The appellant, together with one Glenn Everett Stewart, was charged by indictment with the crime of first degree murder of the appellant’s husband, Larry Lee Schmidt. The indictment alleged that Larry Lee Schmidt died on the 7th day of May, 1966.
The record before us discloses the following facts:
For approximately one year prior to the death of the decedent the appellant, Edith Louise Schmidt, and Glenn Everett Stewart, had been having an affair. The decedent was aware of this situation and had attempted to break it up. During this period of time the appellant was committed to a mental institution for a short period (less than twenty days). After her release, both she and her husband attempted to persuade Stewart to stay away from their home.
On Friday evening, May 6, the evening before the alleged killing, Stewart came to appellant’s home and attempted to persuade her to leave with him. This she refused to do. He told her if she would not leave with him he would kill her husband. Appellant claims that she did not believe he would actually kill her husband. However, the conversation between Stewart and the appellant continued concerning the killing of appellant’s husband. Stewart then drove the appellant to a shopping center where he purchased a hatchet and a hacksaw. His stated intention was that they were to be used to dismember the body of appellant’s husband after he had killed him.
That evening the appellant returned home where she spent the evening with her husband.
The following day the decedent went to work at 4:00 P.M. Stewart came to the Schmidt home at about 7:30 P.M. bringing the hatchet and hacksaw with him. He stayed a few *446minutes then left, but returned again before the decedent came home from work at approximately 11:55 P.M. When the decedent arrived, the appellant let him in. Almost immediately an argument ensued between the decedent and Stewart. The decedent proceeded to his bedroom, followed by Stewart. In an ensuing fight, the decedent was stabbed in the heart by Stewart. The appellant claims Stewart then forced her to clean the blood stains from the floor and help him to move the decedent’s body to the basement.
After taking the body to the basement, Stewart and Mrs. Schmidt returned to the main floor of the house.
On three different occasions during the next day (Sunday) the appellant’s brother came to the house. On these occasions Stewart hid “upstairs between the closets in the bathroom, it wasn’t finished, you can go up in the attic.”
After dark Sunday evening Stewart returned to the basement and spent the evening dismembering decedent’s body.
On Monday Stewart took the appellant and her children to Arkansas, where appellant claims she and her children were held by Stewart as prisoners. She recites a sordid story of abuse at the hands of Stewart, of exposure in the swamps and forests of Arkansas and how she helped Stewart totally dismantle the automobile which they had driven from Indiana. She finally obtained money from Stewart, which she used to transport herself and her children via bus to the home of her parents in Sparta, Tennessee. At the trial Stewart’s mother testified that at the time appellant obtained money from Stewart they embraced each other and kissed before the appellant left for Tennessee.
Up to this time authorities in Marion, Indiana, were unaware of the death of the decedent.
The first knowledge any law enforcement officer had concerning the crime of which appellant now stands convicted was a call from the appellant herself to the Sheriff of White County, Tennessee, in his office at Sparta on Sunday, May 22, *4471966. At that time she registered a complaint with the Sheriff that she and her two children had been kidnapped by a man named Stewart, after he had first killed her husband in Marion, Indiana. That following the killing of her husband, Stewart had forced the appellant and her children to accompany him to Arkansas, where after a period of captivity she managed to effect her escape. Upon receiving this call, the Sheriff went to the home of appellant’s mother and stepfather and obtained information in more detail of her alleged kidnapping and the death of her husband. The information thus obtained was transmitted to police officers in Marion, Indiana. Acting upon this information they went to the home of appellant in Marion where they discovered the dismembered body of her deceased husband.
Upon being informed that the appellant would willingly return to Indiana as a material witness against Stewart, police officers from Marion traveled to Sparta, Tennessee, where the defendant was again interviewed and a tape recording made of the interview.
It is true there was no warning given as described in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, prior to the making of this tape recording. Up to this time the appellant had not been arrested or confined. Her appearance at the Sparta police station was entirely voluntary. She voiced her willingness to return to Indiana and in fact signed a witness’ release stating that she was willing to return to Indiana with the Marion police officers. One of the officers testified that this release was necessary in view of the fact that she was a woman and that she would be traveling with two male officers; that no female officer was in attendance and they wanted to make sure she was going freely and voluntarily.
The tape which was made in Sparta, Tennessee, was introduced in evidence as State’s Exhibit 4. Standing alone it is entirely exculpatory and is merely a statement made by the appellant in which she describes the killing of her husband *448and the kidnapping of herself and the children at gunpoint by Stewart.
The Marion police officers transported appellant to Marion, Indiana, arriving around 10:00 o’clock in the evening. The testimony by the officers was that this was strictly because she was a material witness, and at the time she was transported she was not considered as a suspect. Upon arriving in Marion, she was immediately taken to the home of her brother. There was no restraint or incarceration of any kind. Before leaving her at her brother’s home the police officers did ask her to come to the police station the next day in order that they might obtain further information.
The next day at approximately 11:00 A.M. the appellant voluntarily appeared at the Marion police station. In the meantime the officers had replayed the tape made in Sparta and had made other investigations concerning the case. When the appellant appeared at the police station she was immediately informed by the officers she was now a possible suspect in the case, and the constitutional warnings required by the Miranda .case were immediately given. Officer Harrigan gave three of the four warnings required by the Miranda case and Officer Hickman immediately added a fourth warning, that is appellant’s right to remain silent.
It is true that the appellant testifying in her own behalf at the trial stated that the warnings either were not given or she did not recall the warnings being given by the police officers. Appellant argues that the statement of police authorities that they gave the proper warnings is not believable because the entire proceedings were recorded on tape recording machines with the exception of the warnings, which the officers claim to have given. Although it might have been better had the warnings been recorded at the police station, the fact that they were not recorded does not mean that they were not given, and certainly does not entitle us to wholly ignore the express statements of the police officers that the warnings were given. This, of course, presents a *449conflict of evidence in the trial court which was within the province of the jury to weigh and not within the province of this Court to determine. Smith v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 425, 18 Ind. Dec. 189, 249 N. E. 2d 493.
This Court has previously recognized that “custodial interrogation” as defined in Miranda does not apply to every statement made to police by a person concerning a crime. Smith v. State, supra. See also Maxey v. State (1969), 251 Ind. 645, 16 Ind. Dec. 526, 244 N. E. 2d 650.
The U. S. Supreme Court in Miranda had this to say concerning situations such as those in the case at bar. They stated at page 477:
“* * * General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.
“In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.”
The case at bar bears remarkable similarity to a case decided by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in which a woman reported that some other men had stabbed a man in her house. The police responded to her call and took a statement from her in which she named others as the perpe*450trators of the crime. Upon investigating the police found a dead man in bed in the complaining woman’s house. They questioned her about his habits and told her she would need to come to police headquarters as a witness and that she would be taken home after making her report. At the police station the officer interviewed the woman for about two hours, then while she was waiting for a driver to take her home she suddenly confessed to stabbing the man herself. Here the police officer testified he had considered her original story plausible and had not really considered her a suspect until she made her confession. The Court held that the oral admissions made by the woman were not the product of custodial interrogation. Hicks v. U. S. (1967), 127 App. D. C. 209, 382 F. 2d 158. In so doing the Court stated at page 162:
“* * * rp^g investigation here was not initiated by the police but came after Appellant voluntarily reported a homicide; Appellant, not police, set the inquiry in motion. Nor was there any ‘custodial interrogation’ in the Miranda sense. Questioning of a witness cannot be characterized as ‘custodial interrogation’ simply because it occurs at a police establishment. Nor is there anything in the record to indicate that Appellant had been deprived of her freedom of action in any significant way; since she never attempted to leave the presence of the police, it cannot be said that her presence at Headquarters was against her will, especially as it is now clear that her conduct and very presence at the police station were part of her attempt to put the police on a wild goose chase in search of the mythical ‘jitterbug’ attackers.”
The Court also stated at page 161:
“* * * Appellant was taken to Police headquarters to secure a written statement from her as a material witness in a homicide case. * * *
“Advising Appellant they wanted her to come to Headquarters, rather than ‘requesting’ or ‘inviting’ her, does not alter our view. See Hutcherson v. United States, 122 U. S. App. D. C. 51, 53, 351 F. 2d 748, 750 (1965) ; Scarbeck v. United States, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 135, 152, 154, 317 F. 2d 546, 563-565 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U. S. 856, 83 S. Ct. 1897, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1963). An assumption that *451one is required to cooperate with the police can hardly be equated with an arrest; every citizen has a duty to assist police officers up to the point of self-incrimination. The cooperative innocent person would find it oppressive indeed if courts were to hold every person interrogated must first be taken before a magistrate and subjected to the judicial processes applicable to a person criminally charged, i.e., warned that he had a right to maintain silence and to counsel as a preliminary to interrogation.”
Courts throughout the country have held that where a person calls or comes in to a police station on their own, being in no way compelled to come to the police station or to answer questions, no custodial interrogation has taken place within the meaning of Miranda. See Freije v. U. S. (1969 1st Cir.), 408 F. 2d 100, People v. Peterson (1967), 251 Cal. App. 2d 676, 59 Cal. Reptr. 694.
Of course, when such a person giving voluntary information to the police becomes a suspect, the police must then give the warning. This they did in the instant case.
The custodial interrogation of the appellant did not begin until she arrived in the Marion police station at 11:00 A.M. on May 23, 1966.
Appellant claims error in that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury, and that the verdict was contrary to law. It is her contention that no reasonable man could possibly be convinced by the evidence that she was guilty of being either a principal or accessory before the fact. However, as above recited, there was evidence submitted to the jury that appellant knew Stewart was intending to kill her husband; that she had been with Stewart when he purchased a hatchet and a hacksaw with the stated purpose of dismembering decedent’s body. That after having such information the appellant failed to warn her husband. That she went to the front door and admitted him knowing Stewart was waiting in the house for the avowed purpose of killing the decedent.
*452Various statements made by appellant to the authorities and received in evidence indicate the appellant full well knew the plans of Stewart to kill her husband and aided him in carrying out these plans. Yet these statements are .constantly interspersed with protestations of innocence claiming that she cooperated with Stewart only through fear for her personal safety and for the safety of her children. It was within the province of the jury to weigh these statements by the appellant and from their overall content to determine what part, if any, she actually played in aiding Stewart in the commission of the crime. We hold that the evidence is sufficient upon which a jury could reasonably believe the appellant was in fact an accessory before the fact to the killing of her husband. We have repeatedly stated that we will not weigh the evidence. Smith v. State, supra.
Appellant next contends her conviction was contrary to law because she was charged with first degree murder and was actually convicted as an accessory under Burns Ind. Stat., 1956 Repl., § 9-102. We find no merit in this contention. The statute specifically permits the charging of an accessory as a principal. Brunaugh v. State (1910), 173 Ind. 483, 90 N. E. 1019.
Appellant claims that the case should be reversed because the State did not meet its burden of proving the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because she was convicted on her own statements which were intended by her to be exculpatory, and if they are believed at all they must be believed in their entirety. With this we cannot agree. This Court in the case of Martin v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 504, 141 N. E. 2d 455, had occasion to pass on this specific question. In that case the appellant had been convicted of shooting another person in what he claimed was a fight in which the deceased person grabbed a gun from his pocket and in the struggle the gun accidentally discharged, causing the deceased’s death. The State had no other evidence of the existence of the gun except for the defendant’s own statements, *453yet the jury in order to convict him was forced to on the one hand rely on his statements to establish the use of the gun and on the other hand disbelieve his statements as to the facts surrounding the shooting. This Court stated at page 507 of the opinion:
“No witness who observed the second fight saw the gun at any time and it was never recovered or put in evidence. However, the appellant both at trial and in his confession admitted that the gun which fired the shot was his. The medical examiner found no powder burns on the hands, clothes or body of the deceased. A photograph of the body introduced in evidence shows the bullet wound well over on the left side. Although there is no evidence whether the decedent was right or left handed, she was not a large woman, nor were her arms large and muscular. The jury was amply justified in finding that appellant’s testimony that decedent shot herself with a twelve inch pistol held in her left hand to cause the bullet to enter her body and take the course it did was so difficult and unreasonable that his explanation of the shooting was false.”
In criminal prosecution though we are bound to strictly enforce the constitutional rights of the accused, this does not mean that we are engaged in a game which prevents the trier of fact from making reasonable examination of the evidence and drawing the proper conclusions therefrom. To say that a jury must be required to either believe a defendant’s testimony in its entirety or disbelieve it in its entirety would be to remove justice from the realm of reason and place the jury in an unrealistic strait jacket in their quest for the truth.
Appellant next alleges the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s demurrer to the appellant’s plea in abatement. The appellant filed a plea in abatement which stated in substance that the State had forced her to obtain a change of venue from the county by reason of the release of adverse publicity in Grant County. She claims this is a violation of her rights under Article 1, Section 13, of the Indiana Constitution which grants her a fair trial by an *454impartial jury in the county where the offense is committed. By her plea in abatement she asked that the prosecution abate because she could not have a fair trial in Grant County and should not be forced to take a change of venue to another county. The only authorities which she cites in support of this proposition include the celebrated cases of Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), 384 U. S. 333, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 86 S. Ct. 1507, and Irvin v. Dowd (1961), 366 U. S. 717, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751, 81 S. Ct. 1639, for the proposition that under the constitution a person is entitled to a fair trial and may not be forced to go to trial in a county where prejudice has occurred. We find no authority which supports appellant’s contention that she cannot be forced to go to trial in a county to which the venue has been changed because of the alleged prejudice in the county where the offense was committed. We hold the trial court was correct in sustaining the State’s demurrer to this plea in abatement. We do not believe the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Indiana was ever intended to cause an indefinite postponement in the trial of criminal cases. In none of the cases cited by the appellant did the courts suggest that the .cases be indefinitely postponed. The mandate is for a change to a distant county if need be, to a place where there is no local bias and prejudice which would prevent a fair trial. Irvin v. Dowd, supra; C. R. 12 of Indiana Rules of Procedure.
Appellant next claims error on the part of the trial court in admitting State’s Exhibit No. 16 into evidence. This exhibit is a photograph of the decedent’s torso and severed limbs. To support her contention in this regard the appellant cites the case of Kiefer v. State (1958), 239 Ind. 103, 153 N. E. 2d 899. The objection in the Kiefer case was that the questioned photographs did not show the position of the parties to the crime nor did they correctly show the wounds of the victim which caused her death. The court held that they did not “shed any light on any issue” or serve to enlighten the jury on any issue of fact, but served only to arouse passion *455and prejudice. The Court did observe in the Kiefer case at page 114:
“We recognize that photographs of a corpse are admissible in evidence even though they portray a gruesome spectacle and may arouse passion and resentment against the defendant in the minds of the jury, but such photographs must be material and relevant and tend to prove or disprove some material fact in issue.”
In the case at bar there was evidence that Stewart with the cooperation of the appellant planned to murder the victim and to dismember his body in order to facilitate its removal from the premises. The photograph tends to substantiate this evidence by showing a dismembered human body identified as that of the victim in this case. One could hardly expect such a picture to be other than gruesome. This does not mean that it was inadmissible. Wilson v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 680, 221 N. E. 2d 347, 9 Ind. Dec. 401; Brown v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 161, 247 N. E. 2d 76, 17 Ind. Dec. 296. We hold the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to view the photograph of the remains of the victim.
Appellant next claims the court erred in permitting the appellant to be tried before Stewart was tried. To support this proposition appellant cites Kyser v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 482, 217 N. E. 2d 585, 8 Ind. Dec. 527. We do not interpret the Kyser case as supporting appellant’s contention. It is true this Court stated in that case at page 485:
“In order for the evidence to be sufficient to justify a conviction of an accessory, it must also show the guilt of the principal.”
This does not mean that the principal must first be convicted or enter a plea of guilty before an accessory can be tried. Such an interpretation of the rule would create an absurd situation. Suppose the principal to a murder was killed by authorities during apprehension or died from any cause before his known accessory could be brought *456to trial. Appellant’s interpretation would mean that the accessory could never be tried for the crime. We interpret the Kyser case and all cases of like import to require that the State has the burden to show the guilt of the principal beyond a reasonable doubt as part of its case in a conviction of the accessory. This was certainly done in the case at bar. The fact that Stewart had not yet been tried when the appellant was tried did not prevent her trial and conviction.
Appellant next claims that State’s Instruction No. 1 misled the jury. State’s Instruction No. 1 reads as follows:
“You are further instructed that to actively countenance and support the doing of a criminal act by another is_ to encourage it, within the meaning of the aiding and abetting statute just read to you; and a person encouraging the commission of a felony is guilty as a principal and subject to the same prosecution and conviction as the principal.”
to which the appellant made the following objection:
“Defendant objects to State’s tendered Instruction No. One because the accessory statute, Burns’ sec. 9-102 requires an active participation in the crime and the countenancing of a criminal act does not suffice under the Statute.
“(2) the instruction states that encouragement comes under aiding and abetting, which would make the accused a principal in the second degree. Whereas, encouragement is one of the acts which can make an accused an accessory before the fact.
“(3) If the instruction fails to define encourage or encouraging as required by the rule of ejusdem generis under which encourage must require the same guilty of active participation as the words, ‘aid, abet, counsel, hire, command or procure.’ ”
We see no merit to appellant’s objection. This Court has stated:
“* * * While it is true that the mere presence of a person at the scene of a crime is insufficient to constitute him a principal therein, in the absence of anything in his conduct showing a design to encourage, incite, aid, abet or assist in the crime, the trier of the facts may consider *457failure of such person to oppose the commission of the crime in connection with other circumstances and conclude therefrom that he assented to the commission of the crime, lent his countenance and approval thereto and thereby aided and abetted it.” Mobley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 335, 344, 85 N. E. 2d 489.
We hold the instruction is, therefore, correct, and the trial court did not err in reading it to the jury.
Appellant next alleges that the trial court erred in reading State’s Instruction No. 3 to the jury which instruction reads as follows:
“The presence of one at the scene of a commission of a crime and companionship with another engaged therein, and a course of .conduct before and after the offense, are circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such person aided and abetted the commission of such crime.”
The appellant made the following objection to the giving of this instruction:
“Defendant objects to State’s tendered instruction #3 (1) because it invades the province of the jury. (2) it highlights certain circumstances without listing all the circumstances which the jury may consider in determining whether a person aided and abetted in the commission of a crime. (3) The instruction concerns ‘the presence of one at the scene of a commission of a crime and companionship with another therein when the rule can only apply to presence and companionship with the principle in the first degree.’ ”
We see no merit in the appellant’s objection to this instruction. The instruction is complete in itself and does not inform the jury that they can merely rely upon the presence and companionship of the aider and abetter but also conjunctively instructs that they consider the course of conduct before and after the offense. Taken in its entirety the instruction is proper, and we cannot see how it could mislead the jury in any way. Mobley v. State, supra.
The trial court is, therefore, affirmed.
*458Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and DeBruler, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.