Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.The erroneously admitted hearsay statements tended to prove the fact that appellant had on previous occasions struck and beaten his wife while quarrelling. There was no other evidence presented of such physical abuse. The erroneous admission of the statements is therefore not rendered harmless because the facts they proved were established by abundant, independent evidence. Sumpter v. State, (1974) 261 Ind. 471, 306 N.E.2d 95; Prophet v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 312, 315 N.E.2d 699; Martin v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 232, 314 N.E.2d 60.
Upon consideration of the record in the case, I can only conclude that the erroneously admitted hearsay statements aided the jury in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not shoot the victim on a sudden, uncontrollable, and unexpected impulse arising from a mental disease or defect, and was therefore sane; and that the killing was done maliciously rather than in the heat of passion. The fact of prior beatings, proved by the statements, also served to impeach the credibility of the appellant who took the witness stand in his own defense and denied such prior physical assaults. Inasmuch as these hearsay statements were significant in producing the outcome in this case, the conviction *191which rests upon them should not be permitted to stand. I would reverse and order a new trial.
Prentice, J., concurs.Note. — Reported at 340 N.E.2d 502.