(dissenting).
I concur with the result reached by the majority with respect to the defendant Bruce Chambers. However, I respectfully dissent from the result reached with respect to the defendant Edward Palmariello. The court concludes that the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that Palmariello participated as a principal in the killing of Marion Palmariello. The court relies primarily on the following evidence to substantiate an inference of participation: (1) Palmariello’s first hand information about the murder, which established his presence; (2) the subsequent cover-up, which established consciousness of guilt; (3) his so called admission to his girl friend that he knew that she knew “what [he] did to [his] mother”; (4) his threats to his mother, which established hostility; and (5) the injuries to the victim’s forehead, chest, and neck. After reviewing the record, I agree with the court that this is the only evidence which tends to support a finding of wilful participation. However, I do not agree that this evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding of murder in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict in a criminal case, we determine whether the evidence offered by the Commonwealth, together with reasonable inferences therefrom, when viewed in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 294 (1979). I believe that the evidence produced by the Commonwealth does not satisfy this test.
It is well settled that mere presence at the site of the crime or knowledge that the crime is to be committed, even when coupled with failure to take affirmative steps to prevent it, does not make one guilty of the underlying crime. Commonwealth v. Clark, 363 Mass. 467, 473 (1973). The fact that Palmariello knew Chambers, associated with him, and was in his company before and after the crime is not enough. Commonwealth v. Perry, 357 Mass. 149, 151 (1970). Even if the jury inferred from the evidence at the trial that Palmariello was present during the infliction of the injuries and in fact aided *147Brace Chambers afterwards in concealing the crime, this is not enough to convict Palmariello of being a principal without proof of some degree of actual participation. See Commonwealth v. Benders, 361 Mass. 704 (1972).
The remaining evidence which provides a basis for inferring Palmariello’s wilful participation in the murder is his so called admission to his girl friend, the evidence of hostility, and the victim’s injuries. Although the jury may have inferred that, in his statement to his girl friend, Palmariello meant that he “killed” his mother, an equally plausible inference was that he was referring to his subsequent act of placing the corpse in the woods in New Hampshire. In my opinion, this statement, even when read in light of his hostility toward his mother and the victim’s injuries, was insufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant participated in his mother’s murder. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671,677-678 (1979). The evidence is simply too thin.
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree as to Palmariello.