dissenting in part:
I join in the majority opinion except for the last five paragraphs. In my view, a six-month suspension is too short because it allows respondents to resume the practice of law as soon as the six months have passed. I would impose a suspension of a year and a day, thereby requiring respondents to demonstrate affirmatively, by clear and convincing evidence, their fitness for readmission to the bar after their suspension has run its course. See generally In re Harrison, 511 A.2d 16 (D.C.1986); In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215 (D.C.1985).1
Under our Rules Governing the Bar, an attorney suspended for one year or less is automatically reinstated to full membership in the bar as soon as the suspension period expires. D.C.Bar R. XI, § 21(3). An attorney suspended for more than a year, however, must apply for reinstatement, D.C.Bar R. XI, § 21(5), and “must demonstrate to this court, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she meets the qualifications for reinstatement which are set forth in the rule.” In re Round-tree, supra, 503 A.2d at 1217 n. 6. Thus our choice of a sanction determines whether a suspended attorney must bear the burden of proving that he or she is fit to resume the practice of law after suspension.
I would place that burden on Messrs. Reback and Parsons. The majority states, and I totally agree, that “[hjonesty is basic to the practice of law.” Ante at 231 (citation omitted). The record in this case establishes that the respondents committed four separate acts of dishonesty. First, they falsely signed Mrs. Lewis’ name to the second complaint. Second, they falsely procured the notarization of that complaint, which means that either or both of them must have represented to a notary that Mrs. Lewis’ purported signature was genuine. Third, they filed the second complaint with the court, thereby “taintfing] the decision-making process with deception.” In *235re Reback, 487 A.2d 235, 239 (D.C.1985).2 Fourth, they concealed from their client what they had done, which was itself a misrepresentation.3 This series of dishonest acts convinces me that, at the very least, these respondents should be obliged to prove affirmatively that they are willing and able to practice law with absolute honesty. Contrition and remorse are not enough to meet this burden; what is required is a basic change in behavior. I would not allow Reback and Parsons to resume the practice of law until they demonstrate that such a change has taken place.
I repeat what I said when this case was before the division:
Because this is a case of first impression, the sanction we impose here will be the standard for future cases. I think the court must be especially firm in letting the bar know that conduct such as that which these two attorneys engaged in will not be tolerated under any circumstances.
In re Reback, supra, 487 A.2d at 243 (concurring opinion). My view of the case has not changed. In my judgment, the facts of this case dictate a suspension of both respondents for a long enough period to require them to demonstrate their fitness to practice law: a year and a day. “Were it not for respondents’ unblemished records, I would probably vote to suspend them for an even longer period.” Id.
. I also reject the implication in footnote 5 of the majority opinion that, in deciding what sanction to impose, we may consider whether respondents’ client suffered any "substantive harm” as a result of their misconduct. Respondents’ actions were affirmatively and grossly prejudicial to the administration of justice, and on that basis alone they warrant severe sanctions. The fact that Mrs. Lewis was not injured is a lucky break for her, but it does not lessen the gravity of respondents’ breaches of the disciplinary code, nor should it serve to mitigate the penalty for those breaches.
. This quotation is taken from part I of the division opinion, which the en banc court has now adopted as its own. Ante at 229.
. "Concealment or suppression of a material fact is as fraudulent as a positive direct misrepresentation." Andolsun v. Berlitz Schook of Languages of America, Inc., 196 A.2d 926, 927 (D.C.1964) (citation omitted).