requested audiotapes and transcripts within his or her possession, custody or control.” Order of the Trial Court, August 19, 1998. The Hospital and the other defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the Commonwealth Court to stay the trial court's discovery *31Order, and the plaintiffs sought, and the trial court granted, a stay of the proceedings of the second civil action until the Commonwealth Court rules on the defendants’ appeal. Order of the Trial Court, October 13, 1998. The Commonwealth Court accepted the defendants’ petition to appeal the discovery Order but stayed oral argument pending our decision in the case, sub judice. Order of the Commonwealth Court, October 26, 1998.
. While professional health care providers generally assert the Section 4 privilege in medical malpractice cases, courts have considered the confidentiality provision in other types of cases. See Cooper, 539 Pa. at 625-26, 654 A.2d at 549-50 (federal anti-trust law, federal and state due process and equal protection rights, and various state tort and contract theories); Steel, 368 Pa.Super. at 592, 534 A.2d at 815 (defamation action).