Wayne County Civil Service Commission v. Wayne County Board of Supervisors

*301Levin, J.,

{concurring). I am in almost complete agreement with my colleagues. It has not been demonstrated that the objectives and language of Act 3791 (public employee collective bargaining) cannot be reconciled with the objectives and language of Act 3702 (merit system of civil service).

This case comes to us upon appeal from a declaratory judgment; the relevant facts have not been fully developed.

Although the record is incomplete, it is apparent that the road commission has the authority to hire,3 promote and dismiss road commission employees and to control the method by which they perform their work;4 and, as stated in the opinion of the *302«aO'dit, these are generally regarded as critical indicia of aa bmployer-employee relationship. Undoubtedly, there are other major units of county .'gov'einment like the road commission which exer<etee employer functions.

The board of supervisors is willing to Undertake the employer’s negotiating responsibility Us to all county employees.5 The road OOmmission is willing to assume that responsibility as to road commission employees. Although the position of the board of supervisors has fluctuated during the course of this litigation, the board at one time in this litigation recognized that the true employer of road commission employees is the road commission.

The principal' issues to be negotiated in labor-management collective bargaining are usually economic, and even so-called noneconomic issues are generally tinged with an economic cost to the employer and an economic value to the employee. The civil service commission simply does not have the power to authorize the disbursement of county or road commission funds, nor does it have the responsibility of running the units of county government where civil service employees work. Understandably, those who have those powers and responsibilities think that it is their duty to undertake the public employer’s collective bargaining respon*303sibility. The employing unit is bound to be more conversant than the civil service commission with the day-to-day problems that must be resolved to maintain a productive employment relationship. Meaningful collective bargaining cannot occur unless there is a unity of responsibility and authority at the employer end of the bargaining table.6

True, the Wayne County Civil Service Commission has the power under Act 370 to “provide by regulation for the hours and conditions of service, for the length and period of vacations, and for the regulation of sick leaves,”7 and to classify and standardize positions and salaries in the county civil service.8 The superimposition of such regulations does not, however, eliminate the employer-employee relationship existent between the employing unit and its employees, nor does it change the essence of that relationship. The employing unit remains the employer, albeit an employer with an obligation to conform to the lawful regulations of the civil service commission regarding matters within its “regulatory” control.

The provisions of Act 370 (merit system of civil service) are to be construed in the light of its declared purpose:

“The purpose of this act is to guarantee to all citizens a fair and equal opportunity for public service; to establish conditions of service which will attract officers and employees of character and capacity, and to increase the efficiency of the county governmental departments, commissions, boards and *304agencies, by the improvement of methods of personnel administration.”9

The civil service commission’s regulatory power concerning hours, conditions of service, vacations and sick leaves and its power to classify and standardize positions and salaries, which are required to be “uniform for like service in each grade,”10 enables the commission to harmonize disparities between like positions. "A civil service career is, thereby, made more attractive and more competitive with private employment opportunities.

The power of the civil service commission to classify and standardize positions and salaries does not, however, confer upon the commission the authority to fix or limit salaries ;11 nor does the power to “provide by regulation” as to hours and conditions of service, vacations, and sick leaves give the commission authority to require hours and conditions of service and vacation and sick leave benefits less liberal than those which a major unit of county government having the hiring, supervisory, disciplinary and budgetary responsibility is willing to provide.

*305If a contract that has or shall be negotiated is deemed by the civil service commission to conflict with the merit system objectives of Act 370 and the exercise by the civil service commission of its powers,12 then a far clearer issue will be posed for judicial consideration than the somewhat nebulous question we are being asked to resolve in this declaratory judgment action.

To the extent that the Wayne County Labor Relations Board constitutes a vehicle through which all concerned units, departments and agencies of county government may meet with-employee representatives, it may be a useful acl hoc device to implement and reconcile the purposes and objectives of *306the two acts. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that Wayne is the only county with countywide civil service; no doubt the legislature intended that civil service employees of this most populous county should enjoy the same right to meaningful collective bargaining as do other public employees.13

I am in agreement with my colleagues that, to the extent it may have been sought by the creation of the Wayne County Labor Relations Board to supersede the functions of the civil service commission or the road commission or the board of supervisors, it would violate the statutes which confer upon them their respective powers and responsibilities.

PA 1965, No 379 (MCLA § 423.201 et seq. [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.455(1) et seq.]).

PA 1941, No 370 (MCLA § 38.401 et seq. [Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 5.1191(1), et seg.]).

While the civil service commission classifies positions and holds competitive examinations and keeps lists of eligible persons, it does not actually hire employees. This is done by the operating unit or department of county government.

Cf. Labor Mediation Board v. Jackson County Road Commissioners (1962), 365 Mich 645. See, also, PA 1968, No 211 (MCLA 1969 Cum Supp § 224.10a [Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp §9.110(1)]).

It was stipulated between the parties in this action that “3. Prior to Act 370, the road commission had the power to hire, fire, promote, dismiss, discipline and pay its employees under the jurisdiction of the road fund without the approval of any other county agency;

“2. It was originally agreed between the civil service commission, the road commission and the board of supervisors, that the original pay plan as adopted by the civil service commission established under Act 370 of 1941, would be submitted to the board of supervisors and the road commission for their respective approval, and all amendments have likewise been approved by all parties;
“3. The road commission has the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, discipline and pay its employees performing road work, subject to Act 370 of 1941, as amended, sinee its adoption in 3942;
“4. The road commission is the appropriating body for road commission employees performing road work and it makes its payroll and withholds income taxes, health and accident insurance, life insurance, and pays such to the various agencies, companies, subject to Act 370 of 1941, as amended, since its adoption in 1942;
“5. The road commission, the eivil service commission and the board of supervisors, agree on the regulations governing the salary plan.”

*302Clearly the “agreements” referred to in the foregoing stipulation, entered into by the eivil service and road commissions and the board of supervisors after the passage of Aet 370, are now to be regarded at the most as some evidence of the correct construction of the statutes under which they operate; such agreements do not supersede the governing statutes.

The Board of Supervisors of Wayne county is statutorily empowered “to prescribe and fix the salaries and compensation of all employees * * * where not fixed by law”; additionally, it has “the care and management of the property and business of the county in all eases where no other provisions shall be made.” MCLA §46.11 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp §5.331). See, also, Const 1963, Art 7, § 9.

Under § 13 of Aet 379 (MCLA § 423.213 [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.455(13)]) the State Labor Mediation Board determines the unit of employees appropriate for the purposes of eolleetive bargaining.

Section 9 of PA 1941, No 370 (MCLA § 38.409 [Slat Ann 1961 Rev § 5.1191(9)]).

Section 12 of PA 1941, No 370 (MCLA § 38.412 [Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp §5.1191(12)]).

MCLA §38.401 (Stat Ann 1961 Eev §5.1191(1)).

Seetion 12 of PA 1941, No 370 (MCLA § 38.412 [Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp §5.1191(12)]).

In Bischoff v. County of Wayne (1948), 320 Mich 376, 392, 393, the plaintiff, Bisehoff, was chief deputy circuit court clerk of Wayne County and executive secretary of the Wayne County Eoad Commission. The principal issue was whether he should be classified executive II or clerk IV. There was an additional issue arising from the road commission’s recommendation that it pay Bischoff $1,200 a year for his part-time services. This was $200 more than tlie amount ($1,000) which the civil service commission thought proper; the civil service commission’s determination was sustained by the Supreme Court. The language of the Court, which described the commission’s action as “fixing plaintiff’s classification or his compensation,” was entirely appropriate on the facts there presented of a single part-time employee. This opinion of the Court need not be read as recognizing in the civil service commission the power to prevent general increases in compensation or benefits which a major unit of county government, like the road commission, is willing to provide.

In one of its briefs the eivil service commission recognizes that its rules and regulations and its official salary- plan eould be conformed to collective bargaining agreements that may be negotiated. While this was said in support of the eivil service commission's claim that it can negotiate as the employer of all eounty eivil service employees, no reason appears why the rules and regulations and official salary plan eould not be conformed to collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the board of supervisors or the road commission or other units of eounty government provided the provisions of sueh agreements are consistent with the objectives of a merit system of eivil service.

That the commission recognizes an obligation to accommodate its practices to the requirements of meaningful collective bargaining appears from the following statement in one of its briefs:

“The requirement of uniform salaries does not specify that they shall be uniform throughout the County service. Certainly, this would be desirable, and ha« been practiced by the commission in order to be fair to all employees no matter in which department employed. But, there is no restriction that sueh uniformity eannot be maintained within the appropriate bargaining units. It is clearly within the power of the commission to maintain such uniformity to the extent that it is possible between bargaining units, and the fact that it is so obligated by law, will strongly tend to beep some uniformity for all eounty employees.'' (Emphasis by the eivil service commission.)

Similarly, the grievance procedure set out in § 1C of PA 1941, No 370 (MCLA § 38.416 [Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 5.1191(16)]), under which a civil service employee may appeal to the eivil service commission an order of removal, suspension or reduction, is not necessarily in conflict with — it may appear to be merely supplementary of — any negotiated grievance procedure.

Constructively approached by all parties, the taslc of reconciling and implementing the objectives of both acts may very well be achieved.

PA 1941, No 370, as amended, applies only in counties having a population of 1,000,000 or more. MCLA § 38.402 (Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 5.1191 [2]).