¶ 84. 0concurring). I concur in the mandate. The circuit court got it right. I write separately because the majority opinion does violence to the law of remedial contempt when application of accepted principles of contempt law will do. In my view, the majority opinion distorts beyond recognition the meaning of "continuing contempt" under Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) by holding that a failure to meet a deadline constitutes a "continuing contempt" of court.
¶ 85. The majority reads the circuit court's order of contempt as being based solely on the failure of Ronald Henrichs (Ronald) to provide annual income tax returns for the years covered by the parties' stipulation.1 However, the circuit court's findings indicate its order of contempt was based not only on Ronald's past *42failure to provide these returns, but also on his on-going efforts to conceal his income and financial holdings, which continued up though the conclusion of the proceedings before the circuit court. Because the circuit court's findings show that Ronald's contempt was truly "continuing," a straightforward application of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) is all that is required, and the majority's tortured interpretation of "continuing contempt" is wholly unnecessary.
I.
¶ 86. The procedural history of this case is long and complex and need not be related in detail again here. For purposes of this concurrence, I adopt the facts as set forth in the majority's opinion, and I supplement those facts with additional findings of the circuit court as described below. I provide only those facts that are relevant to the reasons for the circuit court's order of contempt.
¶ 87. At hearings before the circuit court on January 8, 2003, and May 20, 2003, regarding Heidi Frisch's (Heidi) motion to compel discoveiy, Ronald testified about income he received and assets he owned, as well as his status as president and treasurer of Henrichs Builders, Inc. References made at the May 20 proceeding indicate that Ronald's attorney had provided supplemental income information to Heidi, including previously withheld W-2s. The circuit court made numerous findings subsequent to receiving and considering this addi*43tional information that are relevant to the contempt finding it ultimately rendered.
¶ 88. On January 19, 2005, the Waukesha County Circuit Court, Honorable Ralph Ramirez, issued its written findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment that formalized the findings and conclusions of the court issued during motion hearings dating from July 2002 to June 2004. The written findings note that in August 2002 Heidi brought a pro se motion seeking to hold Ronald in contempt for his continuing failure to provide evidence of his income by annual tax returns. See also majority op., ¶ 12. Finding number 13 states that at a September 24, 2002, hearing on Heidi's motion, Ronald provided only "partial personal tax returns and some of the tax returns relating to one of his corporations." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 89. The circuit court's findings note that Heidi moved to vacate a child support order and Ronald responded by moving to modify placement of the couple's minor son. In a November 25, 2003, oral ruling on these motions based upon testimony it received at hearings on January 8, 2003, May 20, 2003, and November 6, 2003,2 the circuit court made the following finding, later memorialized in the court's January 19, 2005, findings:
There has been substantial misrepresentation on Ronald's part since the Stipulation was entered. Ronald *44has been substantially evasive and not truthful in regard to his income, his income available to him and the assets available to him for imputing income and his gross income which includes the undistributed income of the corporation.
¶ 90. At the November 25, 2003 hearing, the court found that since the 1996 stipulation,
[substantial information has been set out on the record that... given the machinations of [Ronald], the establishment of the holding company, the payments, loan payments and supplying of a lake home, a vacation home and other toys through the company, that [Ronald] was hiding substantial assets in the course of doing business.
The circuit court then stated it was "convinced that [Ronald] has played a game for a long time in regards to what his actual income and cash available to him is." The circuit court declared that while it did not believe that the 1996 stipulation was obtained by fraud, it was "convinced that there has been substantial — a substantial amount of misrepresentation and fraud on the part of [Ronald] since that time...." Later in the same hearing, the circuit court reiterated that "there was a substantial amount of misrepresentation by [Ronald] ... established on the record." The court indicated that it was convinced that Ronald's accountant, Mr. Nyholm, was "incorrect" in his "assessment of income available to [Ronald] and what was personally available to him." The court was convinced "that [Ronald] has been substantially evasive and not truthful in regards to his income, his income available to him and the assets available for imputing income and his gross income, which includes the undistributed income of the corporation."3
*45¶ 91. The circuit court's written findings of fact show that at a June 15, 2004, hearing the court found that Ronald "has not in any way complied with the requirement to provide income information," and "is in contempt of court for not supplying his income information as ordered." The findings further state that
Ronald grossly and inappropriately hid his income and took affirmative actions to make certain that it was not available for the computation of child support. Ronald avoided reporting income for the purpose of avoiding child support to the children, not to Ms. Frisch but to the children, that he made deliberate and intentional efforts to hide his income.
The transcript of the June 15, 2004, hearing contains additional findings of the circuit court. With regard to Ronald's credibility, the circuit court stated it was "extremely negatively impacted by the testimony of [Ronald]," and reiterated its prior findings that Ronald's "testimony concerning his income lacked credibility." It further stated:
[I]f I look at the criteria for assessing credibility, the in — the demeanor of a person, the ability to recall things, the way that a person presents him or herself, the ability and opportunity to know something, [Ronald] failed on many, many, many of those counts.
He had a selective memory, was evasive, not able to give straight answers. And that plays into the fact that throughout the course of these proceedings and during the course of testimony when I heard about depositions as well, any information from [Ronald] is suspect. It's 4:16 on a lovely summer day. If [Ronald] told me it was *46daylight and sunny out, I'd have to check my watch and I'd have to look out the window.
¶ 92. At the June 15, 2004, hearing the court stated that it was "asked to find [Ronald] in contempt for his failure to provide income information," and that it was "asked to take some action as to dealing with the alleged failure to do so, and it's been established definitively in this Court's mind that [Ronald] misrepresented his income ... The circuit court discussed Ronald's income for the years of the stipulation, 1996-2001, and for 2002 as well. The circuit court referred to a recreational property owned by Ronald's closely-held corporation, and a loan paid by the corporation to Ronald. The circuit court then found that Ronald "grossly and inappropriately hid his income and took affirmative actions to make certain that it wasn't available for the computation of child support."
¶ 93. The circuit court also found at the June 15, 2004, hearing that Ronald "did not provide basic W-2 income or tax filing information appropriately as required previously, that he did not as obligated report changes in income or truthfully report income for the entire amount of time from 1996 on . . . ."
¶ 94. Later, at a hearing on November 12, 2004, the circuit court stated that the "issue has been from Day One the allegations on the part of — from [Heidi] alleging that [Ronald] had in essence hid funds or had made representations that were untruthful in regards to funds available to him, income available for the purpose of paying child support. And, again, I have made an extensive record in the past as to my findings." The court further concluded that "[Ronald] was dishonest and that his income was quite a bit more substantial than he reported to [Heidi] for purposes of paying child *47support. And as a result of that, there was an enormous amount that.. . [Heidi] was denied on behalf of the minor children as support."
¶ 95. The circuit court's January 19, 2005, formal conclusions of law state that
Ronald has engaged in overtrial with respect to his efforts to evade an accurate calculation of his income and he is in contempt for failing to provide tax returns as ordered and also for failing to notify the court and Heidi of substantial changes in his income as ordered and as required by statute section 767.27.
The circuit court also concluded that its order imposing a monetary penalty on Ronald was a "contempt sanction" that was "required as a remedy for Ronald['s] contemptuous, deliberate and willful failure to provide the court and the petitioner with truthful information about his actual income."
II
¶ 96. The majority opinion's statement of the standard of our review is legally correct, as far as it goes. I agree that the question of whether a circuit court has the authority to issue a contempt order in a given case is a question of law that we review de novo. See majority op., ¶ 29.
¶ 97. However, as the analysis below concludes, the authority of the circuit court to make a contempt order is not at issue under the facts as found by the circuit court. Because I conclude that the circuit court had authority to issue an order of contempt in this case, I review the circuit court's order to determine whether it properly exercised its discretion in issuing the order. See City of Wisconsin Dells v. Dells Fireworks, Inc., 197 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 539 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1995).
*48I — I l-H
¶ 98. Chapter 785 of the Wisconsin Statutes codifies the power of a court to issue orders of contempt. The chapter defines "contempt of court" as "[m]isconduct... which interferes with a court proceeding or with the administration of justice, or which impairs the respect due the court," and includes "[djisobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of a court," and "[rjefusal to produce a record, document or other object." Wis. Stat. § 785.01(l)(a), (b) and (d).
¶ 99. A " '[r]emedial sanction' means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court." Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3). The court of appeals' decision below correctly stated that "[a] remedial, or civil, sanction... is imposed to ensure compliance with court orders for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court." Frisch v. Henrichs, 2006 WI App 64, ¶ 27, 290 Wis. 2d 739, 713 N.W.2d 139; see also In the Interest of D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168, 179, 327 N.W.2d 682 (1983).
¶ 100. The majority opinion includes a thorough discussion of the legal background of Chapter 785, with which I have no quarrel. See majority op., ¶¶ 31-37. The problems with the majority's analysis begin with its narrow focus on Ronald's failure to provide copies of income tax returns for the period covered by the stipulation, 1996-2001. Based on this narrow focus, the majority attempts to shoehorn the concept of "continuing contempt" under Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) to fit its view of the facts. To this end, the majority concludes as follows: "Although Ronald did produce all the required documents before the circuit court found him in contempt, his contempt was continuing under Wis. Stat. § 767.27(2m) because his production of documents came *49too late to undo the problems he had created by failing to produce documents on time." Majority op., ¶ 47. Thus, the majority concludes a person who misses a deadline for submitting a document is in "continuing contempt," even after he or she submits the requested document. The majority reasons: "The contempt was continuing because Ronald's failure to comply with the court order deprived Heidi of her ability to utilize traditional remedies in the law. Thus, we cannot agree with the court of appeals that when Ronald turned over the tax documents, 'any prior contempt' was no longer ongoing.'" Majority op., ¶ 47 (citing Frisch, 290 Wis. 2d 739, ¶ 30).
¶ 101. If the contempt order in this case were issued merely because Ronald failed to provide copies of income tax documents for the period covered by the stipulation, I would agree with the court of appeals' analysis of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3). Under such a circumstance, once the tax documents for the years 1996-2001 were turned over, the contempt would no longer be "continuing." The majority's contrary definition of "continuing" invents a new legal fiction to reach a desired outcome. As a result, another law, the law of unintended consequences, is likely to impact future cases involving contempt orders issued under § 785.01(3).
¶ 102. However, the factual findings of the circuit court demonstrate that the order of contempt was not based exclusively on Ronald's failure to provide income tax documents for the years 1996-2001. Both the court of appeals and the majority are locked in to a narrow and incorrect view of the factual basis for the circuit court's order that impacts their respective analyses.
¶ 103. The circuit court's findings show that the contempt order was based on findings that Ronald had hidden and was hiding relevant information from Heidi and the court about his income. Ronald's failure to *50provide income tax documents for the years 1996-2001 as required by the stipulation was an important part of this pattern of deception. However, it was but one example of his efforts to conceal financial information from Heidi and the court, the "game playing" the circuit court found Ronald engaged in up to the date of the order of contempt.
¶ 104. The circuit court's January 19, 2005, written order and several bench rulings are replete with findings that Ronald had concealed information about his income from Heidi and the circuit court both during the period of the stipulation and after. At the November 25, 2003, hearing, the circuit court found substantial misrepresentation on Ronald's part since the stipulation had been entered. The circuit court found Ronald to be "substantially evasive and not truthful in regard to his income, his income available to him and the assets available to him for imputing income and his gross income, which includes the undistributed income of the corporation." These deceptions are clearly separate from Ronald's failure to provide income tax documents during the period of the stipulation.
¶ 105. At the same hearing, the circuit court then stated it was "convinced that [Ronald] has played a game for a long time in regards to what his actual income and cash available to him is." We note the verb tense of these statements indicates the court found Ronald's evasiveness to be on-going as of the November 25, 2003 hearing.
¶ 106. In the context of seeking to ascertain Ronald's actual income, the court made numerous findings regarding Ronald's credibility and truthfulness. At various times, the court found Ronald to be "constantly evasive," "not truthful" and "lack[ing] credibility." At the June 15, 2004, hearing the circuit court found Ronald's "testimony concerning his income lacked credibility." It *51gave the following assessment of Ronald, not in the context of his failure to provide income tax documents to Heidi during the period of the. stipulation, but for his continuing evasiveness in the proceeding before the court:
[I]f I look at the criteria for assessing credibility, the in — the demeanor of a person, the ability to recall things, the way that a person presents him or herself, the ability and opportunity to know something, [Ronald] failed on many, many, many of those counts.
He had a selective memory, was evasive, not able to give straight answers. And that plays into the fact that throughout the course of these proceedings and during the course of testimony when I heard about depositions as well, any information from [Ronald] is suspect. It's 4:16 on a lovely summer day. If [Ronald] told me it was daylight and sunny out, I'd have to check my watch and I'd have to look out the window.
¶ 107. A review of the circuit court's ample findings demonstrates that the circuit court did not base its order of contempt on the failure to provide income tax documents from 1996-2001, hut for a pattern of evasiveness (of which failure to provide said documents was a part) that continued into, the proceedings before Judge Ramirez. The circuit court's January 19, 2005, conclusions of law demonstrate that the circuit court itself viewed the basis for the order of contempt in this manner. The court concluded Ronald had engaged in "overtrial with respect to his efforts to evade an accurate calculation of his income." The circuit court also concluded that its order imposing a monetary penalty on Ronald was a "contempt sanction" that was "required as a remedy for Ronald['s] contemptuous, deliberate and willful failure to provide the court and the petitioner with truthful information about his actual income."
*52¶ 108. Because the circuit court's order of contempt was based on its findings that Ronald was in continuing contempt for failure to provide truthful information to Heidi and the court about his actual income, and not just for the failure to provide Heidi with income tax documents during the period of the stipulation, I conclude that this case involves a straightforward application of a circuit court's authority under Wis. Stat. § 785.01 to issue a remedial contempt order. I further conclude that the circuit court here applied the correct legal standard and reached a reasonable result, and would therefore affirm its entry of a contempt order as a proper exercise of its discretion. See Landwehr v. Landwehr, 2006 WI 64, ¶ 7, 291 Wis. 2d 49, 715 N.W.2d 180.
¶ 109. For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
¶ 110. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this concurring opinion.
This certainly was a reason for the circuit court's finding of contempt. Another reason is given in the court's January 19, 2005, written decision, which states that the contempt was ordered "also for [(Ronald)] failing to notify the court and Heidi [Frisch] of substantial changes in his income as ordered and as required by statute section 767.27." And both of these reasons come under the broader heading of Ronald's long-standing efforts to conceal his income from Heidi and the circuit court, as indicated by numerous findings and conclusions of the circuit court. See infra, ¶¶ 102-107. The argument that the contempt order was made in response to Ronald's repeated and continuing efforts to conceal his income was made by Heidi in her briefs to this court and the court of appeals.
The court of appeals' opinion improperly forces the circuit court's multiple findings regarding the broad nature of Ronald's *42contempt under the narrow heading of failing to provide income tax information from 1996-2001, stating as follows: "Ronald's contempt was his failure to furnish accurate income information by way of timely produced copies of tax returns." Frisch v. Henrichs, 2006 WI App 64, ¶ 30, 290 Wis. 2d 739, 713 N.W.2d 139 (emphasis added). This was not the ruling of the circuit court.
At the November 6, 2003, hearing the circuit court found that Ronald was "constantly evasive [and] nonresponsive" in his testimony. The court also made findings with regard to Ronald's efforts to conceal income in his business: "[T]he Court's going to find that his credibility is highly questionable, and that there's been ample evidence to indicate that he has used corporate income, testimony was received" about a recreational property held by Ronald's construction company. The circuit court found that "the assertion that the property... is used for business purposes is not just suspect, but totally devoid of any credibility."
At the October 22, 2003 hearing, the judge observed "[t]hat [Ronald's] demeanor throughout the course of these *45proceedings . . . and his response to direct questions has been previously evasive, elusive, nonresponsive and tested both the Court and the person to whom is asking the questions."