On appeal the defendant contends that (1) the trial court should have allowed his plea of guilty to be withdrawn since he thought that under the plea agreement he would have been eligible for parole in two years, whereas he claims he subsequently discovered he would not be eligible for parole until he had served at least four years of his twenty-five year sentence; (2) he had a constitutional right to be present in chambers while his plea agreement was discussed with the trial judge; and (3) this court should invoke its power to review sentences and to remand for resentencing or modification of sentence.
Plea agreement.
The trial court assumed, arguendo, that the defendant did not know when he would be eligible for parole when he entered his plea and then found that this was not prejudicial. However, the question is not one of prejudice to the defendant, but whether there is manifest injustice in allowing the plea of guilty to stand. In State v. Reppin (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 377, 385, 151 N. W. 2d 9, this court adopted the manifest injustice test which allows a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty if he can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that his plea was made under any of the following situations:
“American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice — Pleas of Guilty (Tentative Draft, February, 1967), Part II, pp. 9, 10:
*465“ ‘Part II. Withdrawal of the plea.
“ '2.1 Pleas withdrawal.
a i
“ ‘ (ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever the defendant proves that:
“ ‘(1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by constitution, statute, or rule;
“ ‘ (2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant or a person authorized to so act in his behalf;
“ ‘(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge or that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; or
“ ‘ (4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose these concessions as promised in the plea agreement. . . .’ ” (Footnote 2, p. 385)
“We expressly pointed out in Reppin that these situations were not exclusive and other facts could constitute a manifest injustice which would require the granting of the withdrawal of the plea of guilty.” Brisk v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 584, 587, 172 N. W. 2d 199.
The defendant argues that the facts in this case come under standards 2 and 4 in Reppin. However, as to standard 2, from an examination of the record, it is clear that the plea was entered and ratified by the defendant in open court at a time when he was represented by counsel. The plea was voluntary and the trial court, in considerable detail, inquired about the defendant’s knowledge of the charges and the possible sentences that could be imposed. The parties stipulated that the testimony taken at the preliminary examination could be made a part of the record in the case before the trial judge.
As to standard 4 in Reppin, there is no claim that the defendant did not receive the charge or the sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement. The record discloses that the prosecuting attorney fully stated the details of the plea agreement in open court in the *466presence of the defendant and his counsel and again the trial court fully interrogated the defendant as to his understanding of the agreement. At this point we observe, with deference to the trial judge, that this appeal probably would have been unnecessary had a different procedure been used at the time the pleas were accepted. The information filed November 26, 1968, charged the defendant with first-degree murder. After a series of conferences between defendant’s counsel and the prosecutor, a plea agreement resulted whereby the defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and two counts of aggravated battery. At the time the pleas were accepted on December 17, 1968, the prosecutor made his recommendation to the trial court in accordance with the plea agreement. Without being specific as to the details of defendant’s understanding of the agreement, the trial judge inquired in a general way of the defendant as to whether he had conferred with his counsel and as to his understanding of the plea agreement. The defendant replied affirmatively to each of the inquiries so directed to him.1 Sometime later, after sentencing and while defendant was in the institution, he took the position that it was his understanding he would be eligible for parole in two years, when in fact he would not be eligible for parole for four years. This necessitated appointment of counsel for postconviction proceedings. On defendant’s motion to withdraw his pleas, his trial counsel testified at considerable length and his testimony includes the following:
“A. I told him that we have reached the agreement, if that’s what you call it, that he be sentenced to 15 years on second degree and that he would be sentenced to five years each on the two counts of aggravated assault. I told him that his eligibility for parole as I believed it *467to be would be — and what I got from this conference— would be two years on the second degree murder and an additional year for each one of the other. Now, he did somewhat- — I don’t know whether to use the word, ‘rebel’ or object to that. And I further explained to him. I said, ‘Bill, it’s the best we can do.’ And I said, ‘A person is not only dead, but there is two that were wounded. And you can’t expect to get out on the murder charge in two years anyway.’ And he let me know his acceptance of it.”
From our examination of the entire record, we conclude that the defendant has not met his burden of establishing a manifest injustice.
In this opinion we have not considered the possible application of the requirements of Federal Rule 11 for the reason that its application is prospective only. Ernst v. State (1969), 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N. W. 2d 713.
Conference in chambers.
In addition to the conferences between defendant’s counsel and the prosecutor in regard to the plea agreement, at least two conferences were held in chambers. The defendant contends that his failure to be present at the conferences in chambers was violative of his constitutional rights.
In Ramer v. State (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 79, 84-86, 161 N. W. 2d 209, this court stated:
“The question here is not waiver but whether the defendant has a right to attend a conference in chambers and admits of no categorical ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. A conference in chambers might well constitute part of the trial depending upon what matters are discussed or passed upon. Likewise, such a conference might not be a part of the trial in the sense of one’s constitutional right to be present. See Annot. 85 A. L. R. 2d 1111. When a conference in chambers deals solely with a question of law or preliminary matters of procedure, it has been held not to constitute a part of the trial in the constitutional sense. . . .
*468 U
“We think, however, that conferences of the court and attorneys outside the presence of the accused should be rarely held during the trial and the trial judge should be solicitous in allowing the defendant to be present at a conference in chambers when he requests it. There is always a risk of the conference exceeding a nonconstitu-tional scope or causing misunderstanding.”
In this case the defendant had the benefit of counsel during the entry of his plea and at the sentencing. See State v. Strickland (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N. W. 2d 295. While the practice followed in this case is not commended, such conferences cannot be considered part of any trial in the sense of one’s constitutional right to be present when acquiescence to the plea agreement must be made in court and recorded, as was done in this case.
We are of the opinion that in this case no error was committed by the trial court in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty.
Review of sentence.
Finally, defendant requests that this court invoke its power to review sentences and to remand for resentenc-ing or modification of sentence. However, there is no showing of any abuse of discretion by the trial court and this case is far from the “unusual cases” in which that power should be employed. Cheney v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 454, 171 N. W. 2d 339, 174 N. W. 2d 1; State v. Tuttle (1963), 21 Wis. 2d 147, 124 N. W. 2d 9.
By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed.
There is no question raised on appeal as to the role of the trial court in the plea agreement process. See State v. Wolfe (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 478, 176 N. W. 2d 216, 221.