(dissenting). I respectfully disagree. I would reverse. The trial court entered very extensive findings of fact in this case. The majority of the court state that on appeal these findings will not be overturned by this court unless they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Insofar as these findings are of adjudicative facts, I agree that this is the standard of review to be used. However, insofar as these findings by the trial court concern matters of legislative choice, then that court, as well as this court on review, must examine the record to ascertain whether the legislative choice is without rational basis.1
*394These findings are, in my opinion, matters of legislative choice. In the prior City of Beloit Case we said:
“. . . What is ‘desirable’ or ‘advisable’ or ‘ought to be’ is a question of policy, not a question of fact. What is ‘necessary’ or what is ‘in the best interest’ is not a fact and its determination by the judiciary is an exercise of legislative power when each involves political considerations and reasons why there should or should not be an annexation. ...” 2
The trial court here itself recognized the difficulty in making judicial determinations of matters largely within the sphere of legislative choice when it said:
“Now it isn’t for me to say what the annexation law of this state should be, but I will say this into the record that this trial has convinced me that a problem of this kind should not be solved by courts. The issues in this case so far as they pertain to the sufficiency of the petitions, the question of whether or not any or either of the parties technically followed the procedural statutes involved, certainly those are good legal questions. But when you start having a judge decide whether or not a proposed annexation includes land which is reasonably useful and adaptable to the uses and needs of the city of Beloit or any other city you are asking that judge to make not a judicial determination but a political and a legislative determination and one in which I find it very difficult to apply legal rules. Some other body should do this, not courts.”
Nevertheless, here the trial court specifically found that the city has no present nor reasonably foreseeable future need for any additional land. The majority affirm this finding as not being against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.3
*395It would seem to be almost impossible to distinguish between a determination of what is necessary as being an exercise of legislative power and not a factual determination, and a determination of no reasonable need which, according to the majority, is a factual determination not to be overturned on review unless against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. This is a matter of legislative choice and, therefore, the trial court’s and this court’s function is merely to check into the facts to see if there is any rational basis. I would find that there is a rational basis and thus confirm the annexation.
If this analysis is rejected and the application of the so-called rule of reason is insisted upon, I would limit its effectiveness to annexations which are so outrageous and outlandish as to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary and capricious.4 In determining this, this court should be free to apply, on its own, the rule of reason to determine the reasonableness of the proposed annexation.5 A determination by a trial court that a proposed annexation does or does not violate the rule of reason is, in my opinion, a conclusion of law by that court. In such a situation this court is free to accept or reject such conclusion irrespective of any standard ostensibly limiting our scope of review. In other words, this court can make its own conclusions of law from the adjudicative facts as found by the trial court which are not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.
The proposed annexation here does not violate the rule of reason. It is not a shoestring,6 hole in the dough*396nut,7 or the wholly unneeded attempted annexation of a big, largely undeveloped community to a tiny one.8 It is not arbitrary or capricious.9 Thus, the annexation should not be voided.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Heffernan joins in this dissent.
See Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Tomah (1966), 30 Wis. 2d 547, 141 N. W. 2d 299, citing South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers (1938), 303 U. S. 177, 191, 58 Sup. Ct. 510, 82 L. Ed. 734.
In re City of Beloit (1968), 37 Wis. 2d 637, 644, 155 N. W. 2d 633. See also: In re Incorporation of Village of North Milwaukee (1896), 93 Wis. 616, 67 N. W. 1033.
See Town of Menasha v. City of Menasha (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 719, 168 N. W. 2d 161.
See Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac (1964), 22 Wis. 2d 533, 126 N. W. 2d 201.
Cf. Town of Brookfield v. City of Brookfield (1957), 274 Wis. 638, 80 N. W. 2d 800.
Mt. Pleasant v. Racine (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 41, 127 N. W. 2d 757.
Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, supra, footnote 4.
Elmwood Park v. Racine (1966), 29 Wis. 2d 400, 139 N. W. 2d 66.
Town of Brookfield v. City of Brookfield, supra, footnote 5.